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gentlemen who left no idea unchallenged and every aspiration encouraged, Fabian Neuner and 
Hakeem Jefferson. In the development of this dissertation, special thanks go to Skip Lupia for 
honing my research approach to studying Twitter and to my RA Matthew Stewart for setting me 
up to be a Twitter data vacuum. And then there is my perfect committee. Gratitude goes to Ceren 
Budak for forcing me to be precise in my assumptions and alerting me to inferential traps (a role 
I usually like to play). Stuart Soroka provided invaluable, careful feedback to multiple drafts 
making the work far more coherent and stronger than I could have hoped. Scott Page, whose 
mind and encouragement could inspire a thousand dissertations, is responsible for propelling my 
work in modelling diffusion on social networks which laid the foundation of this dissertation. 
And finally to my advisor. I hit the jackpot in getting Nicholas Valentino as my mentor and 
guide. Nick is the person to go to when your thoughts are hazy or you are struggling with a 
research design; his patience and sharp mind will guarantee you are left with clarity and direction 
every time. This work is as much a product of Nick's endless cajoling, critiquing, enthusiasm and 
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encouragement as it is mine. To him I owe the biggest debt, for making my ten-year old dream 
come true.  
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Social media sites are widely believed to solidify our echo chambers by sorting the political 
information liberal and conservative Americans are exposed to, leaving partisans and ideologues 
in information bubbles where their beliefs are confirmed and their views go uncontested. This 
dissertation challenges that common understanding of information polarization on social media 
and instead proposes that social media polarizes not by exposing users to congruent information 
but rather to extreme information. In examining the potential mechanisms of information sorting 
on social media – the flow of information in homophilous networks and users’ choices in who 
they connect to and what to share – I find that social media sites are poorly equipped to filter out 
challenging information. Indeed, they may be better designed to expose users to more 
ideologically diverse information than those users encounter on other media on and offline. 
Rather than solidify our echo chambers, I propose that social media sites polarize our 
information environments by amplifying the prevalence of what I term “extreme” news - news 
that is ideologically dogmatic, emotionally-evocative and tribal in nature. Like “information 
sorting” and the creation of echo chambers, “information extreming” can have damaging 
consequences for civil society and democracy; the exposure to extreme information from both 
sides of the political spectrum leaves partisans and ideologues more certain in their correctness 
and in the illegitimacy of their political opponents. In the second part of the dissertation I 
examine one of the levers of information polarization – social media users’ curation biases – and 
present a theoretical framework to explain users’ motivations for sharing confirming and extreme 
information. That framework proposes that users are motivated to both signal solidarity with 
their political groups and, in times of threat, to rally against outgroups. Online experimental tests 
provide confirmation for elements of the framework, but much work is left to be done to 





On the morning of November 9th, 2016, liberal America woke up both defeated and confused: 
defeated after having lost a hard-fought election battle; confused by the fact that half of their 
fellow Americans had voted for a man they believed to be indisputably unfit for office. 
In the face of this bewildering result, liberals began to publicly wonder if they were dangerously 
out of touch. Perhaps they were living in bubbles that were blind to the lives of and views of 
large swaths of America? A Michael Moore Facebook post that chastised his followers to “stop 
saying they are ‘stunned’ and ‘shocked’” went viral: “What you mean to say is that you were in a 
bubble and weren’t paying attention to your fellow Americans and their despair” (Moore, 2016). 
Liberal elites asked what they should do to get out of their ideologically homogenous worlds. A 
New York Times op-ed “Life Outside the Liberal Bubble” (Vance, 2016), published the day after 
the election, provided a window into the mindsets of conservative working-class whites, and 
sales of the author’s book, Hillbilly Elegy, shot up soon after - as did Google searches for “liberal 
bubble” (Google Trends). Saturday Night Live didn’t miss the opportunity to have fun with their 
audience’s newly found liberal angst, advertising apartments in “The Bubble”: a new 
development where residents would find “a community of like-minded free thinkers....and no 
one else” (SNL, 2016). 
Liberals also found a culprit for their cozy bubbles: social media. By giving Americans a place to 
connect and share information, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter were blamed for 
placing ideologues in information chambers where only their views are echoed back to them. So 
clear was social media’s role that if you were to search “echo chambers” in 2016, the top links 
Google would serve up included “The reason your feed became an echo chamber” (NPR Staff, 
2016), “Confirmed: Echo chambers exist on social media” (Emba, 2016) and “Blame the echo 
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chamber on Facebook: But blame yourself too” (Hosanakar, 2016). (The last, at least, 
acknowledged social media was not solely responsible.)1 
Bubble making was not the only crime pinned on social media; social media sites were also 
faulted for distorting the 2016 election campaign by promoting “fake news.” A cottage industry 
of sites had sprouted up in during the election, the owners of which weren’t necessarily in it for 
political reasons (a few ran both liberal and conservative sites) but had become masters of 
fabricating stories ripe for the clicking. Trump supporters were fed headlines such as “Pope 
Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President” while Democrats could feast on 
“Rupaul Claims Trump Touched Him Inappropriately in the 1990s.” And click they did. In the 
months before the election the top twenty fake news stories – which include the two above - had 
more “engagements” (likes, comments, shares) on Facebook than the top news stories from 
legitimate news sites (Silverman, 2016).2 
While fake news made political headlines in 2016, the popularity of fabricated stories was part of 
a broader – though less publicly discussed - phenomenon on social media; the promotion of news 
that aims to push our partisan and ideological buttons. A few public thinkers took note. Jonathan 
Haidt warned of social media’s capacity to expose users to a “constant stream of unbelievable 
outrages” (Haidt, 2016). Barack Obama similarly cautioned about social media’s ability to 
spread information that paints “the opposition in wildly negative light without rebuttal” 
(Remnick, 2016). But by and large the spread of what I call “extreme” information – information 
that is ideologically dogmatic, emotional and tribal – has received less attention than echo 
chambers. Yet, as I will argue in this dissertation, the “extreming” of content in our social media 
feeds should cause us equal – if not greater – concern. 
 
1 Liberals are not alone in being in information bubbles; as will be discussed later in this introduction, left and right 
have increasingly been able to shield themselves in echo chambers. In 2016, however, few conservatives were 
publicly decrying those bubbles. 
2 Although 2016 certainly saw a surge in fake news, the extent to which fake news stories were viewed - let alone 
affected the election - is still an open question. One early study (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), for example, suggests 
that the average American only saw 1 or 2 fake news stories during the election cycle. 
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The two phenomena - information bubbles and information extreming – both polarize our 
information environments, but in different ways. Information bubbles sort political information 
between liberals and conservatives, leaving left and right in distinct information worlds, where 
their prior beliefs are left unchallenged and individuals are never forced to engage with those 
who disagree. Because the primary mechanism here is the ability to sort left from right 
information, I call this phenomenon “information sorting” – yet I will often use the terms “echo 
chamber” and “information bubble” to describe the result. “Information extreming,” by contrast, 
exposes individuals to shocking and incendiary information. It polarizes by presenting 
information that represents the most strident and tribal views of each political side; rather than 
making us complacent with a general liberal or conservative point of view, exposure to extreme 
information makes us more dogged in our beliefs, including the conviction that our political 
opponents are unbalanced, unlikable, and untrustworthy.  
This dissertation is an investigation of both phenomena – which I explore on two levels. First I 
look at social network sites as a whole, asking whether they do, in fact, exacerbate information 
sorting and information extreming. I then examine the psychology of social media users, to 
explain what may drive their choices to share political information that is congruent or extreme. 
I offer an answer to the first question by unpacking the mechanics of social media to see if and 
how it has the capacity to polarize our information environments. While it may seem self-evident 
that social media is indeed designed to amplify echo chambers, I question that premise. Social 
networks are emergent systems and, as such, may not behave as our intuitions would expect. 
Social media distributes information through webs of individuals, each of whom make 
independent decisions about whom to connect to and what information to share or withhold. 
Those individual decisions, in turn, result in distribution patterns that are difficult to predict by 
using intuition or simple algorithmic models. To understand social media’s capacity to polarize 
information, it is necessary to examine individuals’ decisions about whom to connect to and 
what to share, but also to grasp how those micro decisions result in macro patterns of 
information distribution.  
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What I find challenges much of the common wisdom about social media. Social media sites do 
polarize our information environments, but not by sorting us into information bubbles. In fact, 
social media has the potential to expose us to a wider diversity of views and information than we 
would otherwise see in our daily lives. But the potential to break down echo chambers is not 
necessarily news to cheer, because while exposing us to information from our political opponents 
social media is well tuned to make sure the challenging information we see is extreme. The 
dynamics of what we share coupled with how we connect on social media leads to the 
amplification of extreme news – from left and right. Our bubbles are punctured with information 
from the other side on social media, but what seeps through is the most incendiary information – 
emotional, dogmatic and tribal. That is troubling for democracy. 
While the first part of this dissertation looks at the global mechanisms of sorting and extreming, 
in Part II I zero in on one of those mechanisms – users’ propensity to share news stories that 
reflect their views and are extreme in nature – to try to understand what drives those behaviors. I 
propose a theory of political information sharing founded on work in the disciplines of Social 
and Political Psychology, Anthropology, Sociology and Communications. That theory posits that 
social media users are motivated by two goals - to project an image of themselves to their 
political group that secures their inclusion and status in that group, and to rally their political 
groups during moments of perceived threat. In a series of experimental studies, I discover 
preliminary evidence that those goals will drive users to post news that is both consonant with 
their political views and that have the hallmarks of extreme news – dogmatism, emotional 
arousal, and tribalism. 
Why Care about Information Sorting and Extreming 
Democratic theorists and political psychologists give us several reasons to be concerned about 
the negative impacts on civic society of both information sorting and of information extreming.  
By inhibiting the exchange of ideas and viewpoints across political groups, echo chambers stunt 
the growth of knowledge, stymie political compromise and even threaten the legitimacy of 
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democracy itself. Societies thrive when individuals are exposed to a broad array of perspectives 
(Page, 2008). No individual or group has a monopoly on truth, but as J.S. Mill first argued 
societies are able to move toward that goal via through the “collision of adverse opinions” (Mill, 
1869). A public marketplace of ideas, to use Holmes’ famous phrase (Abrams v. US, 1919), not 
only results in greater knowledge but is essential to a functioning democracy. When competing 
groups are not exposed to broad sets of information and form distinct perceptions of “truth,” it is 
difficult to find common ground and reach compromise (Sunstein, 2009). Potentially more 
destabilizing to civic society, when groups are unable to share their viewpoints the legitimacy of 
a democracy is threatened. Not all political groups can be electoral winners, but by exposing 
citizens to the reasons behind all parties’ preferences, public debate can legitimize those winners 
- and, by extension, legitimize our democratic institutions (Manin, 1987). Echo chambers, by 
contrast, not only cocoon us from (at least a portion of) the truth, but also prevent us from 
hearing our opponents’ reasoning and so leave us to imagine they are unreasonable or even 
dangerous.  
Work in political psychology backs much of this normative view of information sorting. Even 
with the many cognitive and motivated biases known to prevent accurate processing of political 
information (Kunda, 1990; Lord et al, 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006), citizens have at least some 
capacity to learn about which parties, candidates and policies best represent their preferences 
when they are exposed to information (Barabas & Jerit, 2009; Lupia, 1994; Redlawsk et al, 
2010). Echo chambers, by narrowing our access to information, limit our ability to act as 
knowledgeable voters. Likewise in line with deliberative theorists’ claims, exposure to opposing 
views can promote tolerance for those with whom we disagree (Ben-Nun Bloom & Levitan, 
2011; Erisen & Erisen, 2012; Mutz, 2002b; Mutz & Mondak, 2006) and even dampen hostility 
towards our political opponents (Garrett et al, 2014; Parsons, 2010). 
Yet when those views are extreme as I define the term – dogmatic, emotion-laden and tribal - the 
outcomes of information exchange can create their own set of problems for civic society. Instead 
of promoting learning and awareness, exposure to the extreme versions of the views of our 
political opponents may further entrench us in our beliefs (Nelson et al, 2011). We may also infer 
that espousers of those extreme views must be morally corrupt or intellectually inferior (Ward et 
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al, 1997), and make the leap to conclude that all of their co-ideologues are likewise not to be 
trusted (Iyengar et al, 2012; Lelkes et al, 2017; Levundusky, 2013). In short, when counter-
ideologues share extreme views, instead of building greater tolerance and awareness between 
political groups, they may nurture distrust and animosity (Bail et al, 2018; Settle, 2016).  
For a democratic society to be successful, then, it is not only important to ensure that ideas and 
beliefs are shared between liberals and conservatives, but that the views expressed are of a nature 
to inspire understanding rather than animus. 
There are arguments, to be fair, that the effects of information sorting and extreme information 
are not all anti-democratic. Echo chambers may make us more certain and dogmatic in our 
beliefs, but such certainty also leads citizens to be engaged in the political process; ambivalence 
and moderation, in contrast, dampens political fervor, making citizens less likely to run to the 
polls, let alone to the next protest (Mutz, 2002b). If extreme information fuels animosity toward 
political opponents, it could similarly energize the electorate and increase political participation. 
Such animosity, moreover, may be warranted and even morally necessary; if it is directed at 
political foes who pose genuine threats to civil society deep animosity and distrust may be what 
are required to defeat those threats. Likewise, civil discourse and the tolerance and understanding 
it hopes to engender may seem like virtues of a democratic society, but civility can also be a 
guise to uphold the status quo and delegitimize the “uncivil” actions of oppressed groups 
(Mendelberg, 2002).  
Those arguments have strong merits and I by no means take the position that all citizens should 
be ever openminded on all topics or that voters should not have strong political views or a zeal 
for defeating their political foes. Healthy democracies need debate, strong political opponents 
and engaged, fired up citizens. A political society in which all citizens are ambivalent and 
apathetic can be as dangerous as one in which all are fixed in their beliefs and ruled by inter-
group animosity. As with all things, a balance is necessary. Strong views motivate action and 
debate, but when they become rigid and dogmatic a society stops learning. Partisan loyalty 
likewise organizes and motivates political participation, but when partisans view each other as 
fundamentally corrupt and beyond redemption, at best politics becomes zero-sum, with every 
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political battle having only big winners and losers. At worst disagreements cannot be resolved 
through non-violent means and democracy breaks down.3 
Information Sorting before Social Media 
While the 2016 election season raised alarms about ideological echo chambers, the phenomenon 
is not new. Information sorting goes back at least to our founding, when many Americans had no 
choice but to live in political bubbles. Our early presses were partisan by design. While some 
news consumers might have been able to get a balanced information diet by, for example, 
purchasing both the Federalists’ and Antifederalists’ papers, presumably many opted for one 
partisan rag or the other, if they were lucky enough to live in an area where they even had a 
choice (Schudson, 1981). The concept of balanced, objective journalism didn’t really take hold 
until the mid-20th century, and in that Golden Era of news there was enough diversity in the 
information environment - from political campaigns to chatty neighbors - to allow liberals and 
conservatives to pick and choose their information diets. In 1944, sociologists Lazarsfeld and 
colleagues quantified that divergence for the first time, observing that only 25% of Democrats 
and Republicans were exposed to proportionately more cross-partisan information than news 
from their own side (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944). Since that seminal work, dozens of studies have 
confirmed that Americans on the left and right live in information worlds that more often than 
not reflect their political views (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Sears & Freedman, 1967). 
The causes of that information divide, however, have not been as easily observed and remain a 
matter of dispute. Lazarsfeld and colleague’s groundbreaking study proposed two explanations 
for why political groups would end up in distinct information environments with little overlap. 
 
3 The idea that partisanship in the US could devolve into physical violence may have seemed far-fetched a couple of 
decades ago, but as signs of affective partisan attachment grow, as does the association between political and racial 
identities (Iyengar et al, 2012; Mason & Wronski, 2018), the future of Democrats and Republicans as Tutsis and 
Hutus or Serbs and Bosnians may not just be dystopian fantasy. 
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For one, voters have “psychological predispositions” and “somehow contrive to select out the 
passing stream of stimuli those by which they are more inclined to be persuaded” (p. 82). That is, 
they “selectively expose” themselves to information that aligns with their views. But what may 
play a larger role than individual inclinations is a voter’s likely existence in an environment that 
“sifts the propaganda” for him (p. 81). A voter need not look for politically aligned information 
to be in a bubble; his environment may create the bubble for him. Conservative rural dwellers, 
for example are more likely to read “farm journals,” which happen to lean Republican. City 
workers, conversely, are more apt to hear talk “from fellow-workers who are pro-labor and pro-
Democratic” (p. 81). The authors also proposed that this congruent information reaches voters 
through a “two-step flow” from “opinion leaders” who first absorb information from the news 
media and political actors and then relay that information in their like-minded communities (p. 
151). 
Lazarsfeld and colleagues presented two puzzles regarding media consumption and social 
networks that remain relevant to our understanding of echo chambers today – and which social 
scientists still struggle to fully disentangle. One is understanding why people tend to surround 
themselves with like-minded others, a phenomenon social scientists call “homophily” 
(McPherson et al, 2001). Scholars know that the reason our friends, neighbors and co-workers do 
such a good job in sifting political information for us is because they, by and large, share our 
political views. What is unknown is exactly why they share our views. We suspect it is not 
primarily because we choose our friends because of their politics (Lazer et al, 2010).4 Three 
other forces, instead, are likely more at play. First, we tend to encounter people who share our 
values and beliefs because we are drawn to the same places and institutions – our church, our 
job, our organic café – that reflect those values and beliefs. To the extent that those preferences 
are associated with political leanings, we will naturally find ourselves surrounded with more co-
ideologues than not. We also tend to like people who are like us - who share our interests, habits, 
and way of thinking. Likewise, because those preferences often correlate with political 
 
4 Although we may choose our mates that way (Huber & Malhotra, 2013). Work in “affective polarization” also 
suggests Americans may increasingly eschew friendships with counter-partisans (Iyengar et al, 2012). 
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preferences, our friends will more often than not be politically aligned with us. Finally, 
homophily is reinforced because we take on the preferences and views of those around us; 
disagreement is uncomfortable and conformity has its benefits (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; 
Lazer et al, 2010; McPherson et al, 2001; Sears & Freedman, 1967).  
The other puzzle, which has been more the focus of political scientists, is the degree to which our 
political information is sorted via our environment or, instead, by our active choices. As pointed 
out by scholars Sears and Freedman (1967), the mere observation that voters consume 
information that aligns with their beliefs (what they call “de facto” selective exposure) does not 
mean they are actively seeking that information (“active” selective exposure).  
At the time of those early works, there was relatively little room for active selective exposure to 
flourish compared to today. Before the 1980s, news consumers would be hard pressed to actively 
insulate themselves from opposing views. The federal “Fairness Doctrine” required that 
broadcasters on radio and TV present both sides of important issues. Although print media had 
no such restrictions, for the most part Americans had (and still have) one local newspaper to 
choose from, and that publication likely took a fairly middle of the road approach so as to not 
alienate portions of its readership (Prior, 2013). In such a media environment, although it would 
be possible to actively build an ideological news bubble, it would require considerable effort; not 
only would a consumer have to tune out all broadcast media, she would need to subscribe to a 
national weekly like The Nation or The National Review - or be lucky enough to live in a large 
enough city that could support multiple newspapers with distinct political viewpoints (Bennet & 
Iyengar, 2008; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955, Schudson, 1981; Sears & Freedman, 1967).5 To the 
extent that information sorting existed in the mid-20th century it was likely due to incidental 
selective exposure, receiving information that trickled through Lazarsfeld’s “opinion leaders.” 
Since the late 1980s, however, media choices have multiplied and diversified – creating an 
environment where active selective exposure can blossom. The Fairness Doctrine was revoked in 
 
5 That is not to say all Americans consumed the same information; depending on where they lived their local paper 
might have a left or right slant.  
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1987, giving broadcasters permission to present only one side of the story. Radio, in particular, 
ran with this option, leading to the rise of Rush Limbaugh and a long menu of other ideological 
(mostly conservative) talk shows. Cable news, although never restricted by broadcast 
regulations, built up large enough audiences to begin diversifying in the 1990’s, birthing Fox and 
MSNBC (though MSNBC took a decade to become a safe space for liberals). The ideological 
fragmentation of radio and cable news would later be dwarfed by the explosion of bloggers and 
news aggregators and sites on the internet. By the early 2000’s, online readers could get all their 
news mediated by Matt Drudge, Markos Moulitsas or countless other partisan online news 
sources and aggregators. Whereas in 1980 it would have taken great effort to build an ideological 
news bubble, 25 years later a conservative could tune in exclusively to Alex Jones, Fox and The 
Drudge Report while a liberal could likewise insulate himself in the cozy world of NPR, 
MSNBC and HuffPo.  
Social commentators took note of the capacity for echo chambers to flourish online. Negroponte 
(1996) called the cozy internet environments we create the “Daily Me,” and Sunstein (2009) 
warned people would use these enclaves to insulate themselves from counter-attitudinal 
messages. And they might not do so purely by choice; as Pariser (2011) suggested in the book 
that gave rise to the term “filter bubble,” online algorithms would further segment our online 
news environment, pushing us into more and more tailored information bubbles. 
Despite these warnings, research only weakly confirms that a fragmented media – on cable, talk 
radio and the internet – allows us to silo ourselves in congenial news environments. It is not even 
clear if consumers actively seek - or “selectively expose” themselves to – politically congruent 
information. Studies do consistently find that in experimental settings, when subjects have a 
choice on what news to consume, ideologues and partisans tend to prefer information that aligns 
with their views, although they don’t show an aversion to uncongenial information and will even 
seek out information counter to their views under certain circumstances (for reviews see Frey, 
1986; Hart et al, 2009). Whether news consumers actively select congruent information outside 
of the social scientist’s lab, however, is harder to examine; again as Sears and Freedman (1967) 
point out, when you observe a liberal reading the New York Times and listening to NPR, it’s 
difficult to say whether a) he has sought out those liberal sources, b) he’s consuming them 
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because that’s what he grew up with and what all his friends consume – or c) he is liberal 
because all he knows are the points of view of New York Times and NPR. 
Stroud (2008), in a rare panel study that attempts to tease out what leads us to be exposed to 
predominantly congruent information, provides some evidence that “active selective exposure” is 
partly responsible. By collecting consumers’ ideological leanings and news preferences over 
time – and during an election season when presumably their interest in political news would rise 
– Stroud’s findings suggest that consumers’ ideological leanings do, in part, drive their 
consumption. Also in line with Daily Me predictions, she found such evidence only when 
looking at consumption of radio, cable and online news; ideology did not have a noticeable effect 
on consumers’ newspaper selection. 
Stroud’s cross-media finding is partly seconded by perhaps the most comprehensive cross-media 
study of selective exposure. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) look at differences between 
consumption patterns of liberals and conservatives across print, television and the internet and 
also compare those divides to how segregated we are in face-to-face interactions. While they find 
that ideologues “isolate” themselves more on cable and the internet than they do when watching 
broadcast news, they also find that consumers are more divided in face-to-face interactions and 
in the national newspapers they read. Perhaps more surprising, consumers are farther apart in 
their choices of which magazines and local news to consume than on what to watch on cable.6 
Information Sorting on Social Media 
Social media is often presumed to continue the bubble-making trend set by radio, cable and the 
internet. Although thought by some early internet optimists to be an antidote to political 
information bubbles (Farrell, 2012; Himelboim et al, 2013), conventional wisdom today is that 
 
6 While Stroud and Gentzkow provide evidence that a fractured media leads to selective news exposure, perhaps the 




social media further filters out counter-attitudinal voices, trapping us in echo chambers of like-
minded folks – to the detriment of democratic deliberation and civic society. As mentioned 
above, Google searches for “echo chambers” in 2016 would primarily surface articles about 
social media. If you were to consult the Encyclopedia of Social Media and Politics it would 
likewise confirm that in using “social network sites, personal Web logs, and other Web platforms 
that encourage audience interaction, individuals strengthen the echo chambers by reposting 
media content” (Bor, 2014). To remind us of our walled informational worlds – and let us peek 
over to the other side - The Wall Street Journal keeps a running record of the differences 
between a “red” and “blue” feed on Facebook (WSJ).  Likewise, Facebook apps have been 
developed to let users scan their “friendverses” and see how deep in the bubble they are. Here, 
for example, is this author’s, admittedly very blue, bubble:  
Figure 1: The Author’s Political Bubble on Facebook 
 
Image created by Politecho.org in 2016, using author’s Facebook data. Politecho’s app lets Facebook users chart the 
political diversity their friends – and how much of a Facebook bubble they presumably exist in. 
The assumption that social media is designed to secure us in echo chambers may be popular 
because it makes intuitive sense. By being “social,” social media introduces three dynamics that 
seem to lend themselves to bubble formation. First and foremost, social media connects us to 
friends and, as in real life, those friends tend to share our views including our views on politics. 
Second, those friends determine what news we see; for the most part while news editors still 
create the news, our friends on social media are the ones who curate that news. It is natural to 
suspect that those friends would be biased curators, selectively sharing information that confirms 
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their - and our - worldview. Finally, as in offline social networks, our friends tend to be friends 
with each other, embedding us inside clusters of like-minded ideologues; thus we may intuit that 
as friends re-share information they will act as filter upon filter further refining - and narrowing - 
the scope of information we are exposed to.7  
In spite of these popularly held intuitions (see e.g. Sunstein, 2018; Manjoo, 2011), recent 
empirical research suggests that social media might not be the bubble maker often feared. True, 
studies that examine levels of cross-ideological exposure show that ideologues are mostly 
exposed to congruent information (Bakshy et al, 2015; Jungherr, 2014) but they do not tell us if 
these levels are more or less than we would expect to see in other media environments. One 
exception is a study by Flaxman and colleagues (2016) which shows that while social media 
does a poor job compared to search engines in leading us to diverse information, it does diversify 
our information environment more than if we were to go directly to news sources online. 
Another study (Barbera, 2014), which looks at information Twitter users are exposed to via 
social acquaintances compared to the news they receive from public news sources, finds 
similarly that those social connections do a better job of exposing us to diverse news.   
Theorists likewise give us reason to imagine that social media could mitigate rather than 
exacerbate polarization. For one, homophily is far from absolute, so we should expect a non-
negligible proportion of our connections to have differing political views (Huckfeldt et al, 2004). 
And, whereas before social media we might only talk politics with a small subset of our friends 
(and those closer to us), social media makes it easy - or unavoidable - to encounter the political 
views of a wider swath of acquaintances, including those we may have little offline contact with.  
Those “weak ties,” as network theorists call them, can expose us to viewpoints we would not 
have otherwise encountered (Brundidge, 2010). Yet another reason social media increases our 
 
7 There are other reasons (independent of these network mechanisms) we would reasonably think social media sites 
sort information. As highlighted by Eli Pariser in The Filter Bubble (2011), almost all social media sites use 
algorithms to filter the posts shown on users’ walls, selecting for information that users prefer to see based on their 
past choices and behavior. Advertisers – including political campaigns –also target messages to users based on 
profiles that social media sites construct (likewise based on user behavior). While these forces are certainly part of 
the information sorting story on social media, they are not the focus of this dissertation for various reasons which I 
discuss at length in the next chapter.  
14 
 
chances of bumping into counter-ideological information is its lack of topical barriers; whereas 
we might expect echo chambers to form if we could restrict political discourse to a forums about 
politics (in which me might select into like-minded groups), on social media politics will pop up 
regardless of the subject matter (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). 
The empirical evidence and theoretical insights above force us to question the popular narrative 
of social media sites as bubble makers and ask if social media is the echo chamber bogeyman it 
is commonly thought to be.  
There are two ways to approach greater clarity. One is to expand on the findings of Flaxman et al 
(2016) and Barbera (2014) by conducting additional large-scale observational studies that 
compare the diversity of information that Americans are exposed to across different media 
sources, including print, TV, radio and water-cooler conversations.  As mentioned above, such 
an approach was taken by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). However, while their research 
compared de facto selective exposure across several media environments, it stopped short of 
considering social media.  
I take a second approach, instead breaking down the dynamics of social media and reexamining 
our intuitions about social media’s ability to create echo chambers. While it may seem self-
evident that social media is a perfect storm of forces designed to sort liberals and conservatives 
into distinct information worlds, no one has conclusively demonstrated that those forces exist, let 
alone measured their strength. I examine each in turn. I look at whether social media users are, 
indeed, selective curators who actively choose to post stories that reflect their political views. 
While accepting the conclusion from previous research that homophily is pervasive in online 
social networks (Bakshy et al, 2015; Barbera et al, 2015; Boutyline & Willer, 2017; Conover et 
al, 2011;  Grabowicz et al, 2012; Hanna et al, 2011; Himelboim et al, 2013), I ask whether 
individuals in online networks are more homophilous than they are offline. Finally, I examine 
whether social networks – which embed us in chains of friendships, each of which is likely 
homophilous - amplify ideological homogeneity as information diffuses from user to user.   
I find that several commonly held assumptions about social media’s capacity to sort us into 
information bubbles are unsupported both theoretically and empirically. For one, social media’s 
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capacity to diffuse information through homophilous networks would not, in and of itself, 
logically produce information environments more homogenous than the group of friends, family, 
and associates to which we belong. Modelling diffusion in homophilous networks – i.e. networks 
in which users on average are friends with more co-ideologues than counter-ideologues - I show 
that our friends are limited in the degree to which they can filter our news for us; as information 
moves through social networks, it will never become fully sorted, but will rather be capped at the 
average level of homophily in the network.8 Moreover, when our networks are less than 100% 
ideologically biased in the information they re-share, diffusion actually diversifies our news 
environments, more so than if our friends did not re-share information at all.  
Examining re-sharing behavior on the social network Twitter, I also find that users are 
surprisingly unbiased in the news they retweet (though their ideological biases show up in the 
news they choose to follow). Finally, relying on research from other scholars, I examine 
estimates of homophily online and in the real world and find little evidence to suggest our online 
networks are more homophilous than our networks offline. All told, I find social media is poorly 
equipped to filter out diverse views and may, perhaps, even expand the breadth of our exposure 
beyond what we would encounter in offline networks. 
Polarizing by Extremes 
The reader may be skeptical of the conclusion that social media is more bubble buster than 
builder. Such a claim runs counter to what seems an obvious truth about online social networks – 
that they are a polarizing force in today’s world. I do not dispute that social media polarizes, but 
 
8 Throughout this work I will often speak of the relative homophily of networks. It is important to distinguish that by 
“homophily” in this respect I do not mean “homogeneity.” It is possible, for example, to have a heterogeneous 
network – with 50% liberals and 50% conservatives – with high levels of homophily if, for example, individuals in 
that network almost exclusively connect to like-minded friends. A highly homogenous network with, say, 90% 
liberals can likewise have low homophily if liberals in that network make an effort to connect to the few 
conservatives that exist (which in turn would give those conservatives a surfeit of liberal friends). 
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I propose that instead of pulling left and right apart by sorting people into information bubbles, 
social media polarizes by proliferating “extreme” information on both sides. 
By extreme information, I mean information - news articles, memes, videos - that is dogmatic, 
emotional and tribal. Extreme information is usually, though not always, generated by far left 
and right sources such as OccupyDemocrats or Breitbart news. It is also characteristic of much of 
the fake news that swirled through social media during the 2016 campaign. But extreme news is 
not necessarily – or even usually – false. Extreme information also does not necessarily advocate 
for extreme policies. What characterizes extreme news rather are three features: its tendency to 
be dogmatic in the support of an ideological view, its appeal to emotions such as anger and, 
perhaps most importantly, its tribal-like focus on political opponents.  
While the above definition of extreme information is unique to this dissertation, I do not 
construct it out of whole cloth. Communication scholars and political scientists alike have noted 
and studied similar concepts – although often using different terms. Taylor (2017), for one, 
characterizes “extreme media” as media that has an “ideological point of view” and that “seeks 
to entertain” while it also “spurs emotions” such as anxiety and fear. In a review of “polarizing” 
media, Prior (2013) notes that such media uses “fervently populist or ideological rhetoric” and is 
“ideologically unambiguous” and “blatantly partisan.” Levendusky (2013) similarly describes 
this type of partisan media as creating “a coherent conservative or liberal interpretation” of the 
news, focusing on “criticism of the opposition,” and selecting stories that make the other side 
look “foolish and inept” as well as “hypocritical and duplicitous.” All three note partisan news 
outlets have a penchant for being “outrage-based” (Sobieraj and Berry 2013). Sobieraj and 
Berry’s definition of outrage discourse is worth reviewing in full: 
“‘outrage’ as a particular form of political discourse involving efforts to 
provoke visceral responses (e.g., anger, righteousness, fear, moral 
indignation) from the audience through the use of overgeneralizations, 
sensationalism, misleading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem 
attacks, and partial truths about opponents—opponents who may be 
individuals, organizations, or entire communities of interest (e.g., progressives 
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or conservatives) or circumstance (e.g., immigrants, welfare recipients). 
Outrage sidesteps the messy nuances of complex political issues in favor of 
melodrama, misrepresentative exaggeration, mockery, and improbable 
forecasts of impending doom. Outrage speech is not as much about discussion 
as it is about verbal competition, akin to political theater with a scorecard.” 
Three common themes in the definitions above characterize extreme information: 
• Dogmatism - Extreme news avoids “messy nuances” and instead offers a clear, 
unambiguous message, with a “coherent liberal or conservative interpretation.”  
• Emotion - Extreme news triggers powerful emotions by deploying sensationalist 
arguments and fervent language focusing on threats to cherished groups, society at large, 
or universal norms. 
• Tribalism - Extreme news focuses on “criticism of the opposition,” using “ad hominem 
attacks” against opponents. It is not about imparting information as much as participating 
in “competition” against the outgroup. 
One theme that notably does not emerge from the definitions above is adherence to extreme 
policy positions. Extreme media may indeed advocate for far left or right policies, but that is not 
its defining, or even a necessary, feature. Extreme news can – and often will - push a centrist 
viewpoint, yet in a dogmatic, emotional or tribal manner. Take the example of trade tariffs, a 
topic in the news cycle as of this writing, and one not strongly associated with liberal or 
conservative views.9 On a week in which China and the US both declare new tariffs, the New 
York Times headlines a straight journalistic “Trump Says He Will Raise Existing Tariffs on 
Chinese Goods to 30%” and Fox offers an equally tame “US and China announce new tariffs.” 
Breitbart, however, opts for “Donald Trump Strikes Back at China with Higher Tariffs,” a 
headline which paints the leader of its political group in a strong, even heroic light. Huffington 
 
9 Indeed, left and right both have their share of free trade advocates and protectionists. 
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Post’s headline, “Trade War Tense - Markets Roiled - Recession Fears,” goes further in its 
extreme tone by emphasizing threat and fear which, implicitly understood by any Huffington 
Post reader, is created by the opposing tribe.10 Breitbart and Huffington Post both manage to take 
a policy neutral story and turn it into an extreme event. 
One way we can think of the distinction between the definition of extreme news above - one of 
unambiguous, visceral, devotion to the tribe - as distinct from thinking of extreme news that 
might preach far left and right policies, is as a parallel to the distinction between traditional 
views of polarization and “affective polarization.” Political scientists who quantify and track the 
degree of polarization in the US have historically focused on how far left and right legislators 
and voters are divided on policy preferences (Hetherington, 2009). That work, notably 
articulated by Fiorina et al (2005), shows that Americans, even staunch partisans, tend to be 
closer on core policy preferences than frequently imagined. Iyengar et al (2012) and other 
political scientists, however, point out that while Americans may not polarize on policy issues, 
they are becoming more deeply divided in their feelings toward each other.  
That work on affective polarization echoes the work of an earlier theorist, Eric Hoffer, on “true 
believers” who (to use Fiorina’s words) “place more weight on symbols (dubbed ‘principles’), 
reject what appear to be reasonable compromises, draw bright lines where many people see only 
fuzzy distinctions, and label those who disagree with them as enemies” (Fiorina, 1999). Like 
affective partisanship or the rise of true believers, when we speak of extreme news, it is the 
emotional, symbolic and tribal aspect of political news, rather than a division of policy 
preferences, that is the defining feature. 
Information extreming – the process of amplifying extreme viewpoints - may seem difficult to 
differentiate from information sorting, but they are conceptually distinct. When information is 
sorted, ideologues are placed in bubbles surrounded by relatively homogenous information that 
affirms their political views. From the perspective of the network as a whole, sorting results in 
 
10 Headlines taken from nytimes.com, foxnews.com, breitbart.com and huffingtonpost.com on August 23, 2019. 
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liberal information being concentrated among liberals and conservative information among 
conservatives. Information extreming, in contrast, results in more extreme - as compared to 
moderate - information throughout the network. At the individual level information extreming 
may leave liberals and conservatives alike exposed to diverse views, but a greater proportion of 
those views will be extreme (dogmatic, divisive, emotional) as opposed to moderate (nuanced, 
non-tribal, reasoned). 
To see how information sorting and extreming lie on distinct dimensions we can imagine two 
information universes. In one, there are only two sources of information, NPR and the Wall 
Street Journal; liberals only listen to NPR while conservatives get their news exclusively from 
WSJ. This world, illustrated in Figure 2a, would be one of complete information sorting, but 
with relatively little extreme information. In another imaginary universe, visualized in Figure 2b, 
all liberals and conservatives might be equally exposed to left and right information, but the only 
two sources of information are Keith Olbermann and Sean Hannity. In this scenario, there would 













Figure 2. Conceiving of Information Sorting and Information Extreming as Two Distinct 
Dimensions 
    A         B 
 
While information sorting and information extreming may go hand in hand, they are conceptually distinct, as 
illustrated by the two fictional worlds above. In fictional world A ideological users’ information is completely 
sorted, with liberals only exposed to liberal information (from NPR) and conservatives only seeing conservative 
news (from the Wall Street Journal); but while information sorting is complete, the information users are exposed to 
is, by and large, not extreme. In world B, users are equally exposed to liberal and conservative information, thus 
with no sorting, yet the information they are exposed to is by and large extreme. 
Extreming, like sorting, was not born of social media. Even during the Golden Age of 
“objective” media, news producers had incentives to report on potentially polarizing stories. 
News, by definition, is information that is out of the ordinary (Lippman, 1922; Shoemaker et al, 
2001), and news gatekeepers have long known that the more extraordinary – or sensational – 
news is, the more it sells (Shoemaker et al, 2001; Soroka, 2012). In political coverage, the 
incentive to deliver sensational news often means reporting on “horse-race” politics, which not 
only highlights day-to-day political battles but also paints the parties as stark adversaries (Broh, 
1980). In spite of those incentives to produce potentially extreme news, however, traditional 
media was also constrained - by long running journalistic norms, a few binding regulations and 
the power of advertisers - to present substantive, even-handed, and not too controversial 
coverage of political issues (Gans, 1979). Even though traditional media gatekeepers produced 

































Those constraints largely fell by the wayside with the arrival of cable and the internet. With a 
fractured media and the disappearance of the Fairness Doctrine, as discussed earlier, news outlets 
could now diversify and present consumers with an array of viewpoints from across the political 
spectrum. Those views could be supported by substantive reporting, but more often than before 
“opinion reporting” – both easier to produce and juicier to consume – would flourish. The Glenn 
Becks, Keith Olbermanns, Drudge Reports and Daily Beasts that sprouted from the new media 
freedom (or free-for-all) created a breed of what the communications and political scholars 
discussed earlier have variously called “extreme,” “partisan,” or “outrage” media; media that 
aims to entertain while spurring emotions such as fear and anger, trading in “fervently populist or 
ideological rhetoric” (Prior, 2013), and liberally using “overgeneralizations, sensationalism, 
misleading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks, and partial truths about 
opponents” (Sobieraj et al, 2013; See also Levendusky, 2013; Taylor, 2017). In the 1970s it 
would have taken substantial effort to get access to such extreme news; even a subscription to 
Commentary or Motherjones would have been tame by comparison. But by the time social media 
arrived, however, extreme news content was free and plentiful (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Bennett 
& Iyengar, 2008). 
While the more popular narrative is that social media cocoons us in political echo chambers, 
there is increasing recognition that social media sites are fertile ground for extreme information – 
and thus pose a threat to civil society. Speaking about social media in 2017, Barack Obama 
warned about “the capacity to disseminate misinformation, wild conspiracy theories, to paint the 
opposition in wildly negative light without any rebuttal—that has accelerated in ways that much 
more sharply polarize the electorate and make it very difficult to have a common conversation” 
(Remnick, 2016). Haidt (2016) similarly worries that “so long as we are all immersed in a 
constant stream of unbelievable outrages perpetrated by the other side, I don’t see how we can 
ever trust each other and work together again.” Journalists have made note as well. A Sunday 
NYT cover story opened its readers to the world of “hyperpartisan” “Facebook-native” sites that 
have come to dominate our feeds due to their adeptness at “cherry-picking and reconstituting the 
most effective tactics and tropes from activism, advocacy and journalism into a potent new 
mixture” (Herrman, 2016). So adept are they that Buzzfeed, an erstwhile media badboy turned 
responsible online journal, reported that those “sites now operate many of the partisan Facebook 
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pages generating the highest engagement compared to more established players, and they 
therefore attract some of the biggest audiences online” (Silverman et al, 2016).  
Extreme news has also caught public attention in its most virulent form as “fake” stories that 
often deliberately foment fear, anger, and inter-group conflict. Although not all or even most 
extreme news is “fake,” fake news often has the hallmarks of extreme news. The five most 
popular fake news stories leading up to the 2016 election were either endorsements of Trump (by 
the Pope) or allegations of illegal actions by Hillary Clinton (including murder and selling 
weapons to ISIS) (Silverman, 2016); each deeply tribal, emotionally evocative and by no means 
nuanced. The alarm caused by the rise of fake news stories in 2016, both their popularity as well 
as evidence that foreign actors had a hand in their promotion (Solon & Siddiqui, 2017), was 
arguably more audible than concerns over bubbles – and its response certainly more concrete. 
The social media giants, Facebook and Twitter, both took measures to weed fake news from their 
users’ feed, including hiring fact checkers and alerting users to less credible news sources 
(Constine, 2017). Yet nearly two years after the election US Congress, seemingly unimpressed 
with those efforts, still thought the dangers of fake news and foreign interference in social media 
warranted hauling Facebook and Twitter executives in to be grilled at Senate Intelligence 
Committee hearings (Romm & Timburg, 2018).   
Outside the US, fake news that plays on emotions and inter-group distrust has likewise drawn 
attention as a result of its arguably more dire consequences. In India, fake stories on Whatsapp 
about kidnappers coming from other regions to steal children led to the murder of over twenty 
people whose only crime was being strangers passing through (Frayer, 2018). Viral Facebook 
stories in Sri Lanka likewise played on fears of others, but with a more direct out-group target; 
rumors of a Muslim plot to sterilize Buddhists there led to riots and mob violence (Taub & 
Fisher, 2018).  
Scholarship, meanwhile, has only cursorily examined the rise and impact of extreme news in 
social media. Most academic research following the 2016 election has focused on quantifying 
and understanding the spread of fake news (Guess et al, 2018; Lazer et al, 2018). Yet some 
recent research suggests social media users tend to re-share information that is not necessarily 
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fake, but is emotionally and morally charged (Brady et al, 2017). Users are both more likely to 
be exposed to stories about immoral acts on social media and more likely to have moral outrage 
triggered than if they were to encounter those stories offline (Crockett, 2017). We also know that 
Twitter users at the far ends of the political spectrum are often the most prolific posters of 
political information (Barbera, 2014). Studies by Facebook and Berkman researchers likewise 
confirm that news stories that come from media’s extremes dominate what users share (Bakshy 
et al, 2015; Faris et al, 2017).11 
But even more so than with information sorting, there is much left to understand about the 
potential of social media to amplify extreme views. Aside from circumstantial evidence just 
referenced, we do not yet know whether social media users do, indeed, prefer to share extreme as 
opposed moderate or balanced news stories. And if such a bias exists, current models do not tell 
us what effect diffusion will have on proliferating these extreme opinions. 
Using the same approach as I do to examine information sorting, I investigate social media’s 
capacity to promote extreme information. In contrast to Twitter users’ absence of bias toward 
retweeting ideologically congruent information, I find a marked proclivity toward retweeting 
stories from extreme news sources. Using simulations on infinite and agent-based models I show 
that this bias will be amplified as information moves through homophilous networks and, unlike 
with information sorting, that there are no natural constraints on information extreming. 
Furthermore, while greater homophily has limited impact on information sorting, it does strongly 
amplify information extreming. In short, while the basic architecture of social media may be 
poorly designed to create ideological bubbles, it provides the mechanics for an efficient 
extreming machine. 
 
11 There is also a longstanding and rich scholarship on the prevalence of polarizing dialogue, particularly 
“incivility,” on online platforms; we might guess that the forces that push social media users to engage in uncivil 




The Psychology of Sharing 
In Part I of this dissertation, as just discussed, I break down the network mechanisms of social 
media to see the role each lever – diffusion, homophily and selective curation – plays in 
contributing to information sorting and extreming. In the second part, I zero in on one of those 
levers – selective curation – to better understand what drives social media users’ selection of 
congruent and extreme news.  
The question is not just academic. Feeling the heat from regulators and lawmakers, platforms 
such as Twitter and Facebook have begun to cull the worst forms of extreme news and to 
increase cross-ideological exposure. Facebook, for example, uses bots to either flag potential 
fake news and to censor or ban user accounts that promote hate speech (Constine, 2017). Twitter 
has also toyed with exposing users to a greater diversity of political viewpoints (Romm & 
Dwoskin, 2017). 
But directly intervening to remove offensive or extreme speech is not the only approach 
platforms can take. Another is to nudge users to spread a more balanced and moderate 
information. To achieve balanced exposure, social media sites could encourage users to connect 
to other uses across the political spectrum, but doing so would not necessarily decrease the 
spread of extreme information. Influencing users’ decisions on what to share and reshare, 
however, can be effective in both broadening users’ information diet while reducing the intake of 
extreme information. 
To influence behavior, we must first understand it. Remarkably, though, little is known about 
what motivates social media users to share political information online. Researchers have 
extensively studied the psychological drivers of sharing information more broadly (Berger, 
2014), yet that research does not adequately explain the sharing of political information. 
To fill that gap, I explore users’ motivation for sharing political information on sites like 
Facebook and Twitter by developing and testing a theoretical framework to explain users’ 
sharing behavior. That framework is built off the premise that, when posting political 
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information on social media, users have an “imaginary audience” in mind, an audience that 
reflects one of their politically salient social groups, such as their fellow conservatives, 
environmentalists or Latinos. I propose two motivations that drive information sharing: “group 
impression management,” which signals users are true and loyal group members, or “group 
rallying,” which unites and incites their group in times of threat. Humans in general are 
motivated to project an image of themselves that helps them forward their social goals. On social 
media, when posting a political story, I posit that users’ goals are to secure inclusion and status 
within their politically salient groups.  The image they aim to project to achieve those goals is 
that of a loyal and competent member. At times, however, users are also motivated to rally their 
political groups to address perceived threats, in particular those posed by the political outgroup. 
Both sets of motivations lead users to post stories with similar traits: at base a story will affirm 
the group’s beliefs and values, but those stories will also tend to be dogmatic in their position, 
emotionally evocative and tribal in nature, extolling the ingroup or denigrating the outgroup.  
In a series of online studies, I test these propositions, specifically that users have their political 
groups in mind when they post political news on social media and that they do so to secure 
inclusion and status in those groups. I find some evidence consistent with the framework. Social 
media users do, indeed, tend to share political stories that affirm their group credentials – either 
because those stories affirm group values and beliefs, extol the ingroup, or denigrate the 
outgroup. I also find some evidence that users have a specific social group in mind as their 
imagined audience when they share news stories. I do not, however, find evidence that what 
specifically motivates subjects to share group-affirming stories is the drive to bolster inclusion in 
those groups.  
Roadmap 
The reader already has a good preview, from the discussion above, of what is to come. I take on 
the question of information polarization in social media in two parts. In Part I, I look at 
information polarization from the network-wide perspective and aim to answer the question “Is 
social media designed to increase information sorting or information extreming?” In Part II I 
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focus on one of the key levers of sorting and extreming – selective curation – to better 
understand what drives users’ tendency to share congruent and extreme information. 
Part I begins with a discussion of the relationship between homophily, selective sharing and 
network diffusion dynamics and how they interact to determine information distribution patterns 
in social media. In Chapter 2, I present a series of diffusion models, using both mathematical 
analysis and agent-based modelling, to show what our expectations should be regarding social 
media’s capacity to polarize our information environments. I find that, given different 
assumptions about homophily and selective sharing, we should have different expectations about 
a social media site’s ability to increase information sorting and information extreming. I then 
examine what those assumptions should be, first by reviewing other scholars’ research and 
analyzing public data to estimate levels of homophily on social networks on and offline in 
Chapter 3, and next by analyzing original data from the social media site Twitter to estimate 
users’ selective sharing biases in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 inserts those estimates back into 
the diffusion models to answer the question “is social media designed to increase information 
sorting and extreming.” I find that while social media creates the conditions to amplify extreme 
information, it is poorly designed to sort political information. Indeed, social media sites are 
more apt to expose us to a greater balance of political information than we might otherwise come 
across through other media although, again, it will be a balance of extremes. 
In Part II, I switch gears from looking at macro patterns of diffusion to home in on the micro 
decisions of social media users. I also move from analysis of observational data and modeling to 
develop and experimentally test a set of psychological propositions. After ruling out existing 
theories to explain political information sharing, in Chapter 6 I develop an original theoretical 
framework to understand the motivations for sharing political information based on work in 
Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Communications. With a series of online experiments 
presented in Chapter 7, I then test elements of that theory.  
The conclusion does what conclusions do: I aim to leave the reader with the importance of 
understanding social media’s power to extremify our information environments and encourage 










Chapter 1. The Mechanics of Information 
Distribution 
In the introduction I presented two narratives of social media and its capacity to polarize our 
information environments. In the more familiar narrative, social media acts as a sorting device, 
leaving users exposed to information that echoes back their views. In the less recognized 
narrative, users are not necessarily exposed to distinct and ideologically homogeneous political 
arguments as much as they are exposed to information that is “extreme”– dogmatic, emotionally 
charged and divisive - in nature.  
How do we test these two theories of information polarization?  
As previewed in the last chapter, rather than treating social media as a black box and comparing 
its outputs - in this case the extremity and ideological diversity of information consumers are 
exposed to - to those of other media systems, in this dissertation I look inside the social media 
box. There I aim to understand the factors - individual behaviors, structures and mechanisms - 
that might lead to information sorting or extreming.  
There are any number of factors one could explore, but I focus on social media’s two defining 
features - users’ ability to connect to each other and their ability share information – along with a 
third feature that is a necessary by-product of the first two, the ability for information to travel 
from user to user. More specifically, I inspect users’ tendency to connect to others who share 
their political views (homophily), their ideological biases in what information they choose to 
share (selective curation), and the flow of politically valenced information through a 
homophilous network (diffusion) to see how those individual decisions and network-wide flows 
might produce information sorting and extreming.  
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The reader may wonder why it is worth bothering opening up the black box to answer the 
question “does social media contribute to information sorting and extreming?” when – as with 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) – a more direct route would be to compare social media’s outputs 
to other media. I have three reasons which I explain below: 1) doing so can give us fundamental 
insights that outlive the current state of social media; 2) we may also be able to correct hidden – 
and misleading – intuitions we have about social media; and 3) most practically, we can give 
researchers and advocates a handle on how to correct the potential harms of social media.  
The first reason is related to the features in the black box that I do not examine. While all social 
media sites are defined by the three dimensions above, each social media platform has a distinct 
set of features that also factor into how information is ultimately distributed throughout a 
network. In particular, many sites use algorithms to select which of a user’s friends’ posts are 
promoted in their feed. Some platforms likewise show ads and allow advertisers to target 
messages based on users’ suspected preferences. Both algorithms and targeted ads certainly have 
the potential to contribute to information bubbles and information extreming (Pariser, 2011), but 
those features are neither uniform nor stable; each social media company has its own algorithms 
for promoting posts and policies regarding ads, and those algorithms and policies can be changed 
on a dime.  
The variability and changeability of platform policies creates two limitations. For one, it is 
difficult to claim, for example, that all social media platforms create information bubbles; there 
could exist sites that filter posts to insure its users are exposed to challenging information.12 It 
would even be hard to claim that Social Media Site X, for example, fuels the spread of extreme 
information because while it may do so one day, it could implement a policy that downgrades all 
posts from far right and left media the next day, dramatically changing the ideological content of 
information on its platform. Facebook, for one, is known for making such feed-altering policies. 
In 2018, for example, the platform altered its algorithm to promote posts that produce more back 
 
12 While such social media platforms may not exist, there have been numerous attempts to build apps to help social 
media users break through their filter bubbles. (See, for some examples, Piore, 2018 and Lum, 2017.) 
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and forth engagement, which could have resulted in increased cross-partisan exposure (Mosseri, 
2018). Another policy that year prioritized posts from more trustworthy sources, that likely 
decreased exposure to extreme information (Zuckerberg, 2018).  
Examining the core mechanisms of social media, in contrast, gives us insights into what leads to 
information polarization both across platforms and over time, even as social media companies 
change their policies.13 While platforms can easily change their algorithms and ad policies, they 
cannot change fundamental human behavior, such as what drives users to choose who they friend 
or what they post. They also cannot change the laws of network dynamics. By focusing on 
fundamental - and less changeable - features of social media I hope to gain insights that outlive 
social media’s current state.14 
The second reason to understand the inner mechanisms of social media is because we may think 
we already do so – and yet our intuitions may be leading us astray. Social networks are complex 
systems, and as such may run on rules that are not intuitive. We thus may have assumptions 
about the inner workings of social media that color our broader understanding of social media’s 
impact. If inaccurate, those hidden assumptions could lay a false foundation for other theories 
about social media. But by dissecting the inner workings of social media we may simultaneously 
uncover what hidden assumptions we hold and dispel errant intuitions.    
 
13 It is true, however, that user behavior could change overtime as well; consumers may still be adapting to social 
media which is still less than a decade old (for most users), so their preferences about who to connect to and what to 
post may still be adapting. Yet those changes should be slow and will be constrained by fundamental human 
motivations. 
14 While I do not include an examination of algorithms to explain information polarization in this work, I by no 
means discount their role in contributing to or potentially mitigating information polarization. To the contrary, the 
choices platforms make on what information to promote or demote can substantially alter users’ information 
environments; in the conclusion I will present some recommendations of my own on how to minimize information 
polarization. The relationship of the algorithms to the underlying mechanisms of social networks can be thought of 
as akin to the relationship between nature and nurture in behavior; the fundamental forces I look at in this work are 




To illustrate how complex systems can foil intuition – and how studying them can reveal and 
correct our hidden assumptions - consider Schelling’s classic segregation model (Schelling, 
1971). It is a well-known feature of US cities that they are racially segregated. Among the 
structural and social causes that may lead to high levels of segregation, one common intuition is 
that segregation occurs because people, particularly white people, prefer to live in neighborhoods 
where most others look like them. Schelling famously tested this intuition using an innovative 
method at that time – agent-based modelling - to see if, indeed, it was necessary for people to 
prefer segregation in order to create segregated neighborhoods. He set up linear neighborhoods 
in which he placed fictional residents (“agents”) and simulated what would happen as those 
agents made decisions to stay on their plot or move to another house. Their decisions to move 
were based on whether a percentage of their neighbors shared their “race.” If their neighborhood 
was above a given threshold they would stay; if not, they would move to the nearest suitable 
spot. His models showed, surprisingly, that in order for neighborhoods to be highly segregated, 
residents do not need to have a preference for segregation. To end up with neighborhoods that 
are 80% segregated, for example, it is only necessary that individuals have a preference to live in 
a neighborhood where at least 50% of their neighbors share their race. In other words, if 
everyone is happy to live in a mixed neighborhood (where up to 50% of their neighbors do not 
share their race), they will end up in highly segregated neighborhoods where only 20% do not 
look like them. 
Schelling’s model shows how the “micro” behaviors of individuals that interact in complex 
systems can lead to surprising “macro” patterns. As his segregation model illustrates, the 
“emergent" properties of a complex system can go against our intuition - or even reveal 
assumptions that seem so “true” we do not realize we had them. By examining the inner 
mechanics of social media, we may likewise reveal some of our hidden – and awry - assumptions 
and about how social media works.  
The final reason for studying the mechanics of social media is the most practical. For bubble 
bursting advocates - or perhaps social media companies interested in mitigating extreming - it is 
useful to know how information sorting and extreming occur and what the strongest levers are to 
dial information polarization up or down. If we want to diversify users’ information 
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environments or decrease the spread of extreme news, does it make sense to focus on 
encouraging more cross-ideological connections or to instead nudge users’ sharing behavior? 
Which effort will get better results? Understanding the underlying dynamics of information 
distribution will answer those questions and help practitioners direct their energies and strategies. 
The Mechanisms of Social Media 
So what is in the black box? And how does this dissertation attempt to shine a light inside? I’ve 
already identified the major parts and mechanisms are that I hope to illuminate - that is, users’ 
choices about whom they connect to, their political biases in choosing what to post and, finally, 
how those two micro behaviors combine to create macro level patterns of information 
polarization. In the remainder of this introduction to Part I, I lay out a theoretical understanding 
how those three elements are related, how much scholars already know about each, and what is 
left for us to discover and understand. In the subsequent sections of Part I, I take up each of those 
elements and attempt to fill in the holes in our knowledge.  
Homophily 
Homophily, it is hard to dispute, is the linchpin of information sorting on social media; we place 
ourselves in information bubbles first – and possibly foremost - by surrounding ourselves with 
like-minded friends. Indeed, if we were to surround ourselves with diverse friends online, it 
would be difficult to conceive of how we would be exposed to homogenous information.15 
The common and undisputed expectation is that social media users would, indeed, form 
homophilous online networks. It is well known that Americans tend to be friends with those who 
share their political views (Huckfeldt et al, 1995; Lazarsfeld et al, 1944; Lazer et al, 2010). This 
 
15 Though not impossible. We would have to assume either users have the capacity and willingness to selectively 
share one set of information with their liberal friends and another set with their conservative friends, or that social 
media providers insert a stringent ideology-sifting algorithm. 
33 
 
is not necessarily because individuals actively choose friends based on shared political outlook. 
Rather, secondary factors – shared community, same job, similar tastes in music, etc. – correlate 
with political beliefs and thus lead to friends sharing political outlooks (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 
1987). We also inevitably influence – and are influenced by – our friends to think alike. On 
social media, to the extent that individuals connect to friends they have offline or seek out new 
like-minded friends we would expect to see users connect to others with similar political view 
(Benckler, 2006; Bimber, 1998). 
Studies show that, indeed, our online selves are homophilic. Users on Twitter, for example, 
cluster by political views regardless of whether one considers networks by who retweets whom 
(Barbera et al, 2015; Conover et al, 2011; Grabowicz et al, 2012), hashtag use (Hanna et al, 
2011), mentions (Conover et al, 2011; Grabowicz et al, 2012), key words (Himelboim et al, 
2013) or who follows which political accounts (Boutyline & Willer, 2017). Facebook users who 
identify with a political ideology also, unsurprisingly, tend to friend co-ideologues (Bakshy et al, 
2015). 
There are, however, still open questions about homophily on social media. For one, it is not clear 
if our online networks are more homophilous than our offline connections. Theorists argue that 
social media give individuals both the capacity to find their political co-ideologues (Benckler, 
2006; Bimber, 1998) as well as the serendipitous opportunity to encounter others they disagree 
with (Brundidge, 2010; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). Whether those counter forces result in 
greater or less homophily is empirically unknown. It is also an open question how much 
homophily contributes to information sorting. As stated above, we can assume that homophily is 
necessary for information sorting to occur, but is it the dominant factor - or do sharing biases and 
diffusion play an equal or more important role?  
Finally, while homophily can be expected to play a critical role in creating information bubbles, 
it is not known whether homophily would affect rates of extreming; if both your conservative 
and liberal friends have an equal bias toward sharing extreme information, will you be exposed 
to more extreme information when the composition of your friend network changes? We 
currently have no answer to that question. 
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Ideological and Extreme Curation 
Just as it is hard to imagine information sorting without homophily, if users in an online social 
network didn’t curate for extreme information, it is not easy to conceive how extreme 
information would gain a viral advantage. In order for one type of story rather than another to 
successfully proliferate through a network, users would need to have a preference for sharing 
that type of message. 
Users would also need to have some bias toward sharing ideologically congruent information in 
order for information sorting to occur. Homophily on its own will not determine a network’s 
level of information sorting. Indeed, homophily will only lead to information sorting if the 
politically aligned friends we connect to likewise post information that aligns with our shared 
views. If all your friends are conservative but they share equal parts liberal and conservative 
information, you will not be in a bubble. The diversity of information you are exposed to will 
thus be not only a function of how ideologically diverse your connections are, but the extent to 
which those connections curate information that aligns with their beliefs. 
So far we have distinguished two types of curation - curating ideologically-congruent 
information and curating extreme information. Just as Sears and Freedman (1967) distinguished 
between “de facto” and “active” selective exposure, however, we also want to make a distinction 
between de facto and active curation. If, for example, a liberal social media user shares 70% 
liberal information, we would say she is a de facto curator, but we would not necessarily know if 
she actively selects information that aligns with her ideology. To be an active curator we would 
expect to see her re-post disproportionately more liberal information than she, herself, is exposed 
to - for example, if she were exposed to 70% liberal information but re-shared 80% liberal 
leaning news. Active curating, in contrast to de facto, demonstrates a bias in the selection of 
information to share. 
While there is evidence that social media users are more often than not de facto curators of 
congruent information (An et al, 2014a; An et al, 2014b; Barbera et al, 2015; Shin & Thorsen, 
2017), there is still no direct evidence that we actively curate ideologically-confirming 
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information on social media. There likewise is scant empirical work to tell us if users have a bias 
toward sharing extreme information.16  
Diffusion 
The distinction between de facto and active curating matters when we consider the diffusion of 
information through a network. If we only looked at users’ immediate connections and the 
information those friends share, we would be missing a signature feature of social media – its 
capacity to spread information in complex (and possibly “viral”) ways. The information I receive 
in a network is not just determined by my friends and their sharing behavior, but also by my 
friends’ friends and their sharing behavior, and their friends’ friends, etc. We will want to know, 
then, what impact our extended network and diffusion will have on the information users are 
exposed to. Does diffusion through the network lead to higher or lower levels of information 
sorting and extreming? In order to answer that question, we need to know both the level of 
homophily of users in a network and users’ active curation rate, but it is also necessary to model 
the flow of information in those networks to see what emergent outcomes arise.17 Just as 
Schelling’s model of segregation showed us that the micro behaviors of agents can lead to 
surprising macro outcomes, we might find that individual sharing behaviors have unexpected 
network-wide results. 
Currently no such models exist to tell us the impact of diffusion on information sorting and 
extreming. Researchers have extensively modeled diffusion to answer other questions unrelated 
 
16 One exception being the aforementioned study by Brady and colleagues (2012) that shows that Twitter users do 
exhibit a bias toward re-posting tweets that are both emotionally and morally charged.  
17 In many ways, the potential mechanisms of information sorting on social media are nothing new; they are merely 
a re-rendering of incidental exposure and the “two step flow” of information first described by Lazarsfeld et al 
(1944) and later developed by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955). As in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s model, the information we 
are exposed to is a function of the people we surround ourselves with and the information they choose to share with 
us. What differentiates social media from the word-of-mouth media described by Katz and Lazarsfeld is that the 
information that flows now comes in the form of news links rather than news summaries (paraphrased by our 
friends). Social media also allows for more than a “two” step flow; with the ease of hitting a “retweet” button news 
can flow multiple steps. This ease might also diminish the role of “opinion leaders” who traditionally consume, 
synthesize and pass along information; now the less politically focused can get in the game of disseminating 
political information, for better or worse. 
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to the polarization of information, such as the relative role of strong and weak ties (Bakshy et al, 
2012; Brown et al, 1987; Goldenberg, 2001; Grabowicz et al, 2012), the effect of hierarchical 
network structures on the size of cascades (Banos et al, 2012), and the kinds of beliefs that are 
more likely to diffuse via simple contagion, which requires one contact with that belief, or 
complex contagion, which requires multiple connections to have such a belief (Centola & Macy, 
2007; Monsted et al, 2017; Romero et al, 2011).  
There is likewise plentiful research that models other dimensions of network polarization, in 
particular studies that use agent-based models to explain how the influence of connections leads 
to the development of homophilous networks (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Banisch et al, 
2012; Bednar et al, 2010; Dandekar et al, 2013; Flache & Macy, 2011). Among this group, 
Sasahara et al (2019) illustrate how exposure to connections’ posts on social media should lead 
to increasingly homophilous networks. 
Two papers are worth noting for coming closest to answering our questions about diffusion in 
networks that have homophily or selective curation. Siegel (2013) uses models to demonstrate 
how diffusion can amplify media bias. In that work, however, bias is not ideological, but rather 
bias toward the non-status-quo position, and the networks modeled are not ideologically 
homophilous. Halberstam and Knight (2016) do model diffusion in a homophilous network in 
which nodes are ideological curators. They report several expectations, including that individuals 
will be exposed to more like-minded than challenging information and that information will 
reach like-minded users more quickly. Yet their paper likewise does not tell us how diffusion 
will affect levels of political information sorting and extreming in social networks. 
Filling in the Gaps 
In sum, while there is plentiful evidence that online social network users are homophilic and tend 
to share information that reflects their political viewpoints, there are still substantial gaps in our 
understanding of the mechanisms that might lead to echo chambers or information extreming on 
social media. To begin with, although we know online homophily exists, we do not know if 
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levels of online homophily are comparable to homophily offline. Likewise, we know that 
ideologues tend to be de facto ideological curators, sharing information that mostly reflects their 
views, but we don’t know if they are active curators of either ideologically congruent or extreme 
information. Finally, there do not exist models to tell us how diffusion in polarized networks - 
assuming some level of active curating - affects levels of information sorting and extreming. 
In the next three chapters I attempt to fill in some of those gaps. I start by looking at networks 
globally, modeling diffusion to see if we should expect diffusion to amplify information sorting 
or extreming. I then review current research and take advantage of two public data sets to assess 
whether social media is evidently more or less homophilic than our offline networks. Finally, I 
analyze data collected from Twitter to look for evidence that social media users are active 
curators of ideological or extreme information. At the end of Part I, I pull together those findings 
to draw a first sketch of what happens inside the black box of social media and make predictions 





Chapter 2. Diffusion 
The previous chapter laid out the mechanics of information distribution in social networks and 
the three components we need to grasp in order to understand how information ultimately gets 
distributed. Those are: the levels of homophily in the network (how biased users are toward 
connecting to the like-minded); the curation behavior of users (users’ biases toward sharing 
ideologically congruent and/or extreme views); and finally, the dynamics of diffusion (how 
users’ sharing decisions build on each other to determine distribution patterns). Putting those 
three pieces together will give us a foundation for understanding how information is distributed 
across a social network - and what drives information sorting and extreming. 
I start, in this section, by examining the last piece of the puzzle. I model diffusion on 
homophilous networks to answer several questions about diffusion’s capacity to increase or 
decrease information sorting and extreming.18 Assuming users are homophilic and have curation 
biases, are users’ bubbles made more homogenous if they are placed in extended networks where 
information diffuses from connection to connection? Does diffusion lead to airtight chambers or 
are there limits to how much diffusion can filter our information and place us in ideological 
bubbles? Likewise, if users tend to re-share more extreme stories, how much - if at all - does 
diffusion favor the spread of extreme information over moderate information?  
 
18 I could have started instead by identifying and measuring levels of homophily and curation in existing social 
media, but before focusing in on specific online social networks, we may first want to get a broad picture of how 
homophily, curation and diffusion interplay. In doing so we not only improve our understanding of diffusion and are 
better able to predict levels of information sorting and extreming across different online social networks, but we may 
also find relevant patterns such as critical thresholds that tip the balance toward creating runaway information 
sorting or extreming. 
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As discussed above, existing models of diffusion cannot fully answer these questions. We also 
cannot trust our intuition for guidance. We may not be able to intuit, for example, how 
homogenous our information environments will be if 80% of our friends share our ideology and 
we all have a 90% bias toward re-sharing congruent information. Intuition likewise may not tell 
us how much extreme information will fill our feeds if people have a bias toward sharing 
extreme (as opposed to moderate) information. Given that online social networks are complex 
systems, the only thing we might expect is the unexpected. 
To replace our intuition, I model diffusion on a range of homophilous networks. I first look at the 
dynamics of information sorting, starting with a simple infinite network that, although missing 
many of the features of real-life social networks, lays a foundation for understanding the effects 
of diffusion in polarized networks. I then move on to model diffusion on increasingly complex 
networks using agent-based models to see if the patterns of information sorting we see in simple 
infinite models hold across networks that more faithfully resemble real social networks. Finally, 
I look at information extreming, reversing course by first examining patterns in complex agent-
based models and later infinite networks to understand why we might expect diffusion to lead to 
information extreming. 
Information Sorting in Infinite Networks  
To begin examining diffusion and information sorting, I use a simple network. As their name 
suggests, “infinite networks” have an infinite number of individuals (“nodes”), like the central 
node in Figure 3, that each links to a set of connections that branch infinitely in all directions. 
Although infinite networks lack many of the features we know exist in real-world social 
networks (for one, one’s friends cannot be connected to each other), I start here because they 
lend themselves to relatively simple mathematical interpretation. With these networks we only 
require algebra to gain insights into the fundamental dynamics of diffusion in homophilous 
networks. With such a grounding, we can then use those insights to grasp the dynamics in more 
complex and realistic networks. 
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I start with a few assumptions. First, information flows in one direction; each node has a set of 
connections from which it can receive information and another set to which it passes information 
along. Nodes are also either “conservative” or “liberal” and are homophilic, preferentially 
linking to co-ideologues. Finally, nodes are ideological curators; they prefer to pass along 
messages that align with their ideology. 
Figure 3. A Slice of an Infinite Directed Network. 
 
The infinite directed network we start with in this chapter is composed of an infinite set of nodes, each like the 
central node above. Each node is either conservative (red) or liberal (blue), receives messages from five friends from 
one direction and passes a subset of those messages along to five others. Both incoming and outgoing branches 
extend infinitely. 4/5ths of a node’s friends share its ideology. Note: Not all branches of the central node are 
depicted to avoid the image filling with an infinite number of nodes. 
To see how information sorting may occur in this network, I simulate the diffusion of messages 
starting with one user posting either a liberal or conservative piece of information. In each 
simulation, once a user is thus “seeded” with a message, all its followers are “exposed” and each 
then decides whether or not to “re-post” (or be “infected” by) the message. Their decision to re-
post is based on an ideological curating bias. If that bias is 90%, for example, a user would re-
post messages that align with her ideology 90% of the time while posting counter-ideological 
messages only 10% of the time. If a user re-posts the message, their followers are in turn 
“exposed” and decide to repost or not – and the process continues.  
What happens to levels of information sorting as a message diffuses through a network? First, let 
us mathematically define “information sorting” as the proportion of nodes exposed to a message 
that share that message’s ideology. Labelling the number of conservatives exposed as 𝐶𝑒 and the 
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number of exposed liberals as 𝐿𝑒, information sorting - when considering a conservative message 
- would be: 
𝐶𝑒
𝐶𝑒+𝐿𝑒
                                                                          (1) 
Simply put, if 70% of the nodes that are exposed to a conservative message are themselves 
conservative, then sorting is 70%. Later we will look at the flip side of sorting – that is, the 
proportion of messages any given node sees that aligns with her ideology. 
Let us walk through one simulation, calculating the level of information sorting at each “wave” 
that a message moves through a network. In this simulation we use the following arbitrary 
parameters: a) 80% homophily in the network, b) an ideological curating rate of 90% for all 
nodes, and c) 50 friends for each node. To start, we seed a conservative node with a conservative 
message. In this initial wave, information sorting is 80%; that is, 80% of the nodes exposed to 
that post will be conservative and 20% liberal. This is a calculation we can do in our head, but 
since the math will soon get tricky, let us formalize the number of liberals and conservatives 
exposed to a message (𝐿𝑒 and 𝐶𝑒)  as a function of how many liberals and conservatives have 
been infected by that message (𝐿𝑖 and 𝐶𝑖), how many friends those infected nodes have (F), and 
what proportion of those friends share their ideology (H) or do not (1-H): 
𝐿𝑒 =  𝐿𝑖 ∗ 𝐻 ∗ 𝐹 + 𝐶𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝐹                                          (2a) 
𝐶𝑒 =  𝐿𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝐹 + 𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻 ∗ 𝐹                                          (2b) 
In our starting wave, since  𝐶𝑖= 1 and  𝐿𝑖 = 0, then 𝐿𝑒 = 10 and 𝐶𝑒 = 40.  
𝐶𝑒
𝐶𝑒+𝐿𝑒





In the subsequent wave, the number of exposed nodes that go on to post the conservative 
message, and thus become infected, will be function of how many nodes are exposed and those 
nodes’ curation bias: S (for “sharing”) if the message shares a node’s ideology and (1-S) if the 
message does not:  
𝐿𝑖 = 𝐿𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝑆)                                                    (3a) 
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𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶𝑒 ∗ 𝑆                                                              (3b) 
Plugging in a curation rate of 90%, that will mean 1 liberal and 36 conservatives re-post the 
message in the second wave and, using equations 2a and 2b again, that 400 liberals and 1450 
conservatives are newly exposed to the message in this wave, making 78.4% of the exposed 
nodes conservative (and 21.6% liberal). In other words, information sorting has decreased from 
80% to 78.4%. 
We can iterate through this process a few times, but after just a handful of waves, we soon arrive 
at an equilibrium where 78.2% of exposed nodes on any given wave are conservative and 21.8% 
liberal. If we stick with an 80% homophilic network, but look at different rates of curation bias, 
we see in Figure 4a that an equilibrium appears to be reached no matter the rate of curation (or 
“selective reposting”). This is true regardless of starting point; if we instead seed a liberal node 
with a conservative message, as in Figure 4b, we see the same equilibria arrived at. 
Figure 4. A Conservative Message Diffusing Toward a Sorting Equilibrium 
         
Information sorting levels (“Concentration among conservatives”) of a conservative message as it diffuses through a 
homophilous network (of 0.8 homophily) after being seeded in a conservative node (A) or liberal node (B). Based 
on simulations in an infinite network. Each line represents diffusion for different levels of biased curation 
(“selective.reposting”), from 0.5 (no bias) to 1.0 (complete bias). Regardless of starting point, after a number of 
waves of diffusion, information sorting levels reach an equilibrium which is below the networks’ level of 
homophily.             
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We arrived at these equilibria by iterating calculations for each wave. It is possible, however, to 
also derive the equilibria algebraically. To do so, we collapse formulae 2 and 3 to tell us the 
number of exposed nodes that are conservative or liberal in a given wave (𝐶𝑒𝑡+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑡+1) 
based on the number exposed in the previous wave (𝐶𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑡). Since we ultimately are 
interested in proportions we can drop the term for number of friends: 
𝐶𝑒𝑡+1 = 𝐻 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ [ 𝐶𝑒𝑡]   +  (1 − 𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑆) ∗ [ 𝐿𝑒𝑡]                           (4a) 
𝐿𝑒𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝑆 ∗ [ 𝐶𝑒𝑡]  +   𝐻 ∗ (1 − 𝑆) ∗ [ 𝐿𝑒𝑡]                           (4b) 
At equilibrium, by definition, the proportion of conservative to liberal nodes that are exposed to 
a message will stay the same from wave to wave. To make it simpler to find that proportion – 
and to generalize the equation to not just refer to conservatives – substitute P (the proportion of 
nodes receiving a politically aligned message) for 𝐶𝑒, and 1-P (the proportion of nodes receiving 
the same message, but for whom the message is counter-ideological) for 𝐿𝑒, giving the 
equations: 
𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝐻 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ [ 𝑃𝑡]   +  (1 − 𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑆) ∗ [ 1 − 𝑃𝑡]                         (5a) 
1 − 𝑃𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝑆 ∗ [ 𝑃𝑡]  +   𝐻 ∗ (1 − 𝑆) ∗ [ 1 − 𝑃𝑡]                        (5b) 




𝐻∗𝑆∗[ 𝑃𝑡]  + (1−𝐻)∗(1−𝑆)∗[ 1−𝑃𝑡]
(1−𝐻)∗𝑆∗[ 𝑃𝑡] +  𝐻∗(1−𝑆)∗[ 1−𝑃𝑡]
                                            (6) 




𝐻∗𝑆∗𝑃  + (1−𝐻)∗(1−𝑆)∗[ 1−𝑃]
(1−𝐻)∗𝑆∗𝑃 +  𝐻∗(1−𝑆)∗[ 1−𝑃]
                                                 (7) 
Finally, solving for P: 
0 = (2𝑆 − 1) ∗ 𝑃2 + (2 − 2𝑆 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝑃 − (1 − 𝐻)(1 − 𝑆)                            (8) 
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We can now plug in any H and S to the equation to calculate the level of information sorting at 
equilibrium. Figure 5 shows those equilibria across networks with different levels of homophily 
(lines) at different levels of ideological curation (dots on the line). 
Figure 5. Sorting Equilibria across Networks of Different Levels of Homophily 
 
Each point represents the equilibria of information sorting (“Concentration among co-ideologues”) reached in 
networks of varying levels of homophily (represented by lines) and biased curation (“selective sharing”). Equilibria 
are derived from simulations in an infinite network.  
The first observation to make in looking at Figure 5 is that information sorting has limits; no 
matter the rate of active curation, information sorting equilibria never exceed the level of 
homophily in the network; equilibria will be somewhere between 50% (when ideological 
curation is essentially non-existent) and the level of homophily in the network (when curation is 
100%, or absolute). 
Figure 5 also shows that the relationship between curation biases and homophily is not linear; at 
high levels of curation bias, equilibria hew closely to homophily levels and do not alter much 
(i.e. have a shallow slope), but at low levels of bias equilibria diverge precipitously from the 
homophily ceiling. A takeaway for those interested in promoting diverse exposure to information 
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is that altering levels of curation bias only has an impact when those biases are already relatively 
low; nudging users to go from 90% to 80% curation will not substantially diminish ideological 
information sorting whereas nudging users from 70% to 60% curation biases will have a larger 
impact in diversifying information exposure. At high levels of curation, then, a designer who 
wants to promote diverse exposure might do better to focus on promoting greater cross-
ideological linking, whereas at low levels they will have more impact by encouraging less bias in 
curation. 
So far we have observed, perhaps counterintuitively, that diffusion in homophilous networks 
does not result in runaway information sorting. Instead, diffusion leads to levels of sorting that 
are at least slightly more moderate than the level of network homophily. But the equilibria in 
Figure 5 only tell us the endpoint of diffusion. They do not tell us if diffusion increases 
information sorting. To answer that question, we would need to compare initial levels of 
information sorting to levels after diffusion. But what are those initial levels? In the diffusion 
simulations we calculated in Figure 4 we assumed that nodes initially either only posted 
messages that align with their ideology (which is somewhat unlikely) or only posted cross-
ideological messages (entirely unlikely). In the first scenario, information sorting decreased with 
diffusion. In the second, information sorting increased. But surely individuals in social networks 
post initial messages that are somewhere in between being fully aligned with their ideology and 
fully incongruent. 
A natural starting point may be to assume that users post initial messages with the same bias as 
they selectively re-post messages; it would be reasonable to assume that if users have an active 
ideological curation bias of 90%, their initial posts would also be 90% congruent with their 
ideology.19 As seen in Figure 6, when we make that assumption looking at networks with 80% 
homophily, diffusion does increase information sorting, yet only marginally.  
 
19 In the next chapter we will see why this is not, indeed, a reasonable assumption. What it disregards is the set of 
information users are exposed to outside their network. Stay tuned.  
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Figure 6. Diffusion’s Effect on Information Sorting: The Starting Point Matters  
 
Information sorting (“concentration among co-ideologues”) over waves of diffusion for different levels of curation 
(“selective sharing”) in a network with 80% homophily. In this simulation, nodes are seeded with messages that 
match their ideology proportional to their selective sharing rates. The same equilibria are reached as in the 
simulations charted above, yet in this simulation equilibria are only marginally greater than levels of information 
sorting before diffusion. 
To get a more complete picture of whether - and when - diffusion increases information sorting, 
we can plot the change in information sorting for any given initial posting bias and curation bias. 
Doing so for infinite networks with 80% homophily, Figure 7 reveals a few patterns. At the ends 
of the spectra, results are as we expect: if users have no initial bias in what they post but are 
100% biased in what they choose to pass along, information sorting will increase by 0.3 (from 
0.5, or no sorting, to 0.8, the level of homophily in the network). Flipping the biases around so 
users are highly biased in their initial posts but indifferent in their re-posts, sorting decreases by 




Figure 7. The Conditions in which Diffusion Leads to Information Sorting  
 
Whether diffusion leads to greater or less information sorting depends upon the selective resharing bias (“curating”) 
of users and their initial posting biases. This chart shows under what conditions diffusion will lead to greater sorting 
(red) or less sorting (blue) in a network with 80% homophily. In this network sorting cannot increase by more than 
0.3 (when curation is 1.0 and initial posting biases are 0.5) or decrease more than 0.3 (when curation is 0.5 and 
initial posting biases are 0.8).  
A second observation is that there are more conditions that lead to increased than to decreased 
sorting levels. For diffusion to decrease levels of information sorting, curation biases must be 
lower than initial posting biases. How much lower depends on how homophilous the network is. 
Looking across networks of varying levels of homophily in Figure 8 we see that the greater the 









Figure 8. Conditions for Information Sorting across Networks with Varying Rates of Homophily 
 
 
Just as in Figure 7, diffusion leads to greater or less information sorting depending upon the initial post bias of users 
and their curation biases. Looking across networks with different levels of homophily, however, we can see that 
diffusion leads to increased information sorting (red) under more conditions in networks with high levels of 
homophily. 
These graphs, again, only show us the effects of diffusion we should expect given different 
assumptions about users’ curating behavior and the network’s level of homophily. To know if 
diffusion leads to greater information sorting in real social networks, we would have to know 
what those curation biases are and how homophilous the network is. We will identify those 
parameters in the next chapters. 
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Looking Up the Tree: How Diverse are the Messages we are Exposed to? 
In the discussion so far, we examined information sorting from the perspective of the network as 
a whole, asking how evenly or skewed ideological information is distributed between left and 
right subgroups. But we may be more interested in looking at sorting from the perspective of the 
individual and asking if diffusion exposes users to more or less diverse information. Does the 
diversity of information individuals are exposed to likewise reach an equilibrium as messages 
diffuse through a network? Might we see airtight informational echo chambers form when 
looking from the individual’s perspective? Or will we see a similar pattern as above with nodes 
being exposed to information that is more diverse than their friend network? 
To answer those questions, we turn again to our infinite networks and algebra. Start by observing 
that one’s exposure to ideologically aligned information will be a function of both homophily 
(H) and our friends’ ideological curation biases (S): 
     𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐻 ∗ 𝑆 + (1 − 𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑆)        (9) 
The first term 𝐻 ∗ 𝑆 represents the congruent information we receive from our co-ideologues and 
(1 − 𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑆)  the congruent information we receive from our counter-ideological friends. 
But this formula does not give us a full account of the information we are exposed to.  The S 
term here tells us how much congruent information our friends post without regard to how much 
ideologically aligned information they themselves receive; it assumes they receive equal parts 
liberal and conservative information. But since our friends have the same level of homophily as 
we do, we should assume they, like us, receive more congruent information from their friends. 
We thus need to calculate the proportion of congruent information users are exposed to given 
how much like-minded information their friends receive, which I will call P: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  
𝐻∗𝑆∗𝑃+(1−𝐻)(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)
[𝐻∗𝑆∗𝑃+(1−𝐻)(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)]+[𝐻(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)+(1−𝐻)∗𝑆∗𝑃]
                        (10) 
The top term represents the number of congruent messages we would receive; it is the same as 
the term in the previous equation, except adding in P, the proportion of congruent information 
our co-ideologues receive and (1-P), how much congruent (to us) information our counter-
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ideologue friends receive. The bottom term represents all the messages we would receive 
including congruent (same as the top term) and incongruent. 
As we did earlier, we can derive the equilibrium using the expression above and noting that at 
equilibrium our exposure to congruent information will be the same as our co-ideological 
friends, or: 
𝑃 =  
𝐻∗𝑆∗𝑃+(1−𝐻)(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)
[𝐻∗𝑆∗𝑃+(1−𝐻)(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)]+[𝐻(1−𝑆)(1−𝑃)+(1−𝐻)∗𝑆∗𝑃]
                           (11) 
When we solve for P, we get: 
0 = (2𝑆 − 1) ∗ 𝑃2 + (2 − 2𝑆 − 𝐻) ∗ 𝑃 − (1 − 𝐻)(1 − 𝑆)                         (12) 
This is the same solution as previously derived when looking at information sorting from the 
perspective of the network. In other words, at equilibrium the level of information sorting in a 
network is the same as the degree of congruence for each node. 
From the perspective of an individual, we can intuitively see why levels of information sorting 
will never be above levels of homophily in the network. Consider again a conservative node who 
has 80% conservative friends and 20% liberal; if we were to imagine that nodes were 100% 
biased in their curation – that is, that conservatives only forward conservative news and liberals 
liberal news – then that conservative node could not possibly receive more than 80% 
conservative information. The only way he could is if his liberal friends were less than 100% 
biased in the news they shared; but if that were the case then his liberal friends’ friends would 
receive substantially more diverse information – and, network-wide, we would still end up with 
slightly less than 80% information sorting.  
Information Sorting in Agent-Based models  
The infinite models above are useful for giving us a basic understanding of diffusion dynamics in 
a homophilous network, but they are probably unrealistic for several reasons. All models are, by 
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definition, simplifications of reality, but infinite models miss central features of real social 
networks that might make them particularly unrealistic and – perhaps - misleading. It may be that 
the simplicity of infinite networks is why diffusion does not lead to high rates of information 
sorting in those models. We might instead observe greater information sorting in networks that 
better represent the structure of actual social networks. 
To see if it is merely the unique properties of infinite networks that are responsible for the results 
above, I simulate and measure diffusion on increasingly complex networks that more closely 
mirror real social networks. Unlike infinite networks, however, these networks are too complex 
for mathematical modeling. We cannot simply calculate the proportion of liberal and 
conservative nodes that will be exposed to a message as we did above; depending on which node 
is seeded and that node’s unique set of neighbors and neighbors’ neighbors, diffusion will result 
with a different distribution each time.  
To simulate diffusion on these complex models I instead use agent-based models which allow 
one to construct complex networks and efficiently simulate diffusion hundreds (or thousands) of 
times. In doing so, we can measure the average distribution of information we should expect in 
different types of networks with different network parameters. 
Agent-based models, true to their name, let us create sets of “agents” that can represent any kind 
of individual entity (such as an individual, a company, or an ant). Those agents are able to take 
specific sets of actions - move residences, buy parts, move left or right to find a grain of rice - 
based on individual decision algorithms. What makes agent-based models useful – and 
interesting – is that agents can be placed in environments with other agents and base their 
decisions on the actions of those agents. Simulations can thus reveal emergent macro behaviors 
that result from the micro decisions of a population of agents interacting with each other. In the 
simulations in this chapter, agents take on the role of social media users, their actions are the 
ability to “post” political information, their environment is a network of connections and their 
decisions are whether or not to post a message when one of their friends does so. 
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Agent-based models could be configured in any programming language. For the simulations 
described below I use Python which, among other attractive features, includes the module 
Networkx that allows for the easy manipulation of networks.  
Types of Networks 
I simulate diffusion on three types of networks (“graphs” in network science speak), each with 
increasing complexity and additional attributes to make them more closely resemble real social 
networks. As with the infinite networks discussed above, all graphs are constructed with varying 
levels of average homophily and with nodes that have active ideological curation biases; 
however, in these networks a graph’s level of homophily is an average among all the nodes. Also 
unlike the infinite networks we saw, these graphs are “undirected”; that is, messages can flow in 
either direction between two linked nodes. The three types of graphs - and how they are 
constructed - are described below. 
Binary Random Graphs.  
In random networks, also known as Erdos-Renyi graphs, all pairs of nodes are linked with a 
given probability (Erdos & Renyi, 1960). Random graphs move us closer to real social networks 
in a few key ways. Unlike in infinite networks, it is possible for friends of a given node to be 
friends with each other. Random graphs also exhibit a signature feature of real-life social 
networks; to move between any two nodes in the network, a message only has to hop through a 
small number of nodes. In an infinite network, it would take an infinite number of hops. You 
may be familiar with this characteristic of social networks as the “six degrees of separation” that 
can make even the largest network feel like a “small world.” 
To create a binary homophilous random network, I vary the Erdos-Renyi graph by first assigning 
nodes a binary ideology of either “liberal” or “conservative” and then adding a homophily bias 
into the probability that any two nodes link. For example, if the homophily of the network is 
80% then the likelihood that two nodes that share an ideology will form a link is 0.8 ∗ 𝐶𝑃 (where 
CP is some ceiling probability) while the likelihood that nodes which do not share an ideology 
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will be linked is (1 − 0.8) ∗ 𝐶𝑃. Figure 9 shows such a graph: one can see how like nodes appear 
to group with like. 
Figure 9. Example Random Binary Network 
 
Example of a binary random network with roughly equal numbers of conservative (red) and liberal (blue) nodes. 
Binary Small World Graphs.  
Random graphs, while more realistic than infinite graphs, still lack important characteristics of 
social networks. For one, in social networks we know that friends of friends not only can be 
friends with each other, but are likely to be. In graph theory this phenomenon is called clustering 
or “triadic closure” (when your two friends become friends, the triangle is closed). Random 
graphs, in contrast to real world social networks, have little clustering. Another way in which 
random graphs are dissimilar to social networks is that all nodes have similar levels of 
popularity; some may have more friends than others, but there is little variance and that variance 
hovers around an average (statistically speaking, popularity is normally distributed around a 
mean). In social networks, however, we know that the distribution of friends is skewed; that is, a 
few nodes tend to be very popular while most nodes are relatively unpopular. 
To generate graphs that include high clustering and a skewed friend distribution, I apply two 
common methods. First, I construct a Watts-Strogatz “small-world” network (Watts & Strogatz, 
1998). These networks are built by starting with a ring of nodes that are all connected to their 
nearest neighbors, thus ensuring that there is a high level of clustering (since a node’s neighbors 
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will also be connected to each other). But such a ring is not yet small world since, unlike the 
random graphs above, it would take many hops for a message to move between a random pair of 
nodes. To add the “small worldness” to the highly clustered ring, Watts and Strogatz rewire a 
subset of the connections, randomly breaking links between neighbors and re-connecting nodes 
to a random node in the network.  
These small world networks get us two qualities of social networks - high clustering and 
relatively few degrees of separation - but nodes still have about the same numbers of friends. To 
create skewness in the distribution of numbers of friends, I add an element of “preferential 
attachment” into the rewiring process. In preferential attachment, when nodes link to each other 
they prefer to connect to nodes that are already more popular. If nodes are rewired sequentially, 
popular nodes become increasingly more popular with each new connection.  
Finally, to bake in ideological homophily, I generate the initial string of nodes using a given 
probability that each successive node shares the ideology of the previous node; by trial and error 
I determine what that probability needs to be in order for neighbors to have a given average 
homophily. Likewise, in the second step of Watts-Strogatz graph generation, nodes are re-wired 
to nodes with a probability biased toward connecting with co-ideologues. 
In Figure 10, you can see the result: as with the random graph above like group with like, but 
now you can see triads forming and heavier clustering. There also appears to be greater variance 
in the number of friends each node has (an attribute known as “node degree”) than in random 
graphs; while the graph below has the same average node degree as in Figure 9, in the small 








Figure 10. Example Binary Small World Network 
 
Example of a binary small-world network with roughly equal number of conservative (red) and liberal (blue) nodes. 
Continuous Random Graphs.  
Finally, because individuals’ ideologies are not binary in the real world, I create graphs in which 
nodes take on an ideological score anywhere between 0 and 1. As in the binary random graphs, 
in these graphs two nodes are linked with a ceiling probability multiplied by a homophily bias. In 
constructing these graphs, that homophily bias is based on how ideologically distant the two 
nodes are from each other; specifically, the bias is set so that a node’s friends will be normally 
distributed around its ideal point. To vary the level of homophily in a given network I altered the 
standard deviation of those individual friend distributions; for example, to create a graph where 
90% of nodes’ friends shared their ideology, I used a standard deviation of 0.17 while for a 
network with 70% average homophily a standard deviation of 0.48. (Those standard deviations 






Figure 11. Example Continuous Random Graph 
 
Example of a continuous random graph with nodes of ideologies from extremely conservative (dark red) to 
extremely liberal (dark blue). 
 
Simulating Diffusion 
For each network type described above, I simulate diffusion on networks with varying levels of 
homophily and ideological curation biases, just as we did with the infinite graphs. Again, 
because diffusion is a complex process, each simulation will result in a unique distribution which 
depends not just on which node is seeded but also the unique network constructed. To find the 
expected – or average – level of information sorting for each set of network parameters (type of 
network, homophily level and curation bias), I generate 100 graphs and run 200 simulations, 
giving a total of 20,000 observations. All graphs have 1,000 nodes with an average degree of 
eight links per node.20   
Each simulation starts with seeding one message (tagged as conservative or liberal) in one node. 
As with the infinite network model, that node’s connections are “exposed” to that message and 
then use a decision algorithm to decide whether to re-post the message. For the binary graphs, 
that decision algorithm is a ceiling probability (of 10%) times S, the curation bias, if the message 
 
20 I run the simulations with average degree of 6 and 10 as well and find similar results as the ones reported here. 
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is congruent, or (1-S) if the message is incongruent.21 I run simulations with curation biases of 
0.5, 0.65, 0.8 and 0.95. In the continuous graph, those curation biases are applied to messages 
that are closer to the node’s own ideology; I use a normal probability distribution so that 
messages closest to the ideology of the node have a high probability of being re-shared by that 
node. I vary the degree of “closeness” by using a range of standard deviations of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 
0.4.22  
At each wave of diffusion, I capture the number of liberal and conservative nodes that are 
exposed to the message. Each simulation runs for five waves.23 At the end of the 200 simulations 
for each graph constructed, I also calculate the average diversity of information that nodes are 
exposed to at each wave. 
A Note on Simple and Complex Contagions 
In the diffusion models used in this section, a node can have multiple opportunities to become 
infected; each time a new friend posts a given political message it can decide anew whether or 
not to re-post that message (although once a node posts a message itself it cannot become 
infected again).  
This type of contagion differs from “simple” contagion models in which nodes can only become 
infected at first exposure. Such simple contagion models are used, for example, in understanding 
the spread of diseases in which individuals, when first exposed to a virus, are either infected or 
proven to be immune. The spread of information can likewise follow a simple contagion pattern; 
 
21 I chose this ceiling probability for two reasons: it was low enough to ensure that networks would not be easily 
saturated yet high enough to ensure messages would not easily die out. In Chapter 5, I use a ceiling rate that more 
accurately reflects real re-sharing rates. 
22 I also run simulations in which the decision algorithm is based off a fixed threshold distance or decreasing linear 
probability. I show results from the normal probability distribution as they exhibit the most extreme bias and so – I 
hoped - were more likely to produce sorting results. 
23 I choose five waves mostly for reasons of coding ease, but it also is an appropriate number; we want to see what 
happens over time, yet even the most successful viral memes rarely make more than five hops (if only because 
individuals are all connected, once again, by “six degrees of separation”). 
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if there is a type of news story that a social media user knows instantly is relevant to their 
network then they will either share it the first time they observe it or never at all. Such messages 
might be breaking news such as the death of a loved celebrity or the results of an awaited 
political outcome.  
The spread of political news, however, might not always resemble a simple contagion, but 
instead diffuse as a “complex” contagions in which individuals must be exposed multiple times 
to a news story before sharing it. Research suggests that behaviors often spread as such complex 
contagions (Centola & Macy, 2007). Taking on a new behavior can be risky; the new movie you 
go to see may be a waste of your time, or the new hair style you try may be embarrassingly 
unhip. But the more friends who have gone to that movie (and perhaps have said they liked it) or 
the more that sport that hairstyle, the less risky that behavior is to adopt. Posting a political 
message likewise entails risk; because political information, particularly information about new 
stories and issues, may be difficult to parse or put in context, it might not be as clear that a bit of 
news is worth sharing. Posting an irrelevant or inappropriate story may be a waste of energy or 
make one look foolish. If, however, one sees a story posted multiple times by friends, the 
significance of that story will become more certain.  
Which kind of contagion should be modeled for the spread of political information? There is 
evidence that information diffusion on social media conforms more to a complex contagion 
model (Monsted et al, 2017), however that may only be the case for certain types of information 
(Romero et al, 2011).  
In the simulations in this section, I use a diffusion model that splits the difference between 
simple and complex contagions. Most models of complex contagion require a node be exposed 
to a threshold number (or percentage) of infected connections before becoming infected itself. In 
the simulations I use I allow nodes to be infected with a single exposure to a news story (a la 
simple contagion), yet if a node is not infected on first exposure it has a new chance to become 
infected each time a new friend shares a given news story. This way I allow for simple contagion 
yet at the same time account for the likelihood that social media users are more apt to share a 




Running simulations on networks of varying degrees of homophily and seeding nodes with 
messages that align with their ideology, we can compare information sorting trends to those we 
saw in infinite networks. As we can see in Figure 12, diffusion leads to decreased information 
sorting at each wave (again, when seeding a node with a congruent message) and appears to 
approach the same equilibria we saw with the infinite networks. There is one exception; in 
continuous networks, when nodes have a strong ideological curation bias (with a bias toward 
messages that are no farther than 0.1 ideological points away), diffusion sometimes begins to tip 
toward sorting levels greater than the network’s level of homophily.24 Yet, as the simulations 




24 I show only the results of simulations run on networks with homophily levels of 0.8 to be consistent with the 
infinite models and not clutter these pages. I, however, run simulations in networks with other levels of homophily 
and see similar results, which can be seen in Appendix I. 
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Figure 12. Diffusion in Agent-Based Models: Information Sorting at the Network Level 
 
Information sorting (“concentration among co-ideologues”) over waves of diffusion for different levels of curation 
(“selective sharing”), in simulated diffusions on a) binary random networks, b) binary small world networks and c) 
continuous random networks. In these simulations, just as those modeled on infinite networks in Figure 4a, nodes 
are seeded with messages that share their ideology. Also as in Figure 4a, all networks have average homophily of 
0.8 and average degree of 8. 
If nodes post initial tweets with the same bias with which they re-post messages, we again see (in 
Figure 13) similar sorting patterns as with the infinite network models: information sorting 
increases slightly and appears to approach an equilibrium. (I do not re-run the models on 







Figure 13. Diffusion in Agent-Based Models: A Selective Starting Point 
 
Information sorting (“concentration among co-ideologues”) over waves of diffusion for different levels of curation 
(“selective sharing”), in simulated diffusions on a) binary random networks and b) binary small world networks. In 
these simulations, as opposed to those in Figure 12, initial messages share the ideology of seeded nodes relative to 
the nodes’ curation rate. As with the models in Figure 12, all networks have average homophily of 0.8 and average 
degree of 8. 
Finally, the agent-based models let us observe information sorting from the perspective of the 
individual nodes. By tracking the diversity of messages nodes are exposed to at each wave of 
diffusion, we can see if diffusion results in nodes being exposed to more or less diverse 
information. Figure 14 charts the diversity of information nodes are exposed to at each wave of 
diffusion. As predicted by the mathematical equilibria in our infinite networks, information 










Figure 14. Diffusion in Agent-Based Models: Information Sorting at the Node Level 
 
Proportion of messages nodes are exposed to that are ideologically congruent at each wave of diffusion for different 
levels of curation (“selective sharing”), in simulated diffusions on a) binary random networks, b) binary small world 
networks and c) random continuous networks. Initial messages share ideology of seeded node. Figure 12 looks at 
information sorting at the network level, i.e. how much ideological messages are concentrated among users who 
share the messages ideology. In these graphs, we instead look at information sorting at the level of the nodes; at each 
wave of diffusion the graphs show the proportion of messages a node will see that shares that node’s ideology. 
The agent-based models and simulations above suggest that the results we saw in the infinite 
network models are not anomalies but may rather be the norm. These are only three network 
types but, with the possible exception of one set of parameters on one network type, simulations 
all point to the observation that information sorting, again, cannot exceed the level of homophily 
in the network.  
One cannot, of course, say that diffusion leads to levels of sorting lower than a network’s 
homophily in all possible networks; to do so we would need to construct an infinite variety of 
networks on which to run simulations – and still there could be the black swan network we 
missed. If such a network model exists, however, it would only be relevant if its structure 
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resembles real social networks. But for now, given the models above and without evidence to the 
contrary, it is reasonable to assume that diffusion has a limit – i.e. the level of homophily in a 
network – to how much is can sort left information from right. 
Information Extreming in Agent-Based Models 
Diffusion’s capacity to strengthen information bubbles, as we have just seen, seems minimal at 
best. Even at the highest levels of filtering, models show that diffusion does not lead to airtight 
echo chambers; rather, information sorting as a rule will be capped at a network’s level of 
homophily.  
But while diffusion has limited capacity to increase information sorting, what of information 
extreming? How much - if at all - does diffusion favor the spread of extreme information? And is 
there a ceiling to how much extreme information can be amplified, as we saw with information 
sorting? 
Before answering those questions, let us revisit the distinction between information sorting and 
information extreming. I defined information sorting as the proportion of users exposed to a 
message who share that message’s ideology or, from the individual’s perspective, the 
homogeneity of messages individual users are exposed to. In other words, the more information 
sorting there is the purer the information bubbles. Information extreming, in contrast, is 
concerned with the proportion of extreme messages to moderate messages that flow through the 
network and that individuals are exposed to. When levels of information extreming are high 
nodes will be exposed to high proportions of extreme information - from either side of the 
spectrum. 
By extreme information, recall, I do not mean information that reflects ideological extremes, 
such as communism or fascism; rather I define extreme information as stories, articles and 




To see how diffusion might amplify extreme information, we can build off our information 
sorting models in binary networks, but with a modification. In those models, we only considered 
binary messages – i.e. messages that are either conservative or liberal. We assumed that users 
have a simple inverse bias in sharing ideological information - so if a user has an 80% curation 
bias she is roughly four times as likely to share an ideologically congruent than incongruent story 
that she sees (sharing an aligned story 80% of the time and an unaligned story 20% of the time). 
By “ideologically congruent,” I merely mean any message that has a left bent (for a liberal) or 
right lean (for a conservative), regardless of how moderate or extreme that message is. We can 
visualize agents’ sharing decisions in those models in Figure 15, again using a network where 
agents have an ideological curation bias of 0.8: if a message is anywhere along the liberal 
continuum (< 0.5 on an ideological scale) liberal users will share that message 80% of the time 
while sharing conservative messages (> 0.5) 20% of the time – and conservatives vice versa.  
Figure 15. Conceptualizing Binary Selective Curation 
 
This image conceptualizes one way of modeling curation biases of liberals and conservatives across messages of 
ideological slants from very liberal to very conservative. In this model, ideologues have binary biases. Liberals 
prefer to share liberal messages 80% of the time and conservative messages 20% of the time.  That preference is 
uniform for all liberal and conservative messages; it does not matter if a message is moderate or extreme. 
To simulate the diffusion of extreme messages, however, we need a way to differentiate not only 
between liberal and conservative messages but also between moderate and extreme messages. It 
is also necessary to model how users might decide to share extreme versus moderate messages.  
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There are at least two ways to do so. One would be to assume that individuals have a bias toward 
re-sharing any extreme information, regardless if it comes from the left or right. But this 
assumption would be both trivial and unrealistic. Trivial because if, for example, we were to say 
that all users in a network are twice as likely to re-share a Breitbart story over a Newsweek story, 
we know already from existing growth models that the Breitbart post will spread exponentially 
faster than the Newsweek post and quickly dwarf the reach of the Newsweek story.25 It would 
also be a stretch to assume that all individuals would be biased toward sharing a post from 
Breitbart or, to pick an example from the left, DailyKos - when, surely, conservatives are more 
likely to prefer to share the Breitbart and liberals to share the DailyKos story. 
More realistic is to imagine instead that a conservative user, for example, has sharing preferences 
that vary across the spectrum from extreme right to extreme left. He might have the strongest 
bias for sharing a post from Fox News, which strongly confirms his worldview, and a slightly 
weaker bias toward sharing a story from a moderate conservative publication like Forbes which 
would be less dogmatic in its support of a conservative worldview. Moving leftward, that 
conservative user would be even less apt to post an article from a moderate liberal publication 
like Newsweek and, finally, would not be caught dead posting an article from Huffington Post 
(though they might do so to mock the story - but that is another matter). Such a bias is 







25 Assuming the resharing rate is high enough that both stories don’t both die out. 
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Figure 16. Conceptualizing Extreme Selective Curation  
 
A second way of modeling curation biases of liberals and conservatives across messages of ideological slants from 
extreme liberal to extreme conservative. In this model, ideologues’ biases are both ideological and relative to how 
moderate to extreme the message is. 
While more realistic, this model has its own simplifications that need be acknowledged. First, it 
assumes that the decision to share a story is merely dependent upon the ideological extremity of 
the story. There are, of course, countless other criteria individuals may use to decide to re-share a 
story - a post could be funny, awe-inspiring or surprising, it might contain a photo, etc. In this 
model we assume all those other qualities even out. In other words, “all else being equal” users 
will be biased towards sharing stories that more strongly confirm their ideological and partisan 
views. 
Second, while the reader might agree in the general direction and angle of the lines presented in 
Figure 16, they might suggest minor alterations. It might be, for example, that there is a threshold 
beyond which the extremity of a message becomes off-putting; while a conservative might 
happily share a story that slams Obama’s accomplishments in office, if the story adds a racial 
layer it might make them pause. Similarly, a liberal might be apt to share a meme exhorting 
friends to fight climate change, but would hold back if the meme recommended using violence. 
We could also imagine individual users’ thresholds varying. But while these modifications – and 
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others I have not imagined – are certainly plausible, once again, I use this simplified schema for 
the sake of parsimony. 
With this decision model, we can now compare the diffusion of extreme and moderate 
information using the same simulation models above. Now, instead of assuming nodes have the 
same ideological sharing bias for all message left or right of neutral (as in Figure 15), in these 
simulations nodes’ curation bias is relative to the extremity of a message (as in Figure 16). Also, 
instead of looking at the relative number of conservatives and liberals exposed to a message, we 
compare the number of all nodes (conservative and liberal) who are exposed to an extreme vs. 
moderate message over successive waves of diffusion.  
I run simulations that diffuse messages of varying extremity from neutral (0.5) to extreme (0.95) 
on networks of varying levels of homophily. The results for networks with 80% and 95% 
homophily are shown in Figure 17. In a network with 80% homophily, in Figure 17a, we see a 
strong relationship between the ideological extremity of the message and the number of exposed 
nodes. Neutral messages (0.5) almost completely die out after 5 waves, while extreme messages 
(0.95) continue to proliferate (though at a decreasing rate). By the fifth wave, approximately five 
times as many nodes are exposed to extreme messages as they are to neutral messages.  
If we consider a network with higher levels of homophily, such as 95% in Figure 17b, we see 
that the gap between exposure to extreme as compared to neutral messages widen further, with 









Figure 17. The Viral Edge of Extreme Messages 
A. Network of 80% Homophily       B. Network of 95% Homophily 
 
Number of nodes exposed to messages at each wave of diffusion, looking at messages shared at different levels of 
selective curation (S) in networks of 80% and 95% homophily. In examining information sorting earlier we looked 
at the proportion of liberal to conservative messages nodes were exposed to. Here we see the total number of 
messages nodes are exposed to, depending on the selective curation nodes have for that message. If we assume 
extreme messages are shared with higher rates of selective curation (e.g. 0.95), those messages will proliferate at 
greater rates than neutral messages with rates of selective curation at 0.5 or 0.65. That viral edge is stronger in more 
homophilous networks. 
There is another take-away from Figure 17. Not only do extreme messages proliferate at higher 
rates than neutral messages, but - as distinct from information sorting which approaches an 
equilibrium - the disparity between neutral and extreme posts continues to diverge with each 
successive wave. In other words, as messages diffuse users are exposed to proportionately more 
extreme messages. 
It may not seem obvious why that would be the case; if all nodes re-share a neutral message at a 
rate of 5%, while an extreme liberal message is shared a rate of 1% by conservative nodes and 
9% by liberals, it might seem that both messages would proliferate at similar levels; 5% is, after 
all, the average of 1% and 9%.  
To see why the results above should not be surprising, let us return to infinite networks which, 
again, allow for mathematical interpretation. First imagine a perfectly polarized world; that is, a 
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connections. Let us assume each node has 100 friends. A moderate message in this network 
(which is really two disconnected networks) will spread at a rate of 2 ∗ (10 ∗ 0.05)𝑥  while an 
extreme message will spread at a pace of 1 ∗ (10 ∗ 0.01)𝑥 + 1 ∗ (10 ∗ 0.09)𝑥.  From what we 
know about exponential growth, the final term for the extreme message, 1 ∗ (10 ∗ 0.09)𝑥 , on its 
own will vastly dwarf the moderate message as x increases.  
But in our homophilous networks, liberals and conservatives don’t exist in distinct networks; 
there are cross-connections between the two ideological groups. To what extent will the spread 
of extreme messages dominate when there is cross sharing between two groups? We could 
mathematically express the total number of nodes that are exposed to a message at varying levels 
of homophily and active curation, but the notation becomes harrowingly complex after just two 
waves of diffusion. Instead, I model the spread of messages in an infinite network using Python 
code to see the differential effect of homophily and curation on the spread of extreme versus 
moderate information.  
A simple way to see that effect is to ask when (i.e. under what levels of homophily and message 
extremity) messages will continue to spread and when they will die out. To do so, we must first 
observe that in predicting when messages go viral or perish, users’ general willingness to re-post 
information and how many friends they have matter. If either parameter is high enough, then 
messages will continue to spread regardless of homophily or sharing biases; likewise if they are 
too low, then a message will always peter out. Those two factors combined – general willingness 
to re-post and number of friends – are what I will call the “ceiling rate of contagion”; that is, the 
number of users that would re-post a message if there were no homophily or selective sharing 
bias. If the ceiling rate of contagion is 2 or above, then a message will continue to proliferate 
forever regardless of how homophilous or biased the nodes are in what they share. This is 
because in the worst case scenario (from proliferation’s point of view) is if a node has equal 
numbers of liberal and conservative friends and those friends are 50% likely (times their general 
willingness to re-post) to reshare the message, then one friend (on average) will forward the 
message at each wave. If the ceiling rate of conversion is less than 1, on the other hand, the 
diffusion of a message will always eventually die out. This is because there is no level of 
homophily and sharing bias that will result in at least one friend reposting a message.  
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The question then is what happens in ceiling rates of contagion between 1 and 2? In figure 18, I 
present results of simulations for different ceiling rates of conversion, charting when we should 
expect a message to continue to spread after 10 waves of diffusion at different levels of 
homophily and curation – and when it will fade away.  
As we see in 18f, when the ceiling rate of contagion is two, as predicted, a message will continue 
to diffuse regardless of nodes’ homophily and curation bias for that message. On the other end, 
when the base rate is one (18a), a message will continue to spread only if homophily and 
curation biases are at 100%. In between, we see messages continuing to proliferate the greater 




Figure 18. When Ideological News Will Spread 
  A                                         B                                         C 
 
   D                                           E                                         F    
 
The conditions under which messages will continue to be re-shared in a network (“growth”) after 10 waves. Each 
figure represents simulations with different ceiling rates of contagion (1.0 to 2.0), which is a function of nodes’ 
general willingness to share a message and their number of friends. Messages will always continue to spread at high 
ceiling rates of contagion (>2) and will always die out if the ceiling rate of contagion is low (<1). In between, the 
more homophilous the network (“homophily”) and the more biased nodes are in sharing a message (“selective 
sharing”) the greater the chances that message will continue to spread. 
Again, if we make the assumption that users are more biased in sharing extreme messages, then – 
all else being equal – extreme messages will have an edge in proliferating through a network, 
particularly if a network itself is highly homophilous. We see this to be the case in our agent-
based model simulations and in infinite models. 
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From Models to Reality 
As the above discussion may have convinced you, the creation of echo chambers and spread of 
extreme views on social media are complex matters. But as the models in this chapter show, 
within that complexity some patterns emerge. For one, there is a limit to how much diffusion can 
sort political information and leave users in ideological bubbles. That limit is the degree of 
homophily in the network; if 90% of users’ friends share their ideology, information will be less 
than 90% sorted.26 The extent to which diffusion can promote extreme information, however, is 
unbounded; if we assume users tend to re-share extreme information, then extreme news stories 
will drown out moderate ones the more news diffuses. 
Outside of those two general observations, diffusion’s ability to filter our information bubbles 
and propagate extreme information depends on the specific parameters of a given network. For 
diffusion to increase information sorting, users would need to have an ideological bias for re-
sharing information that is at least as high as their bias in what they initially post. Exactly how 
much higher depends on users’ initial posting bias and on how homophilous the network is. 
Similarly, for diffusion to amplify the spread of extreme information, it would be necessary that 
users have a bias for re-sharing extreme information. To gauge how much of an extreming effect 
to expect, however, we would need to know how strong of an extreme curation bias users have, 
how homophilous the network is and how much extreme information users are initially exposed 
to. In short, to know if diffusion amplifies sorting and extreming in an online social network we 
need to know at least two things about that network: how homophilous is it and how biased its 
users are in sharing and re-sharing information.  
The next two sections are devoted to understanding what those parameters are in real online 
social networks. In the next section I review existing data on levels of homophily in social 
 
26 Again, this appears to be true given the modelling in the previous section. I, however, offer no proof that this is 
true for every type of network; I leave open that there exist black swan networks in which sorting can exceed the 
level homophily in a network. 
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networks on and off line. Following, I examine a unique data set that allows us, for the first time, 





Chapter 3. Homophily 
In the previous section we used models to better understand diffusion’s capacity to strengthen 
information bubbles and amplify extreme information in social networks. But models only give 
us a picture of what is possible given different assumptions about the real world. Ultimately, we 
want to know what those assumptions should be – in this case, what are social media users’ 
levels of homophily and curation bias?  
In this section and the next, I move from theoretical models to examine users’ homophily and 
curation preferences in existing social media sites. How much homophily is there in social 
media? What are users’ ideological curation biases for what they re-share? And do users have a 
curation bias for extreme information? 
I begin, in this section, with homophily. Although homophily is not required for extreming to 
occur, it is as close to a necessary precondition for information sorting as we can get. We would 
want to know at minimum if political homophily does, indeed, exist on social media. But we 
might also be interested in how strong the tendency is for like-minded folks to connect online; 
figuring out the strength of homophily will lead to better guesses about how much information 
sorting and extreming to expect on social media. For one, as we saw in the previous section, a 
network’s degree of homophily acts as a ceiling on how ideologically sorted information can be. 
The exact level of homophily (along with the sharing behavior of the users) also ultimately 
determines how much sorting and extreming occurs.  
Gauging homophily levels might also inform us whether homophily occurs at meaningful levels. 
Just about every study of online social networks tell us homophily exists, yet what merits that 
distinction is simply if users prefer to friend more like-minded friends than not – even if that 
preference is weak. If, for example, 55% of users’ connections share their ideology, we would 
say there is homophily; yet at such a low level that may seem inconsequential. What, though, 
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would be a meaningful level? If users surround themselves with 95% ideological self-replicas, it 
is easy declare homophily exists at alarming levels. But what if we find users are in 80% 
homophilous egonets? Or 60%? Deciding if homophily exists in a meaningful way may be a 
matter of taste.  
One meaningful threshold for our purposes would be whether levels of homophily online are any 
greater than what is seen offline. Theorists propose many reasons why we may expect homophily 
to be greater - as well as smaller - on social media (briefly discussed below). Remarkably, 
however, researchers have not offered an empirical comparison - although they have extensively 
studied homophily in online social networks, primarily Twitter and Facebook.27  
In this chapter, I review that - at times conflicting – set of research to lay out a range of 
homophily levels that are known to occur in online social networks. I then compare those levels 
to our offline lives, likewise using existing research as well as by analyzing data from two 
national surveys, the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Studies 
(ANES). I find a wide range of estimates for our online homophily, one that does not look 
dissimilar from our offline social networks. 
Some Expectations from Theoretical Work 
There are a few reasons to suspect our online networks are more homophilous than our real-life 
networks. We are now familiar with the inevitability of homophily offline; our choices about 
where to live, work, volunteer etc. will generally surround us with people who share our 
preferences. We will likewise tend to gravitate towards those similar to us and in turn be 
influenced by those connections. Yet in real life, we do not have full control over who we 
encounter day to day. Unless you work at a policy think tank or advocacy group, some of your 
 
27 Other meaningful thresholds might exist: one would be threshold beyond which negative consequences occur - for 
example, that affective polarization or intolerance kicks in. Such research, however, does not currently exist and is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
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co-workers are likely to not share your political views. Life may also bump you into counter-
ideologues at your child’s school, your gym or – as the cliché goes - at your Thanksgiving dinner 
table. On social media, in contrast, it is easy to avoid connecting to acquaintances with 
attitudinally discordant political views - or to “defriend” them when those challenging views are 
expressed - and create a homogenous network. It is also possible to further homogenize one’s 
online social world by finding and connecting to like-minded people who you wouldn’t be able 
to meet in real life (Bimber, 1998; Sunstein, 2009). 
Yet while social media makes greater levels of homophily possible, there are equally plausible 
arguments for why online social networks would be less homophilous than our offline world. 
Offline we are likely to encounter a smaller subset of friends and acquaintances who, precisely 
because of the frequency with which we spend time with them, will grow to share our 
worldview. We may also more selectively choose who, among those “close ties,” we talk to 
about politics. Online, in contrast, our day-to-day networks are likely to span a much wider net 
of “weak ties,” including high school friends, distant relatives and that guy you met at the dog 
run who has unconventional views on immigration (Brundidge, 2010). As opposed to offline, 
where we may be more selective with whom we talk politics, on social media we may more 
inadvertently bump into political discussions with people we’d likely never have a conversation 
with in real life (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). 
Levels of Homophily Online 
As mentioned earlier, there is no shortage of evidence that homophily exists on social media. 
Without exception, researchers find ideological and partisan homophily on social media sites, 
whether looking at how much co-ideologues overlap in who they follow (Boutyline & Willer, 
2017), who users retweet (Barbera et al, 2015; Conover et al, 2011) or mention (Conover et al, 
2011), or how many of users’ connections share their ideology (Bakshy et a;. 2015; Colleoni et 
al, 2014) or share their views on issues (Goel et al, 2010). 
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The exact levels of homophily online, however, are not as easily gauged looking at existing 
research. The first obstacle to estimating levels of homophily across social media sites is that 
researchers do not use similar measures. One of the more frequently cited articles, for example, 
measures homophily as the increased likelihood that users will mention or retweet a co-
ideologue (Conover et al, 2011). Another measures homophily as the likelihood that users’ 
connections will follow the same political actors (Boutyline & Willer, 2017).   
Fortunately, there is one measure – the proportion of users’ connections that share their political 
leanings – that is used frequently enough to give us a ballpark estimate for homophily on 
Facebook and Twitter.28  Unfortunately, at first glance, it is a particularly large ballpark - 67% to 
96%.  
What should we make of this broad range? For one, we should expect variation in homophily 
across platforms, because each are designed for different types of communication and 
community. Facebook, for example, is designed primarily for real-life connections and requires 
users to mutually accept friendships. We might expect Facebook to be more homophilous than 
Twitter which does not require reciprocity and so allows users to connect to a more eclectic array 
of users and users they do not personally know (Colleoni et al, 2014). We might also expect 
greater homophily on platforms that focus on political discussion, such as many subReddits, than 
on non-political topics, such as mommy groups (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). 
But inter-platform differences do not explain all the variation in estimates we see. Differences 
also comes from two choices researchers make in constructing their estimates; first, how to 
 
28 I restrict my gaze to those platforms for two reasons. One is purely practical: that is where the research is. Most 
scholars examining political polarization online look at either Facebook or Twitter. They have good reason to do so, 
since it is on those platforms where political information has its widest reach and largest volume. According to 
surveys from Pew in 2017 (Shearer & Gottlieb, 2017), 44% of Americans get some news via Facebook, and 12% via 
Twitter users (as for the other platforms: 4% get news via Reddit, 6% from Snapchat, and 8% via Instagram). 
Although Twitter’s reach is much smaller, it arguably has an outsized influence on the news agenda of more 




measure the political leaning of users and, often dependent on that first choice, which users to 
include in estimates.  
By and large, social media users do not publicly declare their ideology or partisanship on their 
social media profiles. Even when given a specific feature to do so, as on Facebook, only one in 
ten take the opportunity (Bakshy et al, 2015). Without such self-reports measures of ideology 
come in one of two types; 1. evaluations of the content of users’ messages; or 2. evaluations of 
the ideology of accounts users follow.  
Barbera et al (2015) use the latter approach in what may be the most widely cited and adopted 
method for estimating the ideology of Twitter users (Barbera, 2014). Using a Bayesian spatial 
model, they infer the ideology of Twitter users based on the accounts of political actors that they 
follow. Using this measure, the authors finds that 67% of the median user’s connections are co-
ideologues.29  
Colleoni et al (2014) likewise measure users’ ideology on Twitter, but do so by analyzing the 
content of their tweets. Their estimates for homophily not only differ from Barbera et al (2015), 
but also vary widely depending on the population of users they analyze. Drawing on the full 
Twittersphere in 2009, the authors first measured the homophily of users who had shared at least 
one political tweet30 and found that users were, on average, 80% homophilic. This number, 
however, hides a few complicating dimensions. Because the network of Twitter users they 
identified were overwhelmingly Democratic, if users randomly connected to other users, average 
homophily would be 77% - which makes it seem users have hardly any bias toward homophily at 
all. Yet when the authors separate out partisans, they find that Democrats would connect to co-
partisans 79% of the time at random, but in reality do so 88% of the time. Republicans, in 
contrast, would connect to other Republicans 63% of the time if at random, but do so only 23% 
 
29 Barbera does not distinguish varying levels of homophily between liberal and conservative Twitter users. 
30 The researchers used a machine learning method, basing their training set on tweets of users who exclusively 
followed either Democratic or Republican politicians on Twitter. 
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of the time.31  In other words, Democrats appear to have a bias toward homophily while 
Republicans do not. In part because the authors were surprised by the anti-homophilic behavior 
of Republicans they took a second pass at measuring homophily, this time only looking at users 
who follow political figures on Twitter. Limiting themselves to this smaller pool, their results 
flip; random connections would predict Democrats to be 51% homophilic and Republicans 93%, 
but they are in fact 44% and 96% homophilic respectively. These results should make us 
particularly cautious when considering measures of homophily; depending on which subset of 
users we include in the homophily pot, we could get vastly different results.  
Because of its strength in identifying user’s political leanings, I take the Barbera et al (2015) 
estimate as a more accurate representation of the homophily of Twitter users.32 But should that 
estimate be an upper or lower bound? Since their estimate is limited to users who follow political 
accounts, and since we know that the politically engaged tend to have stronger views (Mutz, 
2002b), we might expect that the Twitter users in their set would be more selective in connecting 
to others. Other analyses in their paper suggest this is the case; users they identify as “strong” 
ideologues have more homophilous egonets. It thus is likely the users in their estimates - who all 
follow at least one political account - are more homophilic than the average Twitter user. 
Turning to look at homophily levels in Facebook, the most cited estimate comes from 
Facebook’s own research team who have the advantage of having access to the self-identified 
ideology of 10.1 million of their active users. The authors report that among those users, on 
average 18% of liberals’ friends were conservative and, similarly, 20% of conservatives’ friends 
were liberal; in other words, liberals appear to be 82% homophilic and conservatives 80% 
homophilic on average. These proportions seem more homophilous than the findings of Barbera 
 
31 The expectation of 63% homophily - when Republicans only comprise 10% of the population - may seem 
surprising. If the researchers were using purely random attachment we would expect 10% homophily. Unfortunately 
the authors don’t say how their random graph was constructed to reach this number.  
32 Barbera (2015) validates those estimates by cross referencing to campaign donation records (>90% accuracy) and 




et al (2015), but they are not directly comparable primarily because moderates are included in 
Facebook’s denominator, whereas Barbera et al (2015) only considered connections among 
liberals and conservatives. If we were to convert Facebook’s estimate by removing moderates 
from the mix, homophily drops to 77%.  
The Twitter and Facebook estimates of homophily we have looked at so far are, again, based on 
users we can assume are more politically active - as they either follow a political account, have 
tweeted a political message or have bothered to identify their political leaning. Again, this is a 
special subset of users that we might expect to have more homogeneous ties. To get a full picture 
of levels of homophily on social media we would need to study the networks of the politically 
inactive as well. The challenge, as we have seen, is identifying the political leanings of social 
media users who don’t engage in politics (by posting, linking or self-labeling).  
Goel et al (2010) partly get around this limitation by launching a Facebook app that asked users 
to take a survey about their political beliefs - and then using those answers to measure 
homophily. Although users who choose to download the app may be a self-selecting group who, 
again, is likely to be more politically engaged, the app was advertised through multiple avenues 
and so had the potential to reach users who might not be normally politically engaged online. Of 
the 2,504 users surveyed, the researchers identified over 12,000 friend pairs between 900 users. 
On average, they found, friends agreed 75% of the time (across issue topics and ideology). But 
adjusting for the fact that a random pair in this sample would agree 63% of the time, the authors 
surmise that for an issue where there would be overall 50/50 agreement, friends would be likely 
to agree 67% of the time. While this number looks similar to the Twitter estimates of Barbera et 
al (2015), there is a key difference; Goel looks not at ideology or partisanship but at agreement 
across policy issues. Since Americans tend to be less polarized on issues (Fiorina et al, 2005), we 
may not be surprised that homophily on issues is weaker than ideological homophily on the same 
platform.  
It should also be noted that the measures above are imperfectly comparable for one more reason: 
some calculate homophily at the individual level and others at the population level. Goel et al 
(2010), for example, does the latter, simply looking at the proportion of all 12,000 connections 
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that are congruent or incongruent. Barbera et al (2015), in contrast, looks at each individual’s 
level of homophily and then averages across those individuals. Assuming not all nodes are 
connected to each other, calculating at the individual or population level will result in slightly 
different estimates of homophily. To see how that might be the case, consider Figure 19a where 
there are a total of four connections, two congruent (solid line) and two incongruent (dashed 
line). At the population level, homophily is 50%. At the individual level, however, we see there 
is one node with 100% homophily, one with 2/3rds, one with 1/2 and one with 0, resulting in an 
average homophily of 54%. Unfortunately, without full access to the researchers’ data sets, it is 
impossible to recalculate the measures above or even know if, say, we should expect homophily 
at the individual level to be higher than homophily at the population level. That would be the 
case if nodes with fewer friends tended to be more homophilic; yet while plausible we do not 
know if that is the case. The best we can say is that the two measures will not be far off from 
each other; to construct a network where the two measures diverge significantly (for example in 
Figure 19b where population homophily is 50% and average homophily is 58%) one has to be 
creative in structuring a network. We might then be confident that both measures fall within a 
couple of percentage points of each other.  
Figure 19. Two Ways to Calculate Network Homophily 
    A     B 
                             
These micro networks demonstrate the differences between calculating average homophily and network-wide 
homophily. In A, average homophily is 54% while network-wide homophily is 50%. In B, 58% and 50%, 
respectively. 
Such small discrepancies, moreover, unlikely account for the wide range of homophily estimates 
we see. Depending upon how we categorize the leanings of users, which users we include and 
the nature of the platform, we see levels of homophily anywhere from 67% to 96%. Yet, if we 
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set aside Colleoni’s estimates as outliers, a narrower range - and more cohesive picture emerges. 
At one end, on Facebook, approximately 77% of users’ friends share ideologies while on Twitter 
the average is 67%. The higher estimate on Facebook might be expected because, again, these 
are mutual friends and so are more apt to be close ties. Both estimates, however, may be upper 
bounds, as these samples are likely to be more politically engaged than the average social media 
user. Goel’s study, which is not limited to the politically engaged, suggests that Facebooks’ users 
may have yet more diverse friendship networks - with homophily as low as 67%. If we assume 
that expanding the breadth of users to the less politically active would diminish estimates of 
homophily, then Twitter users may themselves be less than 67% homophilic on average. Given 
an upper bound of 77% homophily and a lower bound less than 67%, a conservative estimate of 
homophily on social media might be in the range of 70-75%.  
Homophily in Real Life 
How does a 70-75% homophily estimate on social media compare to homophily in real life? 
While estimating homophily online presents challenges, they pale in comparison to challenges of 
estimation offline. On social media the primary hurdle is identifying the ideology of users. Once 
that is known, however, it is then trivial to observe who connects to whom. In assessing whom 
we associate with in real life, by contrast, researchers generally have an easy time identifying the 
ideology of individuals (by asking them in surveys), yet have difficulty observing links between 
those individuals.  
The standard study on real life homophily depends on self-report, asking individuals to identify 
their ideology and the ideology of those they interact with at various levels of intimacy.33 This 
approach has its weaknesses: subjects may not only have difficulty recalling who they associate 
 
33 Not all studies. In “snowball” studies run by Huckfeldt, about to be discussed, researchers survey subjects’ friends 
as well in order not to depend on their friends’ estimates. Yet other studies, usually conducted in organizations, are 
able to create a fuller map of connections by interviewing all members or by using technology to observe who 
connects to whom (e.g. Orbach et al, 2015). 
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with, but may also have a poor sense of what their friends’ political leanings are (Huckfeldt & 
Sprague, 1987). If survey participants were simply inaccurate at recalling or guessing their 
friends’ ideologies, this at least would not be an inferential problem for researchers; subjects’ 
errors would cancel each other out giving us a good approximation of the average level of 
homophily. The risk, however, is that subjects’ errors are not random, but instead share the same 
biases or cognitive shortcomings. One such known bias is that subjects will overestimate how 
much their friends share their political views (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). Another - conflicting 
- bias could be that subjects will want to believe their social networks are more diverse than they 
are; nobody likes to admit they’re a closed-minded ideologue (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). 
As with estimates for homophily online, measurements for offline homophily also come in 
different flavors. Yet a couple of well-regarded papers use a measure homophily offline similar 
to studies above by simply looking at the proportion of like-minded connections.  
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) use data from GSS to estimate offline homophily as a proportion 
of connections that share one’s ideology.34 The GSS survey, given in 2006, asks subjects to think 
of people they are “acquainted with” in their neighborhood, at work, and in voluntary 
organizations35 as well as to think of people in their family and people whom they trust. Subjects 
are then asked how many they are “pretty certain” are “strongly” liberal and conservative, given 
the choices 0, 1, 2-5, 6-10 or more than 10. Looking at the answers of all subjects who identify 
themselves as at least “slightly” liberal or conservative, and converting those bin answers to 0, 1, 
3.5, 8 and 12, we can see in Table 1 that homophily ranges from 58% (for acquaintances at 
voluntary organizations) to 66% (for people subjects say they trust): 
 
 
34 This is not, however, the ultimate measure they use in their paper. Rather they measure “ideological segregation” 
as the distance between the proportion of connections who are conservative among conservatives and liberals. 
35 Such as “schools, clubs, associations, or places of worship.” 
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Table 1. Homophily in Offline Networks 
 All ideologues Solid ideologues 
Voluntary associations 57.8% 60.6% 
Neighborhood 60.2% 63.7% 
Family 62.6% 66.3% 
Acquaintances 62.5% 68.7% 
Work 58.5% 60.8% 
Trusted friends 65.5% 70.4% 
Levels of homophily (% of connections that are strong co-ideologues) among social groups for all ideologues and 
strong ideologues. GSS 2006. 
Those levels of homophily seem substantially lower than what we saw on social media, but there 
is at least one reason we would expect them to be. Recall that the estimates for homophily on 
Twitter and Facebook were restricted to presumably more politically engaged users and thus 
users with stronger ideologies. The GSS sample, in contrast, includes people with weak as well 
as strong ideological leanings, so we would expect them to have more diverse networks. If, 
however, we restrict the GSS sample to only those with relatively strong ideological 
identification (by removing subjects who noted they were “slightly” liberal or conservative), 
levels of homophily range from 61% (voluntary associations) to 70% (trusted friends). 
Even with this adjustment, we should be cautious in using these estimates for reasons already 
mentioned. Subjects are known to have less than perfect recall when asked to describe their 
worlds. People are subject to an array of limitations and biases when asked to recall information; 
they may pull on information that is most accessible - because it is recent or salient - that then 
gives an inaccurate representation of their lives (Schwarz, 1999). Most critical to our concerns, 
subjects may want to answer in ways that project a positive image of themselves. If, for example, 
subjects wanted to think of themselves as open minded (and not stuck in an echo chamber), they 
may imagine they associate with more counter-ideologues than they do. Their answers, however, 
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could also suffer from the opposite bias; they may overestimate how much others agree with 
them and thus underestimate how many counter-ideologues are in their circles (Goel et al, 2010; 
Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). 
Huckfeldt et al (1995) uses a survey methodology that helps mitigate those potential biases by 
forcing subjects to be more specific and concrete in thinking about the ideology of their friends. 
Looking at levels of agreement among citizens in Germany, Japan and the US in 1992, 
researchers asked participants for up to four names of people they talk to about important matters 
and then one more name of someone (not on that list) that they talk to about politics. Participants 
then note the party those acquaintances prefer. Measuring the proportion of all connections that 
agree at the population level (as in the Goel paper), they find that among the acquaintances 
whose party preferences US participants can identify there is 65% homophily. 
The 2009 ANES survey uses a similar approach, asking participants to list the first names of up 
to eight people with whom they spoke “about government or elections” in the previous six 
months. They are then asked (for up to the first three names) whether that person “probably 
think[s] of him or herself as a Republican or Democrat.” Among 1524 self-identified partisans 
who said they had spoken to at least one person about politics, on average 79% of their partisan 
interlocutors shared their partisan identity. If we include in this analysis subjects who “lean” 
Democrat or Republican, the rate of homophily decreases to 72%.  
This estimate is higher than the ones we see in the GSS data and Huckfeldt et al (1995) study, 
but the reader likely has already surmised why that would be the case. In the ANES survey 
subjects are explicitly asked to think about whom they discuss politics with. It is reasonable to 
guess the talking partners who come to mind are those the subject speaks to most frequently 
about politics and thus are more likely to be close connections that share their political beliefs. 
The GSS survey, in contrast, first asks subjects to think of a wide array of acquaintances, which 
would include acquaintances subjects are unlikely to discuss politics with. The prompt in 
Huckfeldt et al (1995) about “people you trust” similarly might capture a more ideologically 
diverse crowd than the ANES’s “people you discuss politics with.” Another explanations for the 
divergence could be the difference between asking about ideology (GSS and Huckfeldt et al) or 
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partisanship (ANES). Finally given trends affective partisanship, it is also possible that part of 
the difference between the Huckfeldt et al (1995) and ANES estimates is due to rising homophily 
(among discussion partners) between 1992 and 2009. 
It must also be noted that the ANES question does not necessarily exclude discussants on social 
media. Although the survey taker asked subjects if they “talked” to anyone, they left open the 
medium of discussion to include “face-to-face, on the phone, by email, or in any other way.” It is 
more than possible, then, that respondents’ lists include friends that they “talk” to on social 
media.  
Homophily On and Off Social Media: The Upshot 
So are our networks on social media more homophilous than our offline networks? The evidence 
above is inconclusive. Reliable estimates for homophily on Twitter and Facebook range from 67-
77%, but those estimates are based on networks of more politically engaged users, so we can 
assume they are higher than for the typical user. Offline, if we restrict estimates to more engaged 
individuals, we see estimates ranging between 61-70%. If, however, we focus on a small subset 
of individuals’ most frequent political interlocutors, homophily rises to 79%. 
The only thing the evidence may tell us is that we have no strong evidence that our friends on 
social media are any more homophilic than our friends in real life. Likewise, we would be hard 
pressed to say that our offline friendship networks create more of a bubble than our social media 
networks. If anything, the estimates above suggest that homophily online is a near reflection of 
our offline worlds. This would align with theorists who argue that technology - in particular 
innovation in communication technology - does not change human behavior, but rather gives 
humans another platform to extend that behavior (Gaver, 1991; Gibson, 1977).  
Moving forward in this dissertation, however, we can take away a good working estimate for 
homophily online of about 70%. This is at the lower end of the 67% - 77% range yet assuming 
that range, again, overestimates average homophily on social media a 70% estimate is possibly 
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conservative. In the final section of Part I, I will use that estimate to re-run the models in the 
previous section. But first it is necessary to get an estimate for users’ curation biases on social 




Chapter 4. Curation 
In 1949, David Manning White, a journalism professor at a Midwest university, asked a local 
“wire editor” to do something that had never been done before - hold on to the wire stories he 
decided not to print (White, 1950).  
White was exploring an idea that to become news, events had to pass through a series of gates 
manned by “gate keepers” each deciding which stories merit being published. A newspaper’s 
wire editor acted as a final gatekeeper; as stories came through the three major wire services - at 
the time, Associated Press, United Press and International News Services - the wire editor 
chooses which to run in the next day’s publication and which to put in the trash bin. At White's 
request, instead of discarding stories that didn't make the cut, for one week this wire editor 
agreed to hold them in a box for the young professor. 
White knew that to understand why some new stories made it through the gate, you need to see 
all the articles that vied for publication. Anyone can see the stories that make it into print; White 
could now see the full set of stories the editor chose from – and so see which factors he selected 
for.   
Similarly today if we want to measure political biases that affect social media users’ choices 
about what to share, it’s not enough to see what they “print” on their walls – we also need to see 
the stories they pass over. 
Existing research on social media users’ curation behavior only looks at their “printed” stories 
and leave out the set of stories users choose from. Those studies confirm the intuition that 
ideologues and partisans tend to post news stories that align with their beliefs; that is, they are de 
facto ideological curators (An et al, 2014a; An et al, 2014b; Barbera et al, 2015; Shin & Thorsen, 
2017). But we do not know if users also actively select politically congruent news to share with 
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their friends, or if they simply pass on any given story on their feed with some constant 
probability. We also do not know if they have a preference to re-post extreme information.   
Therefore, as with understanding what becomes news, we need data that shows us not only what 
news users post, but also what stories they choose from. I collect such a data set from the social 
network site Twitter.36 I choose Twitter for the same reason most researchers do: unlike 
Facebook and other online social networks, Twitter’s data is publicly available. Anyone with a 
Twitter account can use the platform’s API to query and download its data, although with 
limits.37 
Like all online social networks, Twitter has its own unique set of characteristics which shape the 
culture, norms and behavior of users; for example, text used in posts is limited to 280 characters 
and connections between users do not have to be mutual. Twitter users are also more educated 
and more male than users of other popular social network sites including Facebook, Instagram 
and Snapchat (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017). As such, we cannot assume that the sharing of 
behavior of Twitter users represents the behavior of all social media users.  
At the same time, Twitter may be a particularly apt platform to study if we are interested in how 
political information is shared. Twitter users tend to be more politically engaged than average 
(Shearer & Gottfried, 2017) so while Twitter as a whole may not reflect what occurs on other 
platforms, it may represent the exchange of political information that occurs on those platforms. 
Twitter also plays an outsized role in the dissemination of political news, often influencing the 
news picked up by news organizations; so we may be interested in Twitter as a phenomenon in 
its own right.38  Finally, it may be that Twitter’s specific features, its “affordances” in the 
 
36 The data I collect allows me only to look at users’ selective curation from among the tweets that they see; I do not 
collect the totality of news that users are exposed to from all media. Yet, as will be discussed, even limited to 
observing users’ choices from among tweets we can make educated guesses about their selective curation from other 
media sources.  
37 The freely available API is known as the “garden hose” because of the relatively restricted flow of data one can 
pull from. There is also a paid-for “fire hose” service for collecting data which this researcher did not use. 
38 74% of its users receive at least some news on the platform (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017) and virtually all media 
companies and political actors have a presence on Twitter. 
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language of media studies, and its norms are what make it fertile ground for news dissemination. 
Thus we might suspect that future social media platforms that are popular for sharing political 
news will have characteristics in common with Twitter. 
Data & Measures 
To measure users’ active ideological curation, I collected the Twitter posts of a convenience 
sample of 472 Twitter users over a three month period from September through November, 
2016. During that period I also collected the tweets from a sample of the Twitter accounts those 
users followed.  
Most of those 472 Twitter users were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. As participants 
in previous online surveys they were asked if they had a Twitter account and, if so, if they would 
share their Twitter handle and political ideology, and also allow researchers to observe their 
tweeting behavior. Among those who said yes, I followed all who had active accounts - i.e. who 
had posted at least one tweet in the past six months.  
Just as Twitter users may not be typical social media users, Mechanical Turk workers also have 
atypical demographics. Mechanical Turk workers are more male (54% as opposed to 48%), 
younger (32, 48), more educated (45% with a college degree instead of 29%) and more liberal 
(46% identify as Democrats as opposed to 36%) than a representative sample of American 
adults. Yet some characteristics that distinguish Mechanical Turk workers from the US 
population make them similar to Twitter users who are likewise more likely to be male (53%), 
younger (42) and highly educated (45% with college degrees). The exception is partisanship; 
36% of Twitter users as compared to 46% Mturk workers identify as Democrats. Perhaps the 
greatest distinguishing factor between Mechanical Turk workers and Twitter users is race; 59% 
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of Twitter users identify as White while 72% of Mechanical Turk workers do – and the latter 
number is possibly an underestimate (Levay et al, 2016; Shearer & Gottfried, 2017).39  
In addition to the 472 panelists, I also collected the outgoing tweets and a sample of incoming 
tweets for 5000 random Twitter users.40 Unlike the 472 panelists, I did not have the self-reported 
ideology for these users, but their data can be used for examining extreme curation. While it is 
necessary to know the ideology of users to measure their ideological curation biases, no such 
requirement is needed to measure their bias toward sharing extreme information; one merely 
needs to know the ideology of tweets users are exposed to and that they re-tweet.  
User Ideology 
For user ideology I use self-reports of the 472 panelists, each of whom placed themselves on a 
seven-point scale from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). This measure improves upon 
previous work on curation biases on Twitter, which usually infers user partisanship and ideology 
from indicators on their Twitter accounts, such as the content of users’ tweets or the political 
accounts they follow. While inferred measures of political leanings may be reliable (of note, 
Barbera (2015) has greater than 90% validity), they confound our ability to test for both de facto 
and active curation. Estimates of user ideology that depend on the accounts users follow, for 
example, may be correlated with the ideology of users’ tweets for two reasons: they may, indeed, 
correlate because a user has an ideological curation bias, but it is also possible because the tweets 
a user selects its re-tweets from will be from the accounts they follow. If users’ ideologies are 
inferred from those accounts, we should not be surprised that a user identified as conservative 
also posts conservative tweets. Even more problematic are measures of user ideology that depend 
on the content of the user’s tweets, in which case the measure for message content and the user’s 
 
39 In the Mturk study conducted by Levay et al (2016) 7% of respondents did not identify their race. 
40 To collect a random sample of Twitter users, I used a random number generator (in Python) and used Twitter’s 
API to check if there was a user ID associated with that number. Among existing accounts found, I collected tweets 




ideological leanings will be nearly identical. Self-reported ideology, in contrast, gives us an 
independent measure that lets us avoid the use of collinear and possibly confounding variables.  
Tweets and Tweet Ideology 
To estimate the ideology of the political information that users post and are exposed to it is 
necessary to address two challenges. For one, there must be a way to determine if a tweet is 
“political.” Second, we must reliably and validly code political content as liberal or conservative. 
To kill two birds with one methodological stone, I use the ideological news index created by 
Bakshy et al (2015) which estimates the ideology of 500 news sites based on the sharing 
behavior of 10 million Facebook users with self-identified political leanings. To cull out soft 
news sites, the measure uses a trained “support vector machine” to identify only hard news. I use 
that index to assign an ideology to all tweets that include a link to one of those 500 sites. A 
shortcoming of such a measure is that it is based on the behavior of users a year before the tweets 
in this study were collected, during which time there may have been shifts in the ideology of 
news sites. Assuming any shifts were randomly distributed (i.e., there was no imbalanced trend), 
however, any changes from the time the Bakshy index was created should not bias these results.  
I likewise use the Bakshy measure to assess the ideology of tweets users are exposed to. Ideally 
we would measure every tweet from all accounts followed by those 5,472 users, but given the 
limits of data collection set by Twitter’s API I instead selected a random sample of 100 of the 
twitter accounts each user followed, collecting all the tweets from those accounts over the same 
three month period.41  
We must be cautious, however, in saying that this represents the tweets users are exposed to. In 
February 2016 Twitter began promoting the posts it believed its users, based on their previous 
behavior, would be more interested in (@mjahr, 2016). This type of algorithmic filtering is 
 
41 Tweets were collected at the end of each month using Twitter’s API and the Python “Twitter” package. Because 
Twitter limits the collection to the 3,200 most recent tweets it was necessary to collect the tweets of prolific 
accounts twice a month. 
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known to result in greater exposure to ideologically consonant information in Facebook (Bakshy 
et al, 2015) so we might assume it would have a similar effect in Twitter. Given that is the case, 
the estimates we find for users’ exposure to ideologically friendly information are likely 
underestimates.  
In using the Bakshy measure, I am both able to limit my analysis to the spread of hard news 
stories while also having a reliable estimate for the ideology of those news stories. The downside 
is that by using only links to hard news sites, I limit the number of tweets in the data set. Even 
so, I end up with workable number of users and tweets; over the three-month period 140 of the 
panelists and 571 of the random users posted at least one link to a news site in the Bakshy index, 
posting a total of more than 6,000 links. 
Analyzing Ideological Curation 
To determine users’ ideological curating biases, I look at the tweeting behavior of the 472 
panelists only, as these are the users for whom we have self-reported ideology. Given what we 
know about Mechanical Turk workers it is not surprising that our sample leans liberal (Figure 
20). Among the 140 who tweeted out at least one political link, 89 report being liberal, 30 as 
moderate, and only 21 as conservative. Because of the relatively small number of conservatives 




Figure 20. Ideology of Twitter Users in Sample 
 
Count of subjects in panel by stated ideology from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). 
To assess levels of de facto ideological curation (again, how much ideologues tend to share 
ideologically consonant information, regardless of what tweets they themselves are exposed to), I 
use two measurements: the average ideology of the tweets users post and the proportion of 
liberal to conservative tweets shared by users, both based on the Bakshy estimates.42 
As we can see from Figures 21a and 21b, users’ stated ideology is, as expected, associated with 
the ideology of tweets users post both when looking at average ideology (p < 0.01) and, to a 
lesser degree, at the proportion of liberal tweets (p < 0.1). The average tweet ideology of strong 
liberal users (ideology = 6 or 7) is 0.33 on a scale from most conservative (-1) to most liberal (1), 
while 80% of their tweets on average are liberal leaning. Moderate users (ideology = 3, 4, or 5), 
by comparison, have an average tweet ideology of 0.19 and a 67% liberal tweet rate. Strong 
conservative users (ideology = 6 or 7), finally, have a 0.06 average tweet ideology and a 63% 
liberal tweet rate.43 
 
42 I reverse code these estimates so that it is easier for the reader to visually compare “average tweet ideology” with 
“proportion of liberal tweets” in the figures; otherwise the trends would appear at first glance to go in opposite 
directions. 




Figure 21. De facto Selective Curation: The Association Between User Ideology and Ideology of 
their Tweets on Twitter 
A. Average tweet ideology                              B. Proportion liberal tweets 
 
X-axis: stated ideology of users from (1) very liberal to (7) very conservative. Y-axis: (a) Average ideology of 
posted tweets using reverse coded Bakshy Index from very liberal (1) to very conservative (-1) and (b) proportion of 
liberal tweets (positive on Bakshy Index). OLS regression lines w/ 95% CI shown. 
Even though this sample confirms previous findings – and common intuition – that the ideology 
of a social media user is associated with the ideology of what they share, it should be noted that 
there is considerable cross-ideological sharing. Even those who call themselves “very liberal” are 
not purists; on average 18% of the news links they post are to conservative sites.44 
What of active curation? Recall for us to believe active ideological curation occurs, we must 
observe that tweets users post are more ideologically-homogeneous than those they are exposed 
 
44 The reader may wonder if at least part of this “cross-ideological” sharing is a product of the “retweeting is not 
endorsement” phenomenon; that is, a retweet of a NYTimes article could mean one shares the sentiment of that 
article, or – in the feed of a conservative – could come with the presumption of mockery. While it is impossible to 
know the sentiment of a straight retweet (that is, a retweet with no annotation from the retweeter), one can look at 
“original” tweets that link to articles and include a comment from the poster to see if the user’s comment indicates 
mockery (or another form of non-endorsement) of the article it is sharing. To see how pervasive non-endorsement 
tweets might be, I hand coded 500 such tweets and was only able to identify 13 (2.6%) as likely non-endorsements. 
Although a data analysis with a small sample and one coder, it indicates that non-endorsement tweets are unlikely to 
account for all the cross-ideological posting observed among Twitter users. 
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to. As a first step toward detecting active curation, I compare the average ideology of tweets 
users are exposed to (“incoming”) alongside those they post (“outgoing”), and likewise compare 
the proportion of users’ incoming and outgoing liberal tweets. As seen in Figure 22, there is little 
difference between the tweets that come in and those that go out; if anything users appear to have 
an inverse bias, with liberals posting links that are less liberal than the tweets they are exposed 
to.45 
Figure 22. Ideology of Incoming and Outgoing Tweets 
A. Average tweet ideology                              B. Proportion liberal tweets 
 
Average ideology of tweets (A) and proportion of liberal tweets (B) that users are exposed to (blue) and that they 
tweet out (yellow), looking across very liberal (1) to very conservative (7) Twitter users in panel sample.  
The graphs in Figure 22, however, compare incoming tweets to all outgoing tweets; it may be 
more apt to look just at retweets and disregard “original” tweets. Retweets are, as they sound, 
tweets that a user re-posts on their wall, where they appear along with a notation that it is a 
retweet (“RT”) and a reference to the originating user. Users also have a choice to add a 
 
45 We should also recall that Twitter likely prioritizes ideologically congruent tweets, so the estimate for incoming 
tweets may underestimate the proportion of ideologically congruent tweets a user actually sees.  
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comment to the post; in Twitter jargon, a retweet with a comment is an “annotated” tweet. 
Original tweets are generated by the user either by copying and pasting an outside link into a 
twitter post or by using a news site’s Twitter app. Of the two types of tweets, retweets give us a 
more precise picture of bias in curation, since we can more directly compare the set of 
information users are exposed to and what they choose to retweet. Original tweets, by contrast, 
would need to be compared to the totality of the news environment users are exposed to both on 
and off Twitter, information this researcher does not have access to.  
Zeroing in on retweets, Figure 23 shows the ideological difference between what users see on 
their Twitter feeds and what they retweet. Again, there is little movement; users, on average, 
retweet what they are exposed to without seemingly discriminating between left and right. The 
possible exception are those who identify as just left of center; their outgoing retweets are 









46 The propensity of liberal centrists to retweet proportionately more liberal links is seen more strongly when just 
looking at tweets from “unverified” accounts. That centrists are the only ones to exhibit a curation bias may, at first, 
seem surprising since we might expect more extreme users to have a stronger bias in what they re-share. A plausible 
explanation, however, is that we are seeing a ceiling effect: extremely liberal users can’t retweet more liberally than 




Figure 23. Ideological Difference Between What Users See and Retweet 
A. Average tweet ideology                B. Proportion liberal tweets 
 
Difference in average ideology of tweets (A) and proportion of liberal tweets (B) between what users are exposed to 
and what they retweet. 
Figures 22 and 23 give us visual evidence that users are not biased curators. To confirm 
statistically that there is no difference between users’ incoming tweets and outgoing retweets, I 
run a multiple linear regression of user ideology on outgoing tweet ideology holding constant the 
ideology of a user’s incoming tweets. Whereas we saw previously that user ideology has a strong 
association with outgoing tweet ideology on its own, when accounting for ideology of incoming 
tweets that relationship is weakened when the unit of analysis is average ideology (p = 0.08) and 
becomes statistically insignificant when comparing the proportion of ideologically-congruent 
tweets (p = 0.31). As Figure 23 suggests, the relationship is even more tenuous when looking 
only at retweets (p > 0.1 for both average ideology and proportion of liberal tweets).  
One Explanation for the Absence of Active Ideological Curation 
This absence of biased retweeting contradicts popular intuition. A possible explanation why we 
do not see biased curation, however, is that social media users are adept at pre-selecting their 
information environment. If users choose to follow news sources that align with their ideology, 
they obviate the need to impose a selection bias on the stories they share. In other words, it may 
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be that any ideological selection bias happens at the level of selective exposure (users’ bias in 
what accounts to follow) and not selective curation.  
If this were the case, the ideology of incoming tweets should mediate any effect of user ideology 
on their tweets. To test for such a relationship, I use the R mediation package of Tingley et al 
(2014). Results, shown in Figure 24a, demonstrate that, indeed, any effect of user ideology on 
retweet ideology is mediated through the ideology of incoming tweets (Average Causal 
Mediation Effect or ACME), whereas ideology has no direct effect (Average Direct Effect or 
ADE). 
That mediated relationship becomes even more pronounced if we distinguish between “verified” 
and “unverified” accounts that users follow. Verified accounts are those that Twitter deems to be 
of “public interest” and that are “typically maintained by users in music, acting, fashion, 
government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key interest areas” 
(Twitter). We can assume that verified accounts are more likely to belong to figures whom users 
follow due to their public presence rather than due to a social connection. Unverified users, in 
contrast, are more likely to be followed because users are friends or have some other kind of 
offline relationship (Barbera, 2014). 
If the reason we do not see biases in retweeting is because users are, indeed, carefully selecting 
their information environment to reflect their ideology, we would expect a stronger mediating 
relationship when looking at retweets from verified accounts than from unverified accounts.47 
Figures 24b and 24c show evidence to support exactly that conjecture. The entire effect of user 
ideology on retweets from verified accounts is mediated through incoming tweets. By contrast, 
not only is there a minimal mediated effect of incoming tweets via unverified accounts, ideology 
has negligible (and non-statistically significant) overall effect on what users retweet from 
unverified accounts. 
 
47 As discussed previously, although our friends do tend to share our political views, because we pick our friends for 
reasons other than shared political views, homophily is not absolute (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). 
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Figure 24. Selective Curation Mediated by Selective Exposure 
A. All tweets        B. Verified accounts        C. Unverified accounts 
 
Mediated effect of users’ ideology on outgoing tweets (Average Causal Mediated Effect or ACME), mediated by 
incoming tweets compared to Average Direct Effect (ADE). A. All incoming tweets and retweets. B. From 
“verified” accounts. C. From “unverified” accounts. 
This last result contains some surprising – and promising – news about social media.  “Social 
media” can be broadly used to describe platforms where any user can connect to another account 
for the purposes of sending or receiving information. A narrower definition of social media, 
however, only includes those connections that are social in nature – i.e. between two individuals 
who know each other as opposed to between, say, a news organization and an individual. Twitter 
allows for both types of connections. Connections between news organizations and users are best 
reflected in verified accounts and their followers; we could even say that connections to verified 
accounts are a variant of the traditional broadcast media model in which media institutions 
produce news and consumers choose which media outlet to follow. Networks of “unverified” 
accounts, however, represent the “social” dimension of social media (Colleoni et al, 2014).  
Using this distinction, we see a clean relationship between traditional media accounts and the 
users that follow and retweet them: users choose to follow media that reflects their political 
beliefs and, in turn, share information that likewise reflects their political beliefs. When it comes 
to the friends we follow – the social part of social networks – however, our ideology is not so 
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neatly aligned with the political information we receive or share with our friends. This suggests 
that, even with homophily, our friends expose us to information that we would not choose to 
consume ourselves. It also suggests that social media – as opposed to the traditional media model 
– allows users to likewise pass along a more diverse set of news to their friends. In other words, 
there is a weaker echo in our social media than in our traditional media use. 
Analyzing Extreme Curation 
In the analysis above we could not find evidence that users have an ideological bias in what they 
choose to retweet. But might they still have a preference for sharing extreme messages? 
As we did in searching for ideological curation biases, we can look for an extreming bias by 
seeing if the proportion of extreme information that users are exposed to matches or is exceeded 
by what they tweet out. To do so, I bin tweets into deciles, using the Bakshy index once more, 
from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative” media sources. Examples of news sources 
in each decile are shown in Table 2. With these categories I can compare the distribution of 








Extremely liberal < -0.8 thenation.com, occupydemocrats.com, dailykos.com, 
msnbc.com 
Strongly liberal -0.8 to -0.6 newyorker.com, slate.com, vox.com, huffingtonpost.com, 
npr.org 
Solidly liberal -0.6 to -0.4 nytimes.com, buzzfeed.com, thedailybeast.com, 
bostonglobe.com 
Moderately liberal -0.4 to -0.2 time.com, economist.com, nbcnews.com, cnn.com, 
washingtonpost.com 
Marginally liberal -0.2 to 0 bloomberg.com, baltimoresun.com, cbsnews.com, 
usatoday.com 
Marg. conservative 0 to 0.2 nationaljournal.com, cnbc.com, forbes.com, thehill.com 
Mod. conservative 0.2 to 0.4 nypost.com, wsj.com, reason.com, examiner.com 
Solidly 
conservative 




0.6 to 0.8 christianpost.com, washingtontimes.com, newsmax.com, 
foxnews.com 
Ext. conservative > 0.8 dailycaller.com, nationalreview.com, breitbart.com, 
rushlimbaugh.com 
  
Figure 25 shows the aggregate distribution of tweets all 472 panelists are exposed to compared to 
what they retweet. In the top row, we almost see a normal distribution of incoming tweets, with 
users mostly exposed to centrist tweets and thin tails of exposure at the extremes. In the second 
row, we likewise see that users mostly tweet out posts from the center, yet the distribution is 
considerably flattened and the tails at either extreme are far more pronounced. We see this 
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pattern both for tweets from verified and unverified accounts, though it appears to be a stronger 
trend with the latter. 
Figure 25. Aggregate Extreme Curation: Panelists in Sample 
A. All tweets                          B. Verified tweets                       C. Unverified tweets 
 
 
Distribution of tweets panelists are exposed to (“tweets in”) and retweet (“retweets out”) from the most liberal decile 
(-1.0 to -0.9 on Bakshy index) to the most conservative decile (0.9 to 1.0 on Bakshy index) for a) all incoming 
tweets, b) tweets from verified accounts and c) tweets from unverified accounts. In all cases, the distribution of 
articles users retweet is heavier at the tails of distribution than are the distribution of articles they are exposed to. 
To check that the above results are not particular to our set of panelists, I run the same analysis 
with the random pool of 5,000 tweeters that were followed over the same time. We see a similar 
pattern in Figure 26 where, again, users retweet proportionally more extreme tweets than what 
comes through their feed. Also mirroring the results above, there appears to be a stronger 





Figure 26. Aggregate Extreme Curation: Random Sample of Twitter Users 
A. All tweets                          B. Verified tweets                       C. Unverified tweets 
 
 
Distribution of tweets random users are exposed to (“tweets in”) and retweet (“retweets out”) from the most liberal 
decile (-1.0 to -0.9 on Bakshy index) to the most conservative decile (0.9 to 1.0 on Bakshy index) for a) all incoming 
tweets, b) tweets from verified accounts and c) tweets from unverified accounts. In all cases, the distribution of 
articles users retweet is heavier at the tails of distribution than are the distribution of articles they are exposed to. 
These results reflect observations in other studies that look at the distribution of the political 
information users share. Facebook researchers, for one, chart both the distribution of unique 
URLs that circulate on its platform (Figure 27a) as well as the proportion of the links users 
shares (Figure 27b). Although there are a fair amount of “neutral” URLs in the Facebook 
information environment, users are not generally interested in sharing them. Instead they are 






Figure 27. Signs of Extreme Curation on Facebook 
   A       B 
  
Distribution of hard news URLs shared by Facebook’s self-identified liberals and conservatives, looking at (A) 
number of unique URLS and (B) total number of URLs shared. From Bakshy et al, 2015. 
Harvard’s Berkman Center researchers sees similar distributions when they looked at the news 
URLs users shared on Facebook and Twitter.48 Again, as seen in Figure 28, users show a 
preference for sharing news stories at the farther ends of the news media spectrum. 
Figure 28. More Signs of Extreme Curation on Facebook and Twitter 
   Twitter               Facebook 
 
Distribution of news stories shared on Twitter and Facebook, from Faris et al, 2017. 
 
48 The Berkman study used a similar method to assign ideology scores for media articles as does the Facebook team; 
sites’ left-right score depends on the proportion of left to right users who share with those articles. A key difference 
with their methods is that the Berkman ideology estimates depend on identifying the ideology of users by who 




The results from the Twitter data in this study – along with data from the Berkman and Facebook 
papers – indicate that there is an aggregate trend toward re-sharing extreme posts. But we still do 
not know whether that finding driven by the extreme tweeting of a small number of avid users – 
or is it a broad tendency across users? To see, I compare the average proportion of moderate 
(quintile 1) to extreme (quintile 5) tweets that individual users are exposed to and that they 
retweet, with results seen in Figure 29. For both verified and unverified tweets, users on average 
tend to retweet out fewer moderate tweets (1) and proportionately more extreme tweets (quintiles 
4 and 5). As we saw above, the bias toward retweeting extreme tweets is even starker among 
unverified tweets. Again, checking that this pattern is not particular to the panelists, we see 
similar results among the random pool of 5,000 Tweeters. 
Finally, one might be curious to see if this a bias toward re-sharing extreme tweets on one’s side 
of the ideological divide – or a general propensity to retweet extreme stories. There are at least 
two reasons why a liberal user, for example, may want to share an extreme conservative post; 
they may want to mock that post or to alert her friends to the “outrageous” information the other 
side is spreading. To get a sense of whether an extreming bias is one-sided, I look at only the 
liberal panelists and the liberal tweets they see and retweet. As can be seen in Figure 28c, the 
extreming pattern is diminished, but is still visible among unverified tweets. Due in part to the 
smaller sample, N=89, it is also not a statistically significant effect. More analysis is needed to 
see of this diminished effect among verified tweets suggests that at least part of any extreming 
bias includes a propensity to cross-share extreme tweets – or if the results for all panelists are 




Figure 29. Average Extreme Curation 
A.     Panelists 
 
B.  Random users 
 
C.  Liberal panelists & liberal tweets only 
 
Proportion of tweets users are exposed to (“in”) and retweet (“out”) that are moderate (1) to extreme (5) for: (i) all 
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What explains greater extreme curation of tweets from unverified accounts than from verified 
accounts? Two factors may combine to make extreme tweets from our friends so re-sharable.  
First, our friends are best suited for selecting any news story that we find eye-grabbing and 
worthy of sharing – for they themselves were drawn to share those stories and, as our friends, 
they have similar sensibilities. In general in this sample, posts from unverified accounts are 
retweeted at a rate 30 times higher than tweets from verified accounts.49 Also, as posited in this 
dissertation, extreme tweets have qualities that make them exceptionally retweetable – being 
sensational, alarmist, emotionally-valenced, etc. If our friends are pre-selecting the extreme 
tweets that they find particularly tweet-worthy, we may be seeing a powerful interaction effect 
between the inherent tweetable-ness of extreme posts and our friends’ ability to select 
information that is in sync with our preferences.  
The causes behind users’ predilection to re-share extreme posts will be explored in Part II of this 
dissertation. At this point, we can fairly confidently say that Twitter users are, indeed, extreme 
curators. The impact on the distribution of information on social media could be substantial; to 
the extent that users re-share political information, they will shift the tenor of the news 
environment online from moderate to extreme. In this chapter we observed only one wave of re-
sharing; as we saw in Chapter 2, when we compound users’ preference for re-sharing extreme 
information over subsequent waves of diffusion, the dominance of those extreme tweets only 
increase. 
Summing Up our Curating Behavior 
While research – and intuition – tell us that social media users prefer to post news that align with 
their political leanings, no previous research examines if users are indeed ideologically biased in 
the political information they choose to share. To show such a curation bias, it is necessary to see 
 
49 This could be explained in large part by the limitations of data collection which likely result in a fuller sample of 
incoming tweets from unverified than verified accounts. 
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not only what users post, but the set of information they select from. In running such an analysis 
using the data of 472 Twitter users, evidence presented in this chapter suggests that users may in 
fact be ideologically unbiased in what they retweet; instead of cherry-picking ideologically 
congruent news stories to retweet, they appear to retweet a representative sample of the tweets 
that come through their feed.  
The data does, however, confirm previous studies showing that users are de facto ideological 
curators. These combined findings suggest that whatever ideological bias exists on social media 
occurs at the level of selective exposure (the accounts users choose to follow) rather than 
selective sharing (which tweets they choose to repost). Mediation analysis in this chapter 
confirms such a relationship. 
It is important to note, however, that the results in this analysis are null findings; the lack of an 
observed curation bias does not mean one does not exist; rather it may be a consequence of a 
small sample size. To confirm the absence of an ideological curation bias, in would be necessary 
to analyze a larger sample. 
At the same time, while the data presented here do not indicate that users have an ideological 
curation bias, the data do show a pronounced bias toward sharing extreme information. Such a 
preference appears not only among the same 472 panelists analyzed above, but also among 5,000 
random Twitter users followed in this study. This pattern suggests that, while an ideological 
curation bias may exist if we were to examine a larger data set, it would likely be dwarfed by 
users’ bent toward re-sharing extreme information. We are not partisan curators as much as 





Chapter 5. Re-parametrizing the Model 
In the last three chapters, I isolated and examined each of the three mechanisms that dictate how 
information is distributed in a social network. First, we modeled how ideological and extreme 
information flow through homophilous networks, assuming varying levels of homophily and 
biased curation on the part of users. We saw that diffusion’s capacity to increase information 
sorting and extreming is a complex interaction that depends upon the level of homophily in the 
network as well as users’ biases in what they post and re-post. We then looked at what those 
levels of homophily and biased curation might be, first examining estimates for homophily on 
two existing online social networks, Twitter and Facebook, and then analyzing curation behavior 
among a sample of Twitter users.  
We now come full circle. Given estimates of homophily and curation that we see in real social 
networks, what can we say about social media’s capacity to create information bubbles or 
propagate extreme information? To grasp what is happening inside the “black box” of social 
media, we will want to re-run the models in Chapter 2 using the parameters identified.  
First, consider social media’s ability to sort congruent information and create information 
bubbles. The parameters we identified in the sections above are a level of homophily of 
approximately 0.7 and a re-posting bias of 0.5 (that is, no discernable bias). To be consistent with 
the models presented earlier, I stick with networks of 1,000 nodes, in which nodes have an 
average of 8 connections, and I run 200 simulations on each graph generated.  
In setting up the simulations, I modify one additional parameter. In chapter 2, recall, I used a 
10% ceiling rate of contagion, chosen for the practical reasons that rates higher than 10% risked 
leading to messages saturating the network and rates lower than 10% too often saw messages die 
out quickly (i.e. rarely reaching a 5th wave of diffusion).  This rate, however, is far higher than 
what we know about actual retweet rates on Twitter. The full sample of 5,471 Twitter users I 
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observe, for example, retweet about 3.3% of the unverified tweets that come through their feed. 
To better reflect real diffusion patterns, I use a ceiling rate of 6% which results approximately 
3.3% of messages being reshared. To compensate for the high frequency of messages dying out, 
I run simulations on 1,000 instead of 100 generated networks so we are assured of observing 
cascades that run for five waves. 
This ceiling rate of contagion has an added benefit for our model as it produces a ratio of initial 
posts to re-posts that reflects real ratios on social media. This ratio is relevant because ultimately 
we will want to know not just how much congruent and extreme information users are exposed 
to in each wave of diffusion, but how much congruent and extreme information users are 
exposed to in total across all waves. That ratio in social media is hard to pin down, but one 
estimate (Liu et al, 2014), puts the proportion of posts on Twitter that are retweets at 25%. Using 
a ceiling rate of contagion of 6% results in approximately 25% of messages that nodes observe 
being re-shares. 
Finally, we need a parameter for nodes’ initial posting biases. This number is the likelihood a 
node posts an initial message that reflects their ideology. Again, this is not a well-known 
parameter. For the purposes of this simulation, I use the average proportion of original congruent 
tweets among the liberal Twitter users in my sample who posted at least two original tweets; that 
proportion is approximately 70%.  
Plugging those parameters into our model (using a small world binary graph), we can see the 








Figure 30. Modeling Information Sorting with Real Life Parameters 
 
Levels of information sorting across waves of diffusion in agent-based model, using estimated parameters from real 
online social networks: 0.7 average homophily, 0.5 ideological curation and an initial ideological curation bias of 
0.7. 
Figure 30 presents only the weakest of information bubbles – and one that diminishes with 
greater diffusion. At the first wave of diffusion - that is, users’ initial posts - the average user will 
be exposed to 58.4% congruent information. The more a news article is re-shared, however, the 
more evenly it will be distributed between ideologues and, likewise, the more likely a counter-
ideologue will see it. Put another way, the re-tweets that users see will be more ideologically 
balanced than the original tweets they are exposed to. If an article were to be re-shared 3 times 
sequentially (a rarity even among viral tweets), by the 4th wave we might expect it to fully break 
down any information bubble, being evenly distributed between left and right users.  
To assess social media’s capacity to fuel the spread of extreme information, I run the model 
above with additional modifications. As above, I run simulations on a binary small world 
network with a homophily rate of 0.7. This time, however, I chart the spread of two types of 
information; “moderate” information for which users have a curation bias of 0.5 (i.e. no bias) and 
“extreme” information for which users have a 0.9 curation bias. While these levels of bias may 
seem far apart, in the model they mean that a user is only 9/5 times more likely to re-share an 





















that the relative re-shareability of extreme tweets is even greater, so using these parameters will 
likely underestimate any gulf between the viral spread of moderate compared to extreme posts. 
With those parameters, liberal and conservative users will share moderate messages with equal 
frequency (0.5 * Ceiling rate) while they will have an inverse sharing bias for extreme messages 
(0.9*Ceiling rate for congruent and 0.1*Ceiling rate for incongruent).50 To further reflect what 
we see in the Twitter data in the last section, users in the model are themselves initially exposed 
to little extreme information - just 5% of the information they can select from will be extreme 
and ideologically congruent, while 90% will be neutral and 5% is extreme information from the 
other side. We can think of these initial posts as the information they get from “verified” 
accounts or from outside media sources. As in the previous simulation, users have an initial 
curation bias of 0.7. 
Figure 31. Modeling Extreme Curation with Real Life Parameters 
 
Proportion of messages that are extreme that users are exposed to at each wave of diffusion in a network with 0.7 
homophily, assuming that extreme messages are 10% of all initial posts in a network (5% liberal and 5% 
conservative). 
 
50 We are assuming, again, that any extreme bias is purely for stories on one’s side of the spectrum, but as discussed 
above our data does not tell us if the bias we see is for any extreme story, regardless if it is left or right. If an 
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Figure 31 depicts users’ exposure to all extreme information as well as to extreme information 
that is congruent with their beliefs. In contrast to information sorting, Figure 31 shows that 
diffusion fuels information extreming. Without diffusion, users are exposed to relatively little 
extreme information, but as messages are re-shared, extreme messages make up an increasingly 
large proportion of what users are exposed to. If we look down the path of diffusion for 5 waves, 
the proportion of congruent extreme information users are exposed to will have more than 
doubled.  
The figures above, however, only show us how information sorting and extreming fluctuates in 
each subsequent wave of diffusion. Ultimately, we want to know what the cumulative effect of 
diffusion is on sorting and extreming; when we add up the messages that nodes are exposed to 
across all waves, what proportion are congruent and extreme? Because only a small number of 
messages are re-shared, nodes see relatively few re-shares overall; we should thus expect an 
overall modest effect of diffusion. That is what we see. Adding up all the messages nodes are 
exposed to across the five waves of diffusion, information sorting lands at 57%, just a 2.4% 
decrease from initial sorting levels. Turning to information extreming, the cumulative effect of 
diffusion leaves nodes exposed to 10.7% extreme information, a 7% increase from the 10% of 
extreme information our model exposed them to before diffusion.   
All told, then, we can say that the extended network users are embedded in and political 
information’s ability to diffuse through that network have negligible impact on information 
sorting; what effect there is on sorting, moreover, will be numerically negative - or positive, from 
the normative perspective of those who push for exposure to diverse information. Diffusion’s 
effect on extreming, however, is both marginally greater and will be numerically positive - or 
negative for those who worry about polarization.  
As stated at the outset, the dominant factor in determining how closed is one’s echo chamber is 
one’s selection of friends. It is that first tier of friends and their initial posting biases (i.e. what 
they pluck from their outside news environment) that predominantly decides how homogenous 
one’s social media information environment is. The diffusion of information through the network 
– the resharing of like-minded stories that is feared to amplify our bubbles – has little effect on 
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the homogeneity of our social media feeds, and what little effect exists opens us up to more 
challenging information. All told we can expect, knowing what we do about users’ choice of 
friends and their sharing and re-sharing biases that they will be exposed, on average, to about 
43% incongruent information. 
That number aligns somewhat with what Facebook researchers find in their analysis of users’ 
exposure to cross-ideological news (Bakshy et al, 2015). As seen in Figure 32, Facebook reports 
that conservatives are exposed to about 35% cross-cutting information while liberals in their 
sample are exposed to approximately 24% incongruent information. Those numbers are lower 
than the 43% predicted above, but a key distinction in the Facebook analysis is that it does not 
include “moderate” information that falls on users’ side of the political spectrum; if moderate left 
and right information were to be included we would expect the study’s estimates to rise.  
Figure 32. Information Sorting on Facebook 
 
Exposure to cross-ideological news stories by self-identified ideologues on Facebook. From Bakshy et al, 2015. 
While bursting the bubble on social media’s complicity in creating echo chambers, the analysis 
in Part I gives us cause to believe that social media does contribute to the spread of extreme 
news. The effect may be small; again, our models suggest that users’ biases in resharing 
information from the far left and right could lead to about 7% greater exposure to extreme 
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information. But given the possible impact on users’ perception of their political opponents, 
particularly if we imagine that the most viral stories are the most incendiary and salient, then 
even a marginal increase in exposure should be troubling. 
Again, though, the story may not be about how much social media amplifies extreme information 
via diffusion but about the kinds of stories users introduce into social media environments in the 
first place. As suggested by the Facebook and Berkman study graphs we saw above, Facebook 
and Twitter users have a distinct preference to share (whether re-sharing or introducing into their 
social media environments) stories from the ends of the political spectrum (even more so than 
the Twitter users in our sample). It is that mix of news that makes a potentially polarizing brew 
of information on social media. 
Why social media users have this apparent bent toward sharing news from the ends of the 
political spectrum is one of the central questions of the second half of this dissertation. In it I 
construct a theory to explain what motivates social media users to share any political information 
and why those motivations would lead users to share not only congruent, but “extreme” news 
stories. In understanding those motivations, my hope is that we might not just arrive at greater 





Part II. A Theory of Information Sharing: Why 
Social Media Users are Motivated to Share 







Chapter 6: Building a Theory of Political 
Information Sharing 
There is nothing preordained about what counts as “news.” Out of the infinite shapeless and 
complex events, trends and stories that happen around the globe on a given day, only a relative 
handful of occurrences end up as a story in print or on the air. Which events become news stories 
is decided by media’s “gatekeepers” – the writers, editors and media owners who decide which 
stories to produce.  In Part I, we were introduced to one such gatekeeper, “Mr. Gates,” the wire 
editor of a small Midwestern newspaper, whose gatekeeping decisions were studied by David 
Manning White. While White’s study was groundbreaking methodologically, it did not reveal 
strong findings about what makes a story worthy of passing a gate (it hardly could, having 
studied one editor’s choices for one week); it did, however, set in motion decades of research 
aiming to understand news gatekeepers and the motivations behind their decisions. Thanks to 
subsequent scholars we now know, for example, that a host of biases, both personal as well as 
widely held “American” values, shape the stories editors choose (Gans, 1979). We also know 
that practical constraints dictate what gets reported; since news companies depend on audience 
eyeballs and advertiser money, editors’ choices are a calculus of how inherently “news-worthy” 
a story is, how much it costs to produce, how it might increase readership and how it could 
potentially aggravate advertisers (Shoemaker et al, 2001: Gans, 1979; Soroka, 2012; Sigal, 
1973).   
In the past, those gatekeepers decided not only what stories to run, but which stories consumers 
were more likely to see. Whether on the pages of the New York Times, on the evening news or 
on news radio, gatekeepers curated the order and prominence of those stories. In print media, 
readers are free to choose what articles to read by scanning and skipping stories, but editors 
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direct readers to the stories they deem most important by placing those stories “above the fold.” 
On TV and radio, consumers are entirely captive to the curation decisions of the news editors.  
With the internet and social media entering the media landscape, news institutions still maintain 
the dominant gatekeeper role in deciding what news stories are produced, but other players - 
bloggers, search engines and, now, lay citizens - increasingly decide what news we see. In 2017, 
67% of Americans reported getting at least some of their news from social media, up from 62% 
in 2016 (Shearer and Gottfried, 2017). According to one media consulting group, as much as 
43% of its clients’ news content was reached via social media (Ingram, 2015). While news 
institutions have a presence on social media, particularly on sites like Twitter, and thus still 
curate much of the news, it is one’s “friends” on these sites who increasingly decide which 
stories come across our laptop and smartphone screens. News producers largely determine which 
stories get told and how, but our friends have become our new news curators.51 
Just as scholars once probed what motivates the gatekeeping decisions of news producers - the 
biases, constraints and incentives that drive their choices - today, if we want to understand the 
information that news consumers see, it is critical to understand what drives social media users to 
post the news stories they do.  
In the previous sections we saw that those choices matter; they determine how homogenous our 
ideological bubbles are and how extreme the news is that fills our feeds. The diffusion models 
presented in Part I showed us that, to the extent that users have ideological biases in what they 
share, they determine how strong their friends’ echo chambers will be (although they cannot 
make those echo chambers more homogenous than their friends’ networks). If users are 
motivated to share extreme information, moreover, they can collectively amplify extreme stories, 
making views from the far left and right dominate their friends’ information environments.  
 
51 Although not discussed in this dissertation, many others have made the case that social media also increasingly 
influence which stories traditional media report (Zuckerman, 2018). 
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In this part of this dissertation, I shift from observing our online sharing behavior to trying to 
explain it. I speculate on the forces that drive these new gatekeepers to share political stories and 
ask how those motivations explain why users share the stories they do. Specifically, I aim to 
understand why we tend to share articles that reflect our ideology and that are extreme in 
nature.52  
I start by considering whether an existing theory – “selective exposure” – can answer those 
questions as other scholars have proposed. I conclude that selective exposure theory has 
limitations in its explanatory power for “selective curation.” I present an alternative framework 
for understanding social media users’ curation choices that builds on theories in the fields of 
Social Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology and Communications. I propose that when users 
post on social media, they are broadcasting to an “imagined audience” that represents one of 
their social groups (Ellison & Vitak, 2015). In communicating with those conjured groups, users 
are driven by two motivating forces, what I term “group impression management” and “group 
rallying.” “Group impression management,” which draws from Impression Management theory 
and Social Identity theory, posits that when posting political information users are primarily 
motivated to project an image of themselves that will bolster their inclusion and status in those 
groups (Goffman, 1959; Leary et al, 2015; Tajfel, 1974). That image will be of one who is a 
loyal and competent group member. As a secondary force, “group rallying” motivates users in 
times of threat to seek support and coordinate group action by drawing members’ attention to 
threats to the group. Both those sets of motivations lead users to selectively post political stories 
that confirm the group’s beliefs and superiority, and thus are congruent with their political 
affiliation, as well as stories that are “extreme” in nature – i.e. that are dogmatic, emotionally-
valenced and tribal.   
 
52 The reader may recall that in Chapter 4, we found no ideological curation bias among Twitter users, yet I 
conjectured that such an absence of bias might be explained by the biased news environment they create for 
themselves. We might still suppose that users would exhibit a bias if presented with an equal set of liberal and 
conservative news stories. In the next chapter, we will see that is the case. 
121 
 
In the chapter that follows this one, I test elements of that framework in a series of online survey 
studies. First I test whether social media users prefer to share stories that confirm their political 
group’s views and cheer the ingroup. Recall that in Part I we did not find such a curation bias 
among Twitter users, but I conjectured that was the case because Twitter users had created an 
information environment that obviated the need to be ideologically selective in the stories they 
shared. In the next chapter, I create an environment where I can discern a preference for sharing 
stories that are politically congenial. I use such an environment to also test to see if users’ have a 
preference for sharing dogmatic stories and stories that explicitly praise the ingroup or denigrate 
the outgroup. Next I prime the salience of subjects’ social groups in order to detect signs that 
they are, indeed, communicating with one of their social groups in mind. Finally, I manipulate 
subjects’ need to be included to see if I can likewise increase their motivation to project an image 
of themselves as loyal group members. I find support, albeit sometimes weak, for each of the 
propositions. 
Understanding the motivations behind users’ choices on social media is not just academic. While 
as scholars we care about what drives political behavior, having a window into the psychological 
mechanisms behind users’ choices gives us insights into how to temper their more destructive 
choices. Social media platforms, in particular, have an interest in mitigating the spread of stories 
that may spark inter-group violence; understanding what propels users to share those stories 
gives us a handle on how to deter possible harmful instincts to click and share.   
Selective Curation: A Mirror of Selective Exposure? 
Before proposing a new theory to explain any behavior, one should first see if an existing theory 
can adequately do the job. In this instance we need to first ask: is there an established theory that 
can explain what drives social media users’ curation of political information? 
Joseph Cappella, Allison Earl and their colleagues would say there is such a theory – “active 
selective exposure” (Cappella et al, 2015; Earl et al, working paper). Selective exposure, as 
discussed in Part I, predicts that citizens tend to consume news aligned with their political beliefs 
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rather than challenge themselves by reading news from the other perspectives. “De facto” 
selective exposure can be explained in large part by environmental factors; the friends we have 
and neighborhoods we live in surround us with news that aligns with our beliefs. But studies 
show that we are also actively drawn to information that confirms our beliefs and avoid 
information that may challenge those beliefs (Frey, 1986; Hart et al, 2009; Stroud, 2008).  
The underlying mechanism that drives active selective exposure is, according to most studies, 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. That theory is often understood in the simple way 
Festinger put in it in 1962: the “idea that if a person knows various things that are not 
psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more 
consistent” (Festinger, 1962).  Dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling that people try to 
mitigate; one way to do so is to avoid dissonant information in the first place. It follows that if 
someone holds belief A, they will eschew belief anti-A to avoid discomfort. Yet Festinger’s 
foundational experiments and subsequent research by other scholars show that dissonance is 
more complex than a simple mechanism that abhors inconsistency. Underlying dissonance is not 
a discomfort with holding two contradictory beliefs, but rather with being faced with information 
that challenges one’s sense of self or previous decisions.  
The central role of the self can be seen in one of Festinger’s early experiments and a variation of 
that experiment conducted by Claude Steele. In Festinger’s original study (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959), he and coauthor Carlsmith asked subjects to lie to other participants (who were 
confederates in on the ruse) about an experiment they just completed. When subjects lied with 
little incentive to do so - merely being paid an extra $1 - they experienced a dissonance between 
what they believed and what they publicly said. To relieve that dissonance, according to 
Festinger, subjects adjusted their beliefs to be more in line with their stated position. Another 
group of subjects who received $20 to lie, however, did not likewise experience dissonance and 
consequently adjust their beliefs. Unlike the group that received $1, Festinger explains, those 
subjects could tell themselves that they were essentially forced to lie ($20 is the equivalent of 
$180 today) and so could convince themselves that there really wasn’t an inconsistency in their 
beliefs and behavior.  
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Claude Steele suspected something more might be going on for the group that received $20. 
Steele tells us that humans have a need to maintain a view of themselves as “adaptively and 
morally adequate” (Steele, 1988). We can get that sense of adequacy either by seeing ourselves 
as competent and strong or as good and morally upright. If one’s sense of self takes a hit - for 
example by being inconsistent (and so either incompetent or duplicitous) - one will try to restore 
a positive sense of self. For the subjects in Festinger’s $1 condition, Steele would argue, the only 
way to do so was to remove the inconsistency, adjusting one’s beliefs to be in line with one’s 
behavior. But, according to Steele, it is not necessary to restore a sense of self in the same 
domain that was diminished. In the face of evidence that one is inconsistent, one can restore a 
sense of self by searching for other evidence of one’s value. That is what subjects in the $20 
condition were able to do; they could reflect on how smart they were for scoring $20 (again, 
$180 in today’s dollars) for telling one measly harmless lie.  
Steele tested this hypothesis by running a version of Festinger’s experiment, but adding a “self-
affirmation” manipulation for a random set of the subjects, giving those subjects time to reflect 
on an event that made them feel strong in an area they deemed important (family, career, 
morality, etc.). When subjects had an opportunity to “affirm” their sense of self, they had less of 
a need to resolve any dissonance; it no longer bothered them that they lied since whatever deficit 
their inconsistency created in their sense of self was restored in another domain (Steele, 1988).53 
Steele’s work sheds light on the kinds of information we will seek to consume or avoid. For one, 
we will want to avoid information that suggests we have “knowingly chosen to engage in a bad 
or foolish behavior,” because that will be “inconsistent with a self-image as a decent and 
intelligent person” (Kunda, 1990). As one example, offered by Frey in his review of selective 
exposure (1986), a new homeowner will seek out information that confirms he made the right 
purchase - while avoiding information that shows he got a bad deal - to avoid feeling like he’s 
 
53 A tendency to seek information that is consistent with our current beliefs – or “confirmation bias” – may also be 
explained by factors other than a psychological drive to perceive ourselves as competent and good. When asked to 
seek information to see if a theory is true, humans naturally look for information that confirms rather than 
disconfirm the theory (Klayman, 1995) .This logical lapse, which runs counter to scientific inquiry, seems to be a 
simple cognitive quirk, not a psychologically driven bias.  
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“been had.”  Likewise, if we love a good hamburger we might avoid information that claims that 
eating red meat is unhealthy, unethical or destructive to the environment. 
But it is not just information that is inconsistent with our behavior that we will seek to avoid. We 
will also avoid information that challenges our beliefs and values, particularly those we hold 
dearly or wear publicly on our sleeves. At one level, we avoid information that challenges our 
beliefs for the same reason as the homeowner above; information that reveals one is “wrong” 
impugns our competence by making us look stupid.54 At a deeper level, however, information 
that challenges our values and closely held beliefs will be a threat to our identity (Stitka, 2002). 
Those deeply held beliefs and values, like our behavior, contribute to the image of ourselves as 
good and competent human beings. Our values ground our lives in a narrative in which we are a 
sympathetic protagonist - whether that is a responsible homemaker, a fighter for justice, or a 
champion of capitalism (Lane, 1962). Our beliefs are likewise necessary to maintain that 
personal narrative; to be a fighter for justice you must believe injustices exist, and one must 
believe that capitalism is good to be its champion. A challenge to those values and beliefs is then 
a challenge to who we are and so should be avoided at all costs.  
One part of our identity - our social identity - plays a particularly prominent role in the realm of 
politics and the information we choose to expose ourselves to. Social identity theory claims 
humans have a special proclivity to associate with and identify with groups (Tajfel, 1974). When 
we do so we take on the values and beliefs of those groups and seek to protect those values and 
beliefs as our own (Suhay, 2015). Thus any new story that challenges the sanctity or competence 
of our group will likewise be sidelined in favor of stories that confirm our group is virtuous and 
strong (Green et al, 2004; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
Despite our motivation to preserve our beliefs, values and identity, active selective exposure is 
not absolute (Kunda, 1990). Alongside our affinity for confirmatory information, humans also 
seek out new and challenging information. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine a cognitive species 
 
54 Studies show that the more publicly we hold beliefs, the more committed we are to a belief and the more a belief 
is connected to our values, the more we resist finding out we’re wrong (Hart et al, 2009). 
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surviving if that were not the case; to navigate our environments and make choices that benefit 
our well-being, we cannot be blind to reality. In seeking information, thus, humans have dual 
goals - to preserve their beliefs and to form an accurate view of the world.  
Whether an individual seeks new or confirming information depends upon which goal is 
dominant. When information is not a threat to an individual’s self-image - that is, when they 
have not committed to a belief or do not have values connected to a belief - they can freely seek 
new information. Even if we have strong beliefs, when our survival comes into question or there 
is a sizable tangible gain at hand, we will be willing to seek and consider information that 
challenges those beliefs (Bullock et al, 2013; Festinger, 1962; Kunda, 1990). Likewise, we seek 
out attitudinally dissonant information when we experience anxiety, which sends a signal that 
there are risks in our environment (Valentino et al, 2008).  
In the realm of politics, however, accuracy goals will rarely trump the motivation to preserve 
one’s beliefs, for the simple reason that there is rarely a large payoff for holding accurate 
information about policies or candidates. For the average voter, one’s political beliefs have little 
material bearing on one’s well-being; our single vote at the poll booth is neither likely to swing 
an election nor result in different policies (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Without significant 
benefits to holding accurate political beliefs, we might as well keep the ones that maintain our 
positive self-image. 
But there is another reason active selective exposure is not ironclad; even if we are motivated to 
preserve our beliefs, we have other defenses against challenging information. Selective exposure 
is only one way we act as “motivated reasoners” seeking and processing information to reach a 
desired conclusion. If we expose ourselves to an article that confronts our political views, we 
tend to home in on the evidence that confirms our views while ignoring any challenging 
information (Lord et al, 1979). We can also be adept at refuting any disconfirming information if 
we are equipped with facts and arguments. That is why the most policy savvy are willing to 
dabble in articles written by the opposition; with the skills to debunk opposing information they 
are immune to dissonant information and can easily keep their worldview intact (Frey, 1986).  
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In sum, selective exposure theory explains that humans will tend to seek information that 
bolsters their self-image as good and competent individuals, particularly beliefs and values that 
are at the core of their identity and that are held by the groups they strongly identify with. At the 
same time active selective exposure is not absolute; humans are also partly motivated to seek out 
information that gives an accurate view of the world, and - when confident in their ability to 
refute challenging information - willingly expose themselves to opposing views. 
Limitations of Selective Exposure Theory to Explain Selective Sharing 
Capella and colleagues (2015) argue that the same motivations that drive selective exposure will 
be in force when we choose information to share with our friends: we will likewise be drawn to 
share information that reinforces our friends’ views, yet at the same time be motivated by the - at 
times - conflicting motivation to share accurate information 
Capella does not tell us why we would expect the same psychological forces behind our choices 
on what information to consume and what to share, but Earl and colleagues (2018) provide a 
clue. While not giving an explicit reason, they use the phrase “vicarious selective exposure” 
implying that users are practicing a form of empathy, mirroring the emotions and desires of 
others and so acting as if they were them (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). Earl provides 
experimental evidence that we do indeed practice “vicarious selective exposure”; when asked to 
select information to share with others, subjects tend to select information that is congenial to the 
receiver’s views while withholding uncongenial information. It may be, then, that when it comes 
to consuming and sharing information, we simply do unto others as we would have done unto 
ourselves. 
Vicarious selective exposure runs into trouble as an explanation for sharing political news, 
however, when we consider contested and divisive information. For one, when the recipient of 
information has views that conflict with the sharer there will be a conflict between selective 
exposure and vicarious selective exposure; the information that will be congruent with the 
recipient will be incongruent with the sender. Which will dominate, the sharer’s desire to protect 
her beliefs or her empathetic desire to protect the recipient’s beliefs? If the reader has ever 
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witnessed a political discussion between a conservative and a liberal the answer may seem self-
evident; not only will each discussant not try to preserve their ideological opponent’s beliefs, 
they will likely try their best to dispossess their opponent of their ludicrous views. Vicarious 
motivations, thus, may only exist when the recipient shares our views. 
Yet even in the case of recipients who think like us, we may not share the same information we 
are willing to consume ourselves because we may not trust the recipient to have the same powers 
of (motivated) reasoning. Recall subjects who are confident in their ability to refute contradictory 
information are more willing to read challenging news articles; their debunking skills act as 
inoculation against incongruent information. But when we share with others, we may not be 
equally confident in their skills to debunk. Whereas we are certain we are able to see the truth, 
humans tend to think others are susceptible to bias and manipulation (Pronin et al, 2002; Ward et 
al, 1997). To protect those gullible others, then, we may be more careful to sift out news that 
might threaten our shared beliefs. 
In brief, there are limitations to how much vicarious selective exposure can explain our 
motivations for sharing political information; it can only do so when the sender and receiver 
share a worldview, and even then a sharer, in making a common assumption about others, may 
attempt to protect the receiver from views that we do not share.55 
Indeed, both Earl and Capella concede that selective exposure theory may not fully explain what 
drives our decisions to share the information we do. They both propose an additional motivation: 
to strengthen social ties. As Capella says, the selection of what to share “can facilitate or hinder 
social goals” and there are some stories that users would read but not share. As evidence that 
 
55 At the same time there is at least one reason we might expect selective exposure and selective sharing to appear 
similar, if only because it would be hard to explain why a user would share something they had not (willingly) 
consumed themselves first.  
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social goals are in play, Earl finds that vicarious selective exposure is stronger when subjects like 
the person who receives the information.56  
I agree that users are motivated by social goals when they share political information, but 
whereas Capella and Earl suggest such goals may be peripheral or secondary, I propose that 
social goals are central and primary. As such, understanding these social motivations will take us 
much farther in explaining users’ sharing behavior.57  
 
56 Also worth noting is that Earl’s work is dyadic, with subjects sending information to one user. As will be 
discussed at length later, we should expect motivations for sharing information when “narrowcasting” to a friend or 
two to be different from when we “broadcast” to a large audience (Barasch & Berger, 2014). 
57 While the study of information sharing is relatively nascent among political scientists, other fields have studied 
information sharing more extensively. Information and management scholars, for example, have examined what 
motivates “knowledge sharing” in organizations’ online communities (Chiu et al, 2006; Hsu et al, 2007; Lin, 2007; 
Kankanhalli et al, 2005). Researchers on social media have likewise studied the factors that lead to personal 
“disclosure” - the sharing of both emotional and functional information - online (Bazarova & Choi, 2014; Rime, 
2009).  
One of the most comprehensive attempts to understand the motivations of information sharing, though, comes from 
marketing researcher Jonah Berger. Berger (2014) reviews a diverse literature and categorizes those motivations into 
five main functions: impression management (sharing information that creates a favorable impression of ourselves 
to others), emotion regulation (seeking others’ input when we experience emotional confusion or distress), 
information acquisition (seeking advice when making important decisions), social bonding (reducing loneliness and 
reinforcing group bonds), and persuasion. 
In building a theoretical framework for why we share political information, I draw on much of the that research. It 
might also seem sensible to use Berger’s five functions model as a starting point for developing a theory of political 
information sharing. I do not do so, however, primarily because Berger’s review is interested in word-of-mouth 
sharing of product rather than political information. Although there may be similarities with why people would 
share information about a product and why they would share political information, there are reasons to believe the 
motivations would only partly overlap. One shared motivation, for example, is to sculpt the impression others have 
of oneself; “impression management” is likely to play a role in the sharing of any information as it, indeed, plays a 
role in almost all social behavior. The incentives to share political information, however, may differ from sharing 
other information because, for example, political information is inherently contested and divisive; not only will 
people be divided on a piece of political information, but they are likely to be divided along group and political 
lines. Since most existing research on the sharing of information does not address contested information or group 




A Proposed Framework for Understanding the Motivations of Political 
Information Sharing 
As a baseline for understanding our information sharing behavior, I take as a premise that 
humans are goal-oriented.  Ultimately, our goals are material; humans require resources to secure 
their survival and raise children that can then transfer their DNA into future generations. But, 
also like many species, our individual survival and reproductive success depends on the support 
of other humans. In pre-modern times to not have a secure web of social connections (not just 
family, but friends and groups) survival would be near impossible. Successful humans, therefore, 
must make the development and maintenance of social relationships a primary goal (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995; Lieberman, 2013; Tajfel, 1974).  
We can see that primacy of humans’ need for social connection today not only in our behavior, 
but in our biology. The tremendous processing capacity of the human brain, indeed, evolved in 
large part to be able to negotiate complex human relations and develop language necessary to 
communicate with our fellow social beings (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Dunbar, 1998). 
Although we can use that large neural capacity today to ponder non-social questions, our brain’s 
default thinking mode today is still used to mull our social relationships (Lieberman, 2013). So 
important is the need to be connected to other humans, when we are excluded from social 
interaction our bodies register that isolation as physical pain (Eisenberger et al, 2003; Williams, 
2007).  
Group Impression  
Impression Management and our Social Media “Press Secretary” 
The social goals we have are varied – we may need to find a mate, develop a strong friendship or 
be accepted by the cool crowd – but our success in achieving any social goal hangs on how 
others perceive us. We are thus constantly in the game of - as sociologists say – managing our 
impression on others. To be a successful social animal we must mold and project a public “self” 
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that has the characteristics appealing to current or prospective mates, friends or group members 
(Goffman, 1959; Kurzban, 2012; Leary et al, 2015).  
The exact contours of a winning image will vary depending upon culture, age-group, domain 
(e.g. work or play), but generally any successful image has at least one of two qualities. For one, 
we will want to signal we are more “winner” than “loser”; others will want to connect with us if 
they see strength and ability, indicating that we will be more resource gain than drain. Second, 
it’s important that others trust us; a well-resourced friend is not worth much if they are either 
selfish or willing to betray us the moment it becomes advantageous (Neuberg & Cottrel, 2008). 
The ideal connection will be both a “winner” and a “good guy,” although humans are also 
generally willing to align with a powerful, resource-rich jerk or, conversely, a loyal loser. (No 
one, however, has time for a selfish chump.) For others to want to form connections with us, 
then, we will want to project an image that one is more gain than drain (i.e. competent, strong, 
rich, etc) and good (i.e. generous, fair and loyal). 
Impression management colors and influences almost all our interactions, but it may be the 
dominant force in our engagement on social media (Nadkarni & Hofmann 2012). Compared to 
real life, social media sites permit a level of personal brand management that rivals Madison 
Avenue. In real life it is easy to slip and reveal our not-ready-for-prime-time selves, but on social 
media one can more carefully craft - and edit – the optimal public image (Hogan, 2010). That 
image can’t misrepresent who we are too drastically (Back et al, 2010), but it will be enhanced 
(Gosling et al, 2007) and massaged to fit a social ideal (Zhao et al, 2008). 
It may seem that our friends craft that image consciously – with their obvious humble brags 
about their busy lives, filtered photos of glamorous vacation spots, and declarations of love for 
their “amazing” soulmates – but impression management is not always consciously driven. Much 
of the time that we project a favorable image of ourselves, it feels “authentic.” Recall that 
individuals need to perceive themselves in a positive light as both competent and morally good 
(Steele, 1988). Psychologist Robert Kurzban proposes the fact that we want to perceive ourselves 
as competent and good and that we also want to project an image of ourselves as competent and 
good is not a coincidence; theses parallel motivations are, indeed, two sides of the same image-
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conscious coin (Kurzban & Atkipis, 2007). More precisely, Kurzban argues that protecting and 
bolstering the personal self is not its own end. The self, rather, is a creation of our brain’s “press 
secretary,” a module that constructs an image and a narrative of ourselves that lets us 
successfully navigate our many social relations and achieve our social goals. The self we create 
is not for our own satisfaction; it is constructed to impress others. That we experience a self as a 
true entity and not as a mask constructed to win social games is a useful illusion; like any good 
press secretary, it does not need to know the self we project is a fabrication.58 In that light, most 
of the time we don’t need to do any additional work to project a socially-desirable image of 
ourselves that is distinct from our self-perception. Impression management thus will rarely feel 
like impression management – rather like an authentic expression of who we truly are. 
Our Political Groups & the Imagined Audience 
If we are trying to manage the impression others have of us on social media when we share 
political information, the next question is who are we trying to impress? We may also want to 
ask if there is a particular shade of “competent” and “good” we need to project. Sharing a 
political news story on Facebook is not like posting a photo of ourselves crossing the finish line 
of a marathon or sharing a campaign to raise money for suffering refugees; whereas the 
marathon post clearly projects “I’m a winner” and the fundraising campaign “I’m good,” a post 
about global warming or a political candidate doesn’t obviously project either image. Indeed, 
political posts seem impersonal and perhaps even selfless.59 
 
58 Tetlock and Manstead (1985) likewise proposed that impression management and “intrapsychic explanations” of 
behavior (including attitude polarization and other defensive mechanisms) may run in parallel and called for an 
integrative framework for both approaches to understanding behavior. 
59 If you ask people why they post news stories on social media they will themselves tell you that their actions are 
selfless and not at all connected to burnishing their personal image. As a preliminary test in my dissertation work 
(presented in full in Appendix II), I asked a number of social media users why they post political information; their 
most popular answer was that they wanted to keep their friends informed. But of course that answer is the one our 
“press secretary” would present – as it makes us look like good, selfless beings, just the kind of person you’d want 
to be friends with. 
132 
 
As a way of getting to the answer to those questions, we can look to two separate works of 
scholarship. First, I take the approach of information and technology theorists and ask if the 
affordances of social media can help us discern who users are communicating with. Next, social 
and political identity theory can also inform who we are talking to as well as give us insight into 
what impression we wish to make.  
A prominent view among communication theorists is that technologies do not create new 
motivations and behavior, but rather merely provide a new medium to actuate motivations and 
behaviors that humans have always had (Gaver, 1991; Gibson, 1977). While not creating new 
behaviors, however, the features of a given communication technology - its affordances - will 
constrain or augment which motivations and behaviors are manifested. The telephone, for 
example, affords communication between two individuals which allows them to nurture social 
bonds, something that humans have always done but with the telephone can do at great distances 
(Bazarova & Choi, 2014; Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Ellison & Vitak, 2014).  
Social media, however, is unusual in that it does appear to afford a new behavior - or rather it 
allows us to participate in a behavior that was traditionally limited. Before social media, few had 
a megaphone with which to communicate news to all their acquaintances. Perhaps we would 
pass along news to acquaintances in small groups at the dinner table or at meetings with co-
workers, but the scope of information dissemination was limited. But with social media we all 
can all broadcast news, all the time.  
Given that social media offers an activity previously limited to few, it is not obvious what - if 
any – behavior this new medium extends. It is also not clear to whom our communication is 
directed. When we talk to tens or hundreds on social media, what map in our brain are we using 
to understand what our goals and behavior should be? We know that individuals do not appear to 
be speaking to “all of one’s friends and followers” when they post on social media (Acquisti & 
Gross, 2006). The category “everyone I know” does not have a place in our mental map. Instead, 
our brains must create a new map - or, more likely, kluge together a map from existing ones. 
This puzzle – the difficulty of making sense of our own social media environment – has been 
identified by scholars who propose that social media creates a “contextual collapse” for users 
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(Marwick & Boyd, 2011). In real life we deal with situations within specific contexts - work 
meetings, family dinners, sports events - that define our goals and behaviors, and we adapt our 
behavior and image to the group we’re with. This means that in real life, we get to be multiple 
people - or manage multiple identities. On social media, however, we don’t have that option. Or, 
rather, we perplexingly don’t use that option even though services like Facebook let us signal 
separate groups. Instead, all our contexts - our work, family, social groups - collapse into one. 
We deal with this context collapse by constructing and speaking to an “imagined audience,” one 
that is not necessarily reflective of reality (Marwick & Boyd, 2011). That imagined audience 
could instead reflect a group that exists in our real lives - e.g. our college friends, our 
professional colleagues - or could be imaginary, as when a poet might “conjure up a poetry fan 
community” while writing (Litt, 2012). Yet we know little about what makes up a user’s 
imagined audience online, particularly when she posts political information. 
I propose that we have multiple imagined audiences on social media, each loosely mapped onto 
real social groups in our lives. That is, our minds do not conceive of a new category of audience 
- the “everyone I know” audience; instead we rely on familiar social mappings in our brains. 
When we communicate on social media we do so as if we’re speaking to one particular group - 
even though all of our groups can hear what we’re saying.  
Those social groups are more than just a set of individuals who have a shared trait or interest. 
Humans, again, are evolved to want to be part of groups and those groups play a central role in 
our psyche and behavior (Liebermann, 2013; Tajfel, 1974). It takes little for humans to identify 
with a group; merely telling someone they have a propensity to over-count dots, for example, can 
make individuals identify with and favor other “dot over-counters” (Tajfel, 1974). As members, 
we take on the beliefs, values and norms of the group (Suhay, 2015). The group becomes part of 
our identity and our brain adjusts to protect that identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We see “our” 
group as distinct and superior to other groups and develop positive emotions toward fellow group 
members in contrast to feelings of animosity toward “others” (Hogg et al, 1995). 
When it comes to politics, the imagined audience we conjure up when online could be any group 
for whom a political story is salient, including our racial, religious and cultural categories. We 
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are also likely talking to our fellow partisans or ideologues. Much like our racial, religious and 
cultural groups, these political categories play a significant role in the identity of Americans. 
Political scientists have long recognized that American voters identify psychologically with their 
political party (Campbell et al, 1960). Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2004) argue that 
attachment is not to the party but rather to a “partisan group” for which, just as with a religious 
or cultural group, we create a “mental image” of the typical member that matches our own self-
conception. We may hold a similar psychological attachment to an ideological identity (Conover 
& Feldman, 1981; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). Over the past few decades, those two political group 
attachments – to partisan and ideological groups - have taken increasing hold on our identities as 
they become not only more aligned with each other (liberals with Democrats and conservatives 
with Republicans) but also with our other social identities (Mason & Wronski, 2018). 
Our Group Impression Goals & the Stories that Make the Right Impression 
So what is the right image to project to those politically salient groups when we post political 
information on social media – and what kinds of news stories will do the trick? To answer those 
questions we first need to be more clear on what our goals are vis-à-vis our social groups.  
I posit that the primary goals in creating an impression on our group are to a) secure our 
inclusion and b) to increase our status in that group.  It is not enough that we simply identify with 
a group – the group must also accept us as a member. Again, the primary benefit of being part of 
a group is that it provides support – or even survival. We are therefore motivated to secures our 
acceptance in groups, but inclusion is not our only goal; it is also critical that we raise our status 
within that group, as status leads to not only more security but also to greater material benefits. 
To be included in a group, first and foremost we will want to present as someone others can trust 
as a true and loyal member. Just as individuals will be wary of investing in a friendship with 
someone who will not reciprocate favors or, worse, betray one with little provocation, groups 
will be reticent to accept someone who may be a free-rider or, worse, infiltrator. To gain entrée 
into a group it is necessary to project clearly that you are a “true” member, not an imposter but 
rather the real, loyal, deal. 
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To gain status in one’s group, one will likewise want to reinforce an image of solid allegiance, 
but also project an image of individual strength and competence. In other words, to build 
alliances and supporters you will want to be someone others not only trust but also wish to ally 
with because they see such an alliance as leading to personal gain. 
To demonstrate loyalty, we will want to post stories that signal we share the group’s values and 
beliefs or that display other signs of group allegiance, such as praising the ingroup or denigrating 
the outgroup. Users will thus be motivated to send those signals by sharing politically relevant 
stories (or images, quotes or memes) that: 
 ●       Affirm the group’s values, such as an inspiring quote or story. 
●       Either support the group’s beliefs or debunk the outgroup’s beliefs by, for example, 
providing new evidence that global warming is a looming threat or that illegal immigration is 
responsible for job losses. 
●       Burnish the character and stature of the ingroup or disparage the outgroup, as in a story 
about election polls that show the ingroup is winning or scandals that taint the opposition. 
To signal strength and competence, a user has a number of options (Berger, 2014); she can 
present herself as one who has access to information or who has skills and capabilities 
potentially useful to the group. She could also demonstrate leadership or signal she already has 
high status. In the context of sharing political information on social media, the kinds of posts that 
could enhance our status include: 
●    Information useful to the group such as: breaking news about salient issues, political 
events that are relevant to the group, information about engagement opportunities, and facts or 
other evidence that are particularly potent in upholding group beliefs. 
●    Posts that indicate one’s knowledge, intelligence and cleverness, such as clever insights 
or quips about political phenomena. 
●    Posts that demonstrate leadership qualities, including calls to action or messages designed 




Responding to Individual and Group Threat; Calls of Distress and Moral Outrage 
While the types of posts above will be familiar to any who have politically expressive friends on 
social media, the desire for inclusion and status may not account for all political posts. Two types 
of political stories commonly shared on social media that may be equally familiar may not be 
fully explained by group impression management: the “rant” and, its close cousin, the expression 
of moral outrage.  
Communication theorists explain these types of posts as motivated by “emotional regulation”: 
that is, social media users feel so emotionally moved, they must express themselves to relieve 
those emotions (Berger, 2014). This explanation, however, while not inaccurate, only explains 
the immediate, emotional, cause of such behavior.  
The reader may have noticed that I have neglected discussion of emotions as a motivation for 
sharing political information. This is not because I imagine emotions do not determine our 
behavior; to the contrary they play an essential role (Damasio, 1994). I, however, am more 
interested in the goals that motivate behavior. Emotions are not goals in themselves; rather they 
are the mechanism that both direct us to what “should be” our preeminent goal at any one 
moment and motivate us to act in the direction of that goal (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Keltner 
& Gross, 1999; Marcus, 2000). To use the cliché example: when a tiger jumps out from behind a 
bush, we run away not to mitigate the fear we experience - rather, we run away so as not to 
become the tiger’s lunch. Likewise, when we experience hardship and feel distressed, we reach 
out to friends not to feel better but rather to get support. Yet, while mitigating our negative 
emotions is not our goal, emotions are the - absolutely essential - mechanisms that propel us to 
take action. If not for fear pushing us into a sprint, we would be the tiger’s lunch. In the 
theoretical framework I develop in this dissertation, however, my focus is on the ultimate, 
extrinsic goals that motivate sharing. I leave other scholars to study the emotional mechanisms 




Since emotion-based explanations do not fully tell us what motivates the rant or expression of 
moral outrage, we need to understand what purpose these strong emotions serve. I suggest that 
the rant and the expression of moral outrage serve distinct yet related goals. Those are to seek 
assurances of support when experiencing individual threat and to motivate group response to 
threats from outgroups. 
The first motivation is straightforward. The reason we want to secure a spot in a group is 
precisely because at some point we will need the support or possible protection from that group. 
One would expect, given the affordances of social media, that when users experience threat, 
particularly in isolation, that they might use the platforms to send a “distress call” seeking 
support from their group. The rant can be thought of as such a distress call, one that articulates a 
case for why one is aggrieved (for example, by airlines that leave you on the tarmac or by fears 
of global warming) and elicits signals of support, reassurances that your community has your 
back or that they share your worries. 
The second motivation - to coordinate group response to threat - is more speculative. The 
expression of moral outrage is widely observed as a central feature in the spread of incendiary 
news on social media (Haidt, 2016; Wayne, 2014). Researchers Brady et al (2017) likewise find 
empirical evidence that tweets which contain moral and emotional language get a retweet boost. 
One could explain the apparent popularity of “outrage” posts on social media as a form of group 
impression management: those who rage against the moral transgressions of the outgroup will, 
after all, make their group allegiance clear. And, yet, the power and seeming prevalence of the 
moral outrage post suggest that other motivating forces are at play. 
Tooby and Cosmides (2010) provide a possible motivation. They suggest that expressions of 
moral outrage may play a unique role in group behavior; in times of threat from the outgroup, 
sharing moral outrage has the ability to motivate group members to take action against the 
outgroup, coordinating group behavior even without the benefit of a leader. Evolutionary 
theorists are often skeptical of such pro-social, seemingly altruistic behaviors that cost the 
individual for the good of the group. The authors argue, however, that the benefit of motivating 
others to act in concert would (in humans’ history) have had considerable benefits to individuals. 
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If the outgroup did, indeed, pose an existential threat to the ingroup, a cry of moral outrage that 
strengthens other members’ resolve to fight the outgroup would be a relatively small price to 
pay. 
Curating Ideologically Congruent and Extreme Stories 
Above I have laid out a framework for understand what motivates and directs our choices in 
posting political information online. How can this framework explain users’ propensity to share 
ideologically congruent and extreme news stories? 
It is for the most part straight-forward how these motivations would lead to ideological curation. 
If the aim of sharing political information is to project an image of ourselves as loyal group 
members, to the extent that our ideological or partisan group is our “imagined audience” we will 
tend to share information that aligns with our – and our fellow ideologues’ – beliefs about the 
world, policy and politics. That is, we will be ideological curators. 
There are a few reasons these motivations might likewise compel users to post extreme news 
stories. Recall that “extreme” stories are those that tend to be dogmatic, emotionally- charged 
and tribal. 
Not much needs to be said about why the motivation to stir moral outrage against the outgroup 
would compel users to share extreme information. To do so approaches a tautology. The 
expression of moral outrage requires both emotion (specifically anger) and an object of that 
anger (in this case, the political outgroup). We would expect then that when users want to 
express moral outrage against the outgroup, they will be more apt to share news articles that are 
anger-inducing and that strongly derogate the outgroup, two hallmarks of extreme news. 
The motivation to signal one’s allegiance to ideological and partisan groups might also drive 
social media users to share news stories that a) are unambiguous in their political message, b) 
promote ingroup favoritism, and c) are emotionally valenced. In sending signals of loyalty to the 
group, it is important that those signals are clear; a liberal user, for example, will prefer to share 
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an article that unambiguously makes the case for gun control rather than a similar piece of 
information that is murky in its support. Likewise, sharing stories that portray ingroup members 
as virtuous or outgroup members as inferior (in competence or morality) sends a strong signal of 
group loyalty. Emotional content can also signal value as a group member; anger directed 
towards the outgroup, enthusiasm for ingroup wins or sadness at in ingroup loss all indicate 
group commitment. Thus, a motivation to signal group allegiance would make us more apt to 
share stories that are dogmatic, tribal and emotional – the three qualities of extreme political 
news. 
In the next chapter I test to see if social media users do, indeed, have a preference for sharing 
stories with elements of extreme news – as well as other propositions made in this chapter. My 
goal here was to create a broad framework that might help us understand the motivations behind 
social media users’ choices in posting and forwarding political information. This framework is a 






Chapter 7: Putting the Theory to the Test 
In the previous chapter I presented a theory to explain social media users’ choices in sharing 
political information. That theory made several claims. First I proposed that when sharing 
political information on social media, users are communicating with an imagined audience that 
reflects one of their political groups. I then posited two sets of goals that motivate their choices 
with that imagined audience: group impression management and group rallying.  
As in offline life, users are motivated to project an image of themselves to their social groups 
that would make those groups want to have them as a member. The group impression they want 
to make is primarily that they are true, loyal members. Two ways to do that are to signal that one 
share’s the group’s beliefs and values and to cheer the ingroup while denigrating the outgroup. 
Users similarly will want their image to be of someone deserving high status in that group, which 
will likewise motivate them to share information favorable to the ingroup, but will also push 
them to indicate that they have higher competencies – knowledge, leadership qualities, etc. 
Individuals aim to gain inclusion in groups for reason. Groups give an individual support and 
protection when threats are present; groups similarly are able to band together to cooperatively 
combat external threats to their collective wellbeing. When such threats arise, members are 
motivated to send out alarm calls, rallying others either to support oneself or to band together as 
a unified front against the threat. Thus when feeling threatened, either by policy-related fear or 
by the outgroup, group rallying will drive users to share content that beckons support and 
triggers a response against the outgroup. 
Those twin sets of goals lead users to share news stories that are both politically aligned with the 
user and that are extreme in nature. To successfully signal group allegiance, at a minimum 
stories should be compatible with the values and beliefs of one’s political groups; that is, stories 
should be politically congruent with the group’s views. To be even more successful at signaling 
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group allegiance, while in addition raising one’s status in that group, those stories will also be 
dogmatic in upholding group beliefs, emotional in tone and direct in either extolling the ingroup 
or disparaging the outgroup, all hallmarks of extreme news. Likewise to rally group members in 
the face of threat, stories will use emotional language and accentuate tribal divides. 
In this chapter I aim to find evidence to support several of those many propositions and 
predictions. Not having the time and space to test each facet of the theoretical framework, I focus 
on testing one set of goals – Group Impression Management – and one set of users’ motivations - 
to secure inclusion in their political groups.  
But even narrowing the focus to one motivation leaves several sub-elements and predictions to 
examine. In this chapter I test the following propositions: 
• Users post political information on social media with an “imagined audience” that 
reflects one of the political groups they identify with; 
• Users are motivated in part to shore up their inclusion in those groups: 
• If the two claims above are true, we should expect that users will be inclined to share 
stories that are politically congruent and extreme. More specifically 
o Users will prefer to post stories that confirm their group’s beliefs or make their 
group look good.  
o The more dogmatically a story confirms their group’s view, the more a user will 
prefer to share that story. 
o Users will prefer to share stories that explicitly extol their group or denigrate the 
outgroup. 
I take on those claims partly in reverse order, starting with the latter set of propositions - that 
users will tend to share stories that are politically congruent and extreme. Starting at the end 
makes sense for two reasons. For one, if we do not see that, indeed, users share information that 
is politically congruent and extreme in nature - and instead find that they are either neutral or 
they share stories that favor the outgroup - it would falsify the framework and we could end our 
hypothesis testing here.  
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Recall also that earlier we found that Twitter users do not seem to have a preference to share 
information that is favorable to their political groups; they appear rather to be unbiased in re-
tweeting liberal vs conservative-leaning stories, which would suggest they are signaling 
neutrality. I suggested this may be the case because Twitter users had set up their information 
environment to reflect their views – obviating the need for them to selectively share stories 
sympathetic with their worldview. If, however, users were presented with equal shares of 
conservative- and liberal-leaning news stories, we might expect a bias in what they choose to 
share. I create such an environment in the set of studies presented below.  
Selective Curation 
Expectation/Proposition 1: Users will prefer to post stories that confirm their 
group’s beliefs or make their group look good.  
I begin with the prediction that users prefer to share stories that signal one shares the group’s 
beliefs and is a reliable group cheerleader. In an online survey I present subjects with sets of five 
current news stories and ask them to place the stories in order of which they would be “most 
likely to share on social media.” Among the stories presented, one is favorable to the left and one 
to the right – either because they uphold the group’s beliefs and values or otherwise makes the 
group look good. If social media users who post political information are signaling their political 
group bona fides, when asked which story they would be most likely to share, we should see 
them place the story that is favorable to their party and ideology at the top of the list more often 
than the story favorable to the outgroup. 
The News Stories Included in the Survey 
In order to increase the realism of the study I present subjects with current news stories. By 
presenting real, current news stories, I remove the necessity for subjects to imagine what they 
might do at another time or with a fictional story - rather they can more easily and realistically 
imagine what stories they are most likely to share in the current political climate.  
143 
 
All stories came from Reuters, which I selected for two reasons. First, Reuters is a newswire 
service that does not have well-known ideological or partisan bias, so it avoids creating a 
possible confounder that subjects select stories solely based upon the political leaning of the 
source (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Using Reuters also minimized the sensationalism and emotional 
evocativeness of the stories. As much as could be hoped, then, subjects would select the stories 
based on their political content as opposed to source cues or other share-worthy qualities.  
Stories were freshly collected each morning the study ran. I began each search by scanning 
Reuters’ “U.S. News” page, looking for five types of stories: stories that favored Democrats; 
stories that favored Republicans; a nonpartisan hard news story (often an important international 
story, but also the occasional domestic natural disaster); a “fluff” story (celebrity or sports news); 
and one “random” story (any story that did not have an apparent partisan bias). I presented 
subjects an array of nonpolitical stories to choose from to both to create a more natural 
environment (a news consumer would be unlikely to only see partisan political stories when 
surfing the internet) and to avoid tipping subjects off to the fact that I was interested in their 
political choices. If I could not find four stories of each type in “U.S. News” I would scan 
Reuters’ “U.S. Politics,” “World News,” “Technology,” “Business” and “Entertainment” pages 
until I found a complete set. I aimed to find stories posted within the previous 24 hours, but 
occasionally it was necessary to go back two days to find twenty appropriate stories (and, rarely, 
three or more days).  
For each article, I created an image that resembled what one would see on Reuters’ web page, 
including the original headline provided by Reuters, the date, source (Reuters) and the blurb and 
photo Reuters used in listing their stories. In the cases where Reuters did not provide a blurb, I 
would use the first paragraph from their story. If there was no photo, I did a Google News search 
on the story topic and used the first photo the search provided.  
In selecting stories that were favorable to the left or right, I aimed to pick stories that signaled 
group allegiance in one of two ways – either supporting the group’s beliefs and values or 
championing the group in another way. Examples of the first type is story about Medicare 
spending staying within budget (confirming the Democratic view that public healthcare 
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programs are affordable) and a story about record high incidence of heroin use (confirming a 
conservative view that crime levels are high). Stories that championed the ingroup include a 
report on Hillary Clinton leading Trump in the polls (seen in Figure 33) and an article about 
accusations of Clinton corruption. Of course, many stories cannot be exclusively placed into one 
category; a negative story about Obamacare can be both confirmation of conservatives’ beliefs 
and a personal attack on a Democratic leader’s legacy, while a story about a shooting massacre 
can likewise be supportive of gun control policy as well as an opportunity to malign the morality 
of the NRA.  
Figure 33. An Example Set of Stories in the Survey 
 
One set of stories subjects were exposed to in the study. Articles were presented in a similar way to how they would 
be seen on Reuters. Each set of stories included one article that was favorable to Republicans (in this example, the 
article about Obama’s legacy) and one favorable to Democrats (Clinton’s polling numbers). The three remaining 
articles were either a neutral hard news story (banking story), a fluff story (Game of Thrones) and a random story 
(Ohio State player). 
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I ran the survey in batches across five days with a new set of twenty stories each day. Using a 
large set of stories not only decreased the risk that I would select a poor batch of stories on one 
day, but also served to protect the overall results from the influence of any one story that was 
unusually “share-worthy” in some unintended way, for example by being particularly surprising 
or amusing.  
Post Validating the Instruments 
Because articles were selected the day of the survey there was not adequate time to pre-validate 
the target stories for their political valence. I instead depended on my own judgment in choosing 
stories the day of and post-validated the stories after the survey was run. 
To do so I recruited Mechanical Turk workers (the same pool from which I drew participants for 
the survey) posting a 10 minute task for $1 to “Classify political and nonpolitical news stories.” 
Workers were asked to accept the task if they had “some familiarity with American politics and 
policies.” I excluded workers who had participated in the experiment. 
Workers who accepted the task were first briefed in how to identify news stories that were 
“favorable to Democrats, favorable to Republicans or favorable to neither political group.” 
Coders were instructed a story could be favorable to one party or another for several reasons: 
• “It makes the leaders or members of that party look good (eg. smart, capable, ethical, etc.) 
• “It makes the leaders or members of the other party look bad (eg. stupid, incompetent, 
inethical, etc.) 
• “It confirms the views of that political group, makes that group's priorities seem more 
important, or provides evidence to support the group's beliefs (eg. that global warming is a 
manmade problem (for Dems) or that immigration hurts American workers (for 
Republicans)). 
• “It is otherwise good news for that party and/or bad news for the other party.” 
Coders were also told that there might be other reasons a story could favor one party over the 
other and that they should use their judgment.  
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Workers then took a practice quiz asking them to label “A news story about gridlock, that blames 
Democrats and Republicans equally,” “A news story about a celebrity romance,” “A news story 
reporting a Democrat scandal,” and “A news story on new evidence that global warming is 
increasing.” Coders who mislabeled any of the items were shown the guidelines again and asked 
to retake the quiz. If a coder again mislabeled any item their classifications were not included in 
the analysis. Finally, at the end of the task coders were given a six-question political awareness 
quiz. I did not include classifications of coders who had more than two incorrect answers. 
Workers were each randomly assigned ten stories (out of the total 100 stories used in the 
experiment) to classify. After removing coders who failed either the training or political 
knowledge quiz, each of the partisan stories had between 4 and 13 ratings (with the average story 
receiving 8 ratings).  
Looking at all coders who rated a story, more often than not there was agreement with my 
classifications, but not overwhelmingly so; average coder ratings agreed with me on the political 
valence of 25 of the 40 stories (so 63% agreement). However, much of the divergence lay in the 
fact that coders often found stories to be neutral, not favoring either party. If we restrict the 
analysis to only coders who said a story had a partisan slant, then average agreement between 
coders and the researcher rises to 89% of the time (or 33 out of 37 stories, with 3 stories all 
coders agreeing were politically neutral). This high level of agreement gives me confidence that 
if subjects in the experiment perceived a partisan lean to a story, it would be in the same 
direction as intended by the experimenter.60 
Subjects, Design and Results 
For this experiment, and all that follow in this dissertation, I recruited subjects from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Because Mechanical Turk workers are a convenience sample, it is not possible 
to say that the subjects in this experiment reflect the average social media user. In some ways, as 
discussed in Part I, Mechanical Turk workers are similar to typical social media users; for 
 
60 I similarly post-validated all the experiments presented in this chapter with similar results. 
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example they tend to be young and highly educated like the average Twitter user. In others they 
differ; they are more male than Facebook users and more white than Twitter users (Shearer & 
Gottfried, 2017). Mechanical Turk workers have, however, been found to be reliable subjects to 
the extent that they take surveys seriously, and partisan MTurkers (whom we are most interested 
in here) don’t appear to be psychologically distinguishable from the average American partisan 
(Clifford et al, 2015; Levay et al, 2016). 
I pre-qualified panelists by first inviting them to take a “1 minute survey” in which I asked their 
partisanship, ideology and social media use. For the survey experiment, I re-invited 1500 
subjects who indicated they use social media, equal parts Republican, Democratic and 
Independent, to participate in a “10 minute survey.” I ran the experiment using current stories on 
five separate days in June 2016, inviting 300 panelists each day. Over the five days, 513 subjects 
participated including 154 Republicans, 222 Democrats and 137 Independents. 
In the survey experiment, subjects first answered a series of questions about their personality and 
social identity, followed by several filler questions about their news use and familiarity with 
famous figures. 61 Finally I presented them with four sets of five stories and asked “Which stories 
would you be most likely to share on social media? Please place them in order of ‘most likely to 
share’ to ‘least likely to share.’” 
In analyzing their answers, I looked at the frequency with which subjects said they would be 
most likely to share the story favorable to Democratic and Republican parties. 
Partisans took the bait. Figure 34 shows the frequency with which Independents, Republicans 
and Democrats said they were most likely to share the Democrat or Republican friendly story. If 
subjects were to choose at random, they would place either story as a top pick 20% of the time. 
Both Democrat and Republican identifiers, however, place their party-favorable story as a top 
pick over 25% of the time. This is not only significantly greater than at random (in t tests, p 
 
61 One of those questions was about their party identity, which may have primed their partisanship. Yet I asked other 
identity questions so any such prime may have been dampened. In subsequent experiments party identity was not 
asked and effect sizes were even larger. 
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=0.003 and p=0.001 for Republicans and Democrats respectively), but is even more significantly 
distinct from the frequency with which they say they would share the story favorable to the other 
party (p<0.001 for both sets of partisans).62  
Figure 34. Selective Curation of Party Favorable News 
 
Frequency Independents, Democrats and Republicans selected the partisan friendly story as the one they’d be most 
likely to share on social media (out of five stories). 
Subjects’ aversion to sharing the counter-party story are also as we predict, but interestingly they 
share the counter-partisan story as infrequently as Independents do. This could mean one of two 
things. It could be that Independents share a distaste for partisan articles that equals the partisans’ 
distaste for counter-partisan stories. The other possibility we cannot rule out, however, is that 
 
62 A question that may come to the reader’s mind is if subjects say they would share these stories because they 
approve (or find the stories favorable) or because they dislike the stories. A policy victory for Republicans may, for 
example, be shared by a Democrat who wishes to rail against the policy. In this initial test I do not know how often – 
if at all – what appears to be cross-partisan sharing is, indeed, more in-party sharing. In later studies, however, I 
added a question at the end of survey experiments asking subjects if they chose the top stories because they “like” or 
“dislike” the news story. When I count disliked stories that are favorable to the out-party as in-party favorable 















Republican friendly Democrat friendly
149 
 
these stories are un-shareworthy for other reasons; Independents and partisans alike may share 
them less because, for example, the stories are dull. 
In all, the results above confirm the intuition that social media users are politically biased in the 
news they choose to share in the lab and lend support to Group Impression Management theory 
that users are motivated to signal allegiance to their political group.  
A Note Online Surveys and External Validity  
Although the design above allows us to create an environment where we can detect users’ 
selection biases, it is not a natural environment and so presents limits into how much we can 
claim about subjects’ behavior in real life. In other words, it is necessary to question the 
“external validity” of results we see in the lab.  
Asking subjects in an artificial setting what they “would do” in the real world presents two types 
of external validity concerns. One is that subjects may be poor at putting themselves in an 
imagined situation and making predictions about their behavior. We would thus expect errors in 
their predictions. But while such errors may give us an imprecise view of users’ true behavior, 
they do not necessarily bias our findings; with enough subjects those randomly distributed errors 
should cancel each other out.  
The greater obstacle to inferring that in-lab results reflects out-of-lab behavior is the possibility 
that subjects share a similar bias in their predictions. In surveys that ask respondents if they are 
likely to vote, for example, people will both overestimate their commitment to voting and 
underestimate the obstacles that get in their way of making it to the polls on election day 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Nickerson & Rogers, 2010). When they report to a survey taker that they are 
“likely to vote,” they are really saying “I’d like to think of myself as someone who will vote.” 
Similarly, subjects are well known to answer questions in “socially desirable” ways to look like 
upstanding members of society to the survey taker (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2009; Maccoby & 
Maccoby, 1954). Finally, if subjects can intuit the researcher’s hypothesis they may try to behave 
accordingly to please the researcher, creating a “demand effect” (Orne, 1962). 
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The subjects in these surveys could be susceptible to such social desirability and demand 
influences, yet it is hard to say which direction those influences would sway them. In the case of 
social desirability, we might imagine participants like to think of themselves – and likewise to 
present themselves – as nonpartisan and unbiased (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Pronin et al, 2002). 
If that were the case then subjects may avoid saying they would share partisan stories, even 
though that is what they indeed do online. It is also possible that subjects guess the experimenter 
is left of center, which may incline them to share the more liberal story, regardless of their own 
political leanings. A third possibility is that subjects believe partisanship is socially desirable, in 
which case they might overstate their willingness to share partisan stories. Demand effects may 
also incline subjects to overshare the politically congruent story if they suspect that the study is 
about partisanship.  
There are ways to mitigate social desirability and check for demand effects. A researcher could 
add directions that signal to subjects that any answer they give would be socially acceptable. It is 
also common to ask subjects at the end of an experiment what they thought the experiment was 
about to see if many subjects could intuit the experimenter’s goals. Unfortunately this researcher 
did neither.  
Nonetheless a social desirability effect presents little risk here. If subjects had an inclination to 
appear politically unbiased, they would suppress that bias, making the results above a 
conservative estimate of what happens outside the lab. We can also dismiss the possibility that 
subjects are trying to appear socially desirable to the – presumably – left-leaning experimenter. If 
that were the case then we would not see mirror effects for liberals and conservatives. 
Subjects could, however, think it is socially preferable to appear partisan. If that were the case, 
then these results could be a reflection of social desirability rather than an indication of subjects’ 
true sharing biases. Similarly it is possible that subjects have an in-lab tendency to share 
partisan-friendly information to please the researcher, if they sense that is what the researcher is 
aiming for. These effects would be a threat to the external validity of the results found above. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, I did not put in checks to minimize these threats so cannot 
dismiss them at this point. The next experiment I present, however, gives us reason to believe 
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that subjects were not responding to demand effects, nor were they acting in socially desirable 
way to appear partisan. Stay tuned. 
Selective Exposure? 
While the results of the previous survey provide support for a Group Impression Management 
theory, they are also consistent with visceral selective exposure theory; subjects may simply be 
sharing stories they empathically know their friends would want to read. How, then, do we know 
that the observed behavior comes from users’ motivation to impress their groups with their 
allegiance – rather than simply being a manifestation of visceral selective exposure? 
Later in this chapter I test aspects of Group Impression Management theory that distinguish it 
from selective exposure (for example, by looking for evidence that users are communicating with 
an imagined audience). Before doing so, though, it is possible to see if selective exposure (and so 
visceral selective exposure) would produce the results we see above. In other words, we can 
check to see if selective exposure and selective curation are observationally equivalent; are our 
inclinations in what we choose to share the same as what we prefer to read ourselves? If they are, 
that would not necessarily mean that selective sharing and visceral selective exposure operate 
with the same underlying motivations; it is possible that two similar behaviors result from 
distinct motivations (one student might not cheat on an exam for fear of getting caught while 
another needs to uphold their moral self-image). But if selective exposure and selective curation 
are not observationally equivalent, then we have an indication that their underlying motivations 
may be distinct. 
To see whether selective exposure and curation are observationally distinguishable, I recruited 
another set of participants from Mechanical Turk to take a version of the survey described above, 
this time with an experimental manipulation. All participants were again presented with sets of 
five stories, including one favorable to the left and one favorable to the right and asked to 
imagine that they saw those stories on social media. This time, however, I randomly assigned 
subjects to place the stories in order either of what they would be “most likely to share” or of 
what they would be “most likely to read” on social media. As before I ran the study over 
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multiple days (three in this case), using current stories from Reuters. For this experiment I only 
invited subjects who had previously identified as either Republican or Democrat in a pre-
qualification survey, since my question of interest was not how their behavior differed from 
Independents, but how it would shift depending on whether they were choosing which story to 
share or read. Over the three days 385 subjects completed the survey experiment, including 173 
Democrats and 197 Republicans.63 
Figure 35. Comparing Selective Curation and Selective Exposure 
 
Frequency with which partisans selected their party-favorable story and the story favorable to the other party as the 
one they would most likely “read” or “share” on social media. 
I aggregate the results, presented in Figure 35, for both Republican and Democrat subjects. As in 
the previous experiment, subjects showed a strong preference for sharing the news story that was 
favorable to their party while they are much less likely to share the story that is favorable to the 
other party (p<0.001). We likewise see a difference between subjects’ preferences for reading 
 




















party-favorable vs. other-party-favorable stories - 26.5% and 22.1% - yet that difference, shown 
in the third set of bars, only brushes against statistical significance (p=0.12). In contrast, the bias 
to share party-favorable stories over other-party-favorable stories is substantially stronger than 
the parallel bias to read congruent stories (p<0.001). 
The results suggest that whatever motivations we have to selectively expose ourselves to 
political information, the motivations to selectively curate political information have a stronger 
footprint. In other words, while both behaviors may be fueled by the same motivations, when it 
comes to sharing, those motivations are stronger. But the results above suggest there may also be 
a qualitative difference. Recall that if subjects were choosing stories at random, they would 
select any story 20% of the time. Subjects in both the read and share conditions indicate a 
preference for the party-friendly story, although the preference for sharing is statistically greater 
than reading (p=0.01). When looking at the gap between how willing subjects are to read or 
share the other-party-favorable story, however, not only are subjects less willing to share that 
story (p=0.01) than to read it, subjects don’t exhibit any aversion to reading that story; they are 
willing to read it at rates random chance would predict.64 
This last result is in line with research in selective exposure, discussed above, which finds that 
although news consumers have a bias toward consuming congruent information, they do not 
actively avoid incongruent information (Garrett, 2009; Hart et al, 2009). Again, as motivated 
reasoning theorists posit, consumers are not only motivated to reaffirm their beliefs, but are also 
curious and motivated to have an accurate view of the world (Kunda, 1990). Even if they are not 
open to considering opposing views, they may be willing to read what “the opposition” has to 
say because they are confident in their ability to debunk their arguments. When we share 
 
64 There is a second way to read those numbers. It may be that, given subjects’ strong preferences to share the party-
favorable story, the chance that they share the “other party friendly” story is not 20%, but rather 17% (in the share 
condition) and 19% (in the read condition). With this angle, subjects in the share condition would be sharing the 
other party story at random, while the subjects in the read condition would be exhibiting an even stronger preference 




political information, however, even if we want to satisfy the curiosity of our friends, as Earl’s 
“vicarious selective exposure” theory might propose (Earl et al, 2018), we may be less confident 
in our friends’ ability to critically read information that threatens their beliefs, and so may be 
reluctant to share that information than we are to consume it ourselves. 
But even with those nuances, vicarious selective exposure theory fails to fully explain the results. 
If selective exposure theory were able to tell us why we are willing to consume more 
disconfirming information than we share, it is not clear why we would be more eager to share 
than to read confirming information: if users are vicarious selective exposers, why would they be 
more desirous to confirm the beliefs of others than they would confirm their own beliefs? One 
way vicarious selective exposure theory might provide an explanation is if users thought their 
friends were all more partisan than they themselves were; this is possible and, yet, it would seem 
to stretch the power of empathy.  
Group Impression Management theory better explains why it is users have a stronger tendency to 
share politically congruent information than they are to read it. If a user is motivated to present 
themselves as a loyal group member, they both have an incentive to avoid sharing information 
that may challenge that image in addition to share more information that burnishes that image. 
It is easy to see why a social media user would not want to risk sharing information that makes 
the “other” group look good. While that user might, again, be willing or even curious to read an 
article that challenges their group’s views, sharing such a story risks creating the impression that 
one is a doubter of the faith. One may even fear open backlash from other group members. 
Our curiosity may drive us to consume not only challenging information but also non politically-
valenced information; subjects in the experiment may thus be interested to read one of the fluff 
stories or one of the substantive stories that don’t have a political message. In considering what 
to share, however, a fluffy story about a celebrity or a politically neutral story about a world 
event serve little purpose; they send no useful signal (other than that the user is shallow or boring 
- which may be other reasons they are avoided). The story that shows their party with a positive 




As a final note, we can also use these results to set aside concerns about demand effects and 
social desirability in the earlier experiment. Recall that a potential bias in experimental research 
is that subjects will intuit the researcher’s hypotheses and, because humans don’t like to 
disappoint, respond in a fashion they believe will please the researcher. Subjects also might think 
it socially desirable to project an image of themselves as partisan. The results above make it 
unlikely such demand and social desirability effects exists for selective sharing. If one did exist, 
then we would have to assume that subjects intuited the researcher’s hypothesis when asked 
about the stories they share, but less so about the stories they consume. Likewise they would 
only be acting in socially desirable ways (to the experimenter) when asked about sharing rather 
than reading. The pattern of results suggests subjects were responding to questions as they 
thought were true, not as they thought the researcher wanted to hear. 
Testing Extreme Information 
The experiments above support the proposition that users are inclined to share congruent 
information – that is, information that either confirms the group’s beliefs or that makes one’s 
group look good. It does not tell us, however, which attributes of a story make it shareworthy; is 
it the confirmation of the group’s beliefs or is it, instead, the evidence that one’s group is 
superior? The previous experiment also does not tell us if a story becomes more share-worthy if 
it more adamantly confirms the group’s beliefs. In order to say if users have a preference to share 
extreme information, we would want to have answers to each of these questions. In the following 
experiments, I distill those extreme elements of a story – its dogmatic confirmation of a group’s 
beliefs and its direct ingroup exultation - testing each in turn.65 
 
65 Again, in this work I do not test the third feature of extreme news – emotional valence – due to time constraints 




Once again, if social media users are motivated to show they share their political group’s beliefs, 
they will need to share stories that align with those beliefs. But are all aligned stories equally 
effective at sending a signal of group allegiance, or will users – as I posit – have a preference to 
share stories that unambiguously confirm the group’s values and beliefs over a story that is either 
lukewarm in its adherence to the group’s views or that may leave room for ambiguity? A story 
that is nuanced or ambiguous in its viewpoint doesn’t carry the necessary signal of group loyalty 
or - worse - risks projecting an image that one questions the group outlook, so we might expect 
social media users to share those stories less frequently than more dogmatic alternatives. 
To test whether social media users do, indeed, share stories that are more clearly aligned with the 
ingroup’s beliefs, we need some way of comparing relative levels of dogmatism and ambiguity 
in a news story while not inadvertently testing a confounding variable. In other words, we would 
want to see that when a news story dials up its unambiguousness, holding everything else 
constant, subjects with that group’s identity are more likely to share that story. 
To create such articles for comparison, I collected recent news stories on Google News using 
search terms for four policy issues for which the left and right are known to hold divergent views 
- gun control, climate change, immigration and minimum wage. For each issue I selected two 
stories that affirmed a liberal view (e.g. that global warming is a threat) and two that signaled a 
conservative view (e.g. immigrants are a threat). I then manipulated the headlines of those stories 
to either increase or decrease the unambiguousness of that signal. I did so in one of three ways: 
by altering either the certainty, salience or purity of the headline. 
• Certainty: To make a headline more or less “certain” I simply introduced or removed 
words such as “maybe” or “certain.” For example, I altered the CNN headline “Yes, 
climate change made Harvey and Irma worse” (certain in its connection between global 
warming and threat) to “Climate change may have made Harvey and Irma worse” (less 
clear evidence that global warming is a threat). 
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• Salience: While a news article may provide evidence to support a liberal or conservative 
point of view on an issue, the headline may or may not make the connection to that issue 
salient. For example, the Express headline “Earth could be plunged into mini Ice Age - 
and it could REVERSE global warming” makes no doubt that it is providing evidence 
that global warming is not a threat. In this case I simply removed the second phrase 
leaving “Earth could be plunged into mini Ice Age” to make the story less unambiguously 
about global warming. 
• Purity: A news story can provide evidence that confirms an ideological point of view but 
at the same time provide countervailing information. The headline “Research suggests 
gun background checks work” clearly supports a liberal point of view about gun control, 
yet the actual headline (this time from NPR) “Research suggests gun background checks 
work, but they're not everything” sends a mixed message that is a less pure signal of 
support of the liberal line. 
Using one of those three approaches, I created a total of sixteen pairs of stories (two for each 
political side for four issues), formatting them in the same way as the experiment above 
(headline, blurb and image) and pre-tested the degree to which each story confirm a liberal or 
conservative point of view. I recruited coders from Mechanical Turk and showed each ten of the 
32 stories, and asked: 
Does this article confirm the beliefs of liberals or conservatives? (Does it provide 
information that supports one of the beliefs of liberals or conservatives?) 
o Strongly confirms liberals’ beliefs. 
o Somewhat confirms liberals’ beliefs. 
o Doesn’t confirm either liberals’ or conservatives’ beliefs. 
o Somewhat confirms conservatives’ beliefs. 
o Strongly confirms conservatives’ beliefs. 
The more coders agree that a story confirmed a liberal or conservative view, the more “un-
ambiguous” we could say it is. My aim was to identify eight pairs of stories (one liberal and one 
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conservative for each of the four issues) that coders found statistically distinct. I also asked the 
coders to rate stories on several other dimensions - including whether they thought the story to be 
“important,” “informative,” or “interesting” - to make sure that any distinction within the pairs of 
stories was only related to how well it confirmed a left or right point of view. At least 23 coders 
rated each story.  
The coders did not find all pairs distinct in ambiguity: I could only find four pairs of stories that 
were statistically significant (at a < 0.1 p-level using t tests). In order to have a larger set of 
stories to use as instruments, I included four additional stories that, although not statistically 
distinct, were distinct in the right direction. 
Using those eight stories, I repeated the experimental design now familiar to the reader: subjects 
were recruited to look at sets of news stories and asked which they would be most likely to share 
on social media. I recruited subjects who had identified as Republican or Democratic in a pre-
qualification survey, however I was interested in how their ideology (not partisanship) 
influenced their choices. In the experiment, the “treatment” was exposing ideologues to the less – 
as opposed to more - ambiguous story. I conducted the study in two batches; in each subjects 
only saw two of the four target stories. A total of 335 subjects completed the experiment, 
including 139 liberals and 160 conservatives.  
Results 
If ideologues are, indeed, apt to signal that they are true believers we would expect them share 
the less ambiguous story more often than the story that leaves room to question their adherence 
to an ideological view. 
Looking at the frequency with which subjects say they are most likely to share the ideologically 
congruent story on social media in Figure 36, we can see that - across all eight stories - there was 
a marginally higher preference for the “strongly” unambiguous story than the “weaker” version, 




Figure 36. Selective Curation of Weakly vs Strongly Dogmatic News 
 
Frequency partisans share their party favorable story when its headline weakly or strongly confirms ingroup beliefs. 
Moreover, if we break down the difference by individual story, is appears that much of the 
difference seen in Figure 36 can be attributed to one story; a story about immigrants that 
affirmed a liberal point of view. The other stories either show only a slim increase in the 
popularity when a story was presented in its “strong” version or, in two cases, saw a decrease in 
popularity. We thus should be doubly reticent to make anything of the overall finding. 
Although the ambiguity hypothesis is not strongly supported by the experimental findings, a 
post-hoc analysis of the instruments used lends more credence that ambiguity may play a role in 
the popularity of stories subjects choose to share. In pre-validating the instruments, recall, I 
asked coders to say whether a story: 
• Strongly confirms liberals’ beliefs. 
• Somewhat confirms liberals’ beliefs. 
• Doesn’t confirm either liberals’ or conservatives’ beliefs. 
• Somewhat confirms conservatives’ beliefs. 
• Strongly confirms conservatives’ beliefs. 
Using the coders’ answers, I can assign each of the 16 stories a score from 1 (strongly confirms 
















complete ambiguity. Reverse coding the scores of conservative stories, so both sets of stories are 
on the same scale from total ambiguity (3) to no ambiguity (5), and seeing which stories were 
most popular to share among subjects, we see in Figure 37 that there is a strong relationship 
between how clearly a story supports an ideological view and how frequently subjects 
sympathetic to that view say they would share it. Indeed, the clarity with which the stories 
support an ideological view predicts over half of the variance in their popularity. 
Figure 37. A Post-Hoc Analysis: Dogma and Selective Curation 
 
Frequency partisans are most likely to share their party favorable story relative to how clearly the headline confirms 
ingroup’s beliefs, from 3 (total ambiguity) to 5 (minimal ambiguity). An observation below 3 indicates coders 
thought a story slightly confirmed the other party’s viewpoint. The two larger circles indicate two observations on 
the same point. Republican favorable stories are red and Democrat favorable stories blue. R-squared = 0.56. 
As a post-hoc analysis, we can only use this finding as exploratory research. Yet it points to a 
possible future experimental design. Rather than trying to construct identical stories that only 














Strength confirm ideology (pre-validation)
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scoring each for levels of ideological ambiguity and seeing which subjects say they are more 
likely to share.66  
Extolling the Ingroup / Denigrating the Outgroup 
A story that extols the ingroup or denigrates the outgroup sends a clear signal of group solidarity 
- and thus we might expect it is more appealing to share than a similar story that is neutral 
towards one’s in and out groups. 
To test if this is the case, I use an experimental design like the one above again manipulating the 
headlines of real news stories, but this time altering articles to clearly praise the ingroup, tarnish 
the outgroup or, as a control, be group neutral. I looked for stories that extolled the ingroup or 
denigrated the outgroup in different ways, either by distinguishing a group’s inherent traits, 
applauding an achievement of the ingroup or noting an immoral act of the outgroup:  
• Superior group traits. One way to extol the ingroup is to share stories that report the 
group has superior traits. Luckily there is no shortage of these types of stories circulating 
online; I easily found articles that reported on differences between liberals and 
conservatives on their levels of intelligence, attractiveness, bigotry, anger, charitability, 
happiness and gullibility. I chose stories about two traits: one story linking low I.Q. to 
conservatism and one reporting on the superior attractiveness of conservatives. I then 
manipulated the stories’ headlines and blurbs so that they attributed the 
inferiority/superiority to either group or to neither. I chose intelligence and attractiveness 
because both seemed plausibly attributable to either group and because they varied in 
their political salience and importance. Intelligence is a trait that might be considered an 
important and relevant quality for praising a political group; one could argue, then, that 
evidence that affirms a group’s intelligence is relevant political information. A group’s 
level of attractiveness, in contrast, should be politically irrelevant; thus if we see subjects 
 
66 Although such a design would not completely rule out that other factors influenced a story’s popularity. 
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share stories that tout their group’s good looks, this would indicate unadulterated ingroup 
cheerleading. 
Figure 38. Example Stories: Superior Group Traits 
 
• Credit for positive outcomes. Another way to cheer the ingroup is to share information 
that applauds the group’s positive achievements; if a political group is shown, for 
example, to improve the economy or reduce crime, it would affirm that the group has 
superior policies and leadership. They also show that the group is “winning.” Ideally, in 
an experimental manipulation I could take a similar approach to the “trait” stories above; 
that is, use the same stories for both political groups and merely alter which group could 
be credited with a policy achievement. The challenge was finding stories that could be 
equally plausible regardless of attribution; since subjects would be likely to know who is 
in political power and the issues that parties care about, it would not be believable to 
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read, for example, “Democrats improve economy”67 or “Republicans reduce global 
warming.” To find articles that could be plausibly manipulated, I looked for stories that a) 
were about policies that are not known to be owned by one party and b) did not require 
one party to be in power for them to claim credit. What fell into those categories were 
two stories about bipartisan efforts to introduce legislation on cybersecurity (shown) and 
battling opiate addiction. Another advantage of using these stories is that I did not have to 
present subjects false information; subjects merely saw partial information in the 
manipulation.  
Figure 39. Example Stories: In-party Credit 
 
• Immoral behavior. Finally, I used stories that impugn the morality of the outgroup. These 
came in two flavors: political scandals (both sex and corruption) and stories that 
attributed racist actions to members of the outgroup. As with the “credit giving” stories 
above, there were challenges to finding suitable current news items that I could easily 
 
67 At the time of this study, Republicans held Congress and the presidency. 
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adjust for both Democrats and Republicans. For example, a story about a Republican 
mayor calling immigrants “raccoons” may have been implausible if I insisted he was a 
Democrat. I was also concerned about falsely attributing negative behavior to political 
groups; even though subjects would be debriefed at the end of study, false beliefs are 
known to linger even after corrected (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Instead of using the same 
story for each political group, I selected different stories for the liberals/Democrats and 
conservative/Republican subjects and manipulated the headline to merely note the party 
membership of the immoral actor or leave their party information out. It was also 
necessary to choose politicians and news items that were significantly obscure so that 
subjects would be unlikely to know their political affiliation. This choice necessitated 
using local politicians with little power, which risked weakening the intervention. 





In addition to recruiting subjects with known partisan identities, I also included Independents; I 
wanted to be sure that any increased preference for sharing the ingroup/outgroup story was 
specific to partisans and not a general preference for stories that specify party or ideological 
affiliation. As with the studies above, I recruited subjects from my Mturk pool, offering $1 to 
take a “10 minute survey.” In total, 390 subjects took the online experiment, including 132 
Republicans, 130 Democrats and 128 Independents. Each subject saw five sets of five stories; in 
three of those sets they saw one of the target stories, either a group neutral story or a story that 
extolled or denigrated one group. 
Overall, subjects with party affiliations showed a strong preference for stories that puffed up 
their party or associated ideological group (p=0.01) compared to neutral stories. This preference 
was not shared by independents; in fact, independents showed an antipathy toward stories that 
differentiated ideological groups). A difference-in-difference analysis between independents and 
partisans shows a 12 percentage point difference in treatment effect (p<0.01).  
Figure 41. Extolling the Ingroup / Denigrating the Outgroup 
 
Frequency that partisans and independents share stories that (for partisans) extol the ingroup or denigrate the 

























As with the previous experiment, not all stories had similar treatment effects. The overall effect 
seen above appears to be driven largely by the stories that differentiate between the inherent 
traits of members of ideological groups.  
Figure 42. Extolling the Ingroup: Superior Traits 
  
Frequency that ideologues and independents share stories that (for ideologues) report on the superiority of their 
ingroup (treatment) or are group neutral. 
When liberals and conservatives are reported to have similar levels of intelligence or 
attractiveness, partisans and independents alike show no preference toward sharing those stories. 
If a subject’s ingroup, however, is reported to have higher intelligence or attractiveness, that 
subject will be substantially more likely to say they would share that story (p<0.01). This result 

























Figure 43. Extolling the Ingroup: Ingroup Credit 
 
Frequency that partisans and independents share stories that (for partisans) give their party credit for policy gains 
(treatment) or are group neutral. 
The same cannot be said for news stories that credit the ingroup with legislative action. Partisans 
are equally likely to say they will share a story that reports on a bipartisan legislative effort as 
when that effort is credited solely to their party. They are, however, significantly more likely to 
share a story that credits their party than an independent would (p=0.01). One way to explain 
these unexpected findings is that partisans and independents alike are fairly neutral about these 
stories, since they share them at a rate equivalent to random, with the exception for independents 
who have an antipathy toward sharing stories that credit one party over the other. Another 
possible interpretation is that a story about one lawmaker or one party introducing a bill is 
inherently dull, but such a story sends a share-worthy signal for a partisan when the subject’s 
party member is responsible. In that light, these results could confirm our expectations that 
partisans have a predilection toward sharing stories that signal their group’s achievements.  
What remains a puzzle is why both partisans and independents are likely to share a story about 
bipartisanship. One possible answer is that independents and some partisans share a desire to 



























Figure 44. Denigrating the Outgroup: Morality 
 
Frequency that partisans and independents share stories that (for partisans) impugn the morality of the outgroup 
(treatment) or are group neutral. 
Finally, subjects’ preferences for sharing stories that point out the moral failings of the outgroup 
are only somewhat in line with our expectations. Partisans do show a preference for sharing 
stories about corruption and bigotry when it is clear that the perpetrator is an outgroup member, 
yet that difference does not reach statistical significance (p=0.23). What is unexpected is 
Independents’ comparative aversion to sharing any morality story (p=0.02, just looking at the 
group neutral story).  
Once again, there are at least two possible interpretations for these results. Partisans may feel 
indifferent about the signal these stories send (again, they share them a rate near random), while 
Independents have an aversion to spreading negative political stories and signaling that they care 
about mucky politics (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002).  
Another possible explanation for the results in Figure 44 is that, like the stories about bill 
introductions above, these stories are inherently dull unless a user is a partisan and there is an 
opportunity to impugn the morality of one’s outgroup. That is easily done when the party of the 
moral transgressor is explicitly noted. It may also be possible, however, if the party of the 
transgressor is easily intuited to be that of the outgroup. Looking at the stories I used for moral 
transgressions, that could be the case for the Republican stories I used (as I notice in hindsight). 


























without being told he was Republican subjects knew that he was a state legislator in Utah, which 
is a strong clue of conservative and Republican leaning. The second instrument I used for 
Republican moral transgressions may have been equally obviously Republican (Figure 45); in 
this case, subjects saw an image of a white man who called undocumented immigrants 
“raccoons,” which may have elicited an association with conservatives. 
Figure 45. Group Neutral Story for Republican Immorality / Racism 
 
Group neutral instrument that may not have been so group neutral (i.e. subjects may have guessed the Mayor in 
question was conservative and/or Republican). 
The instruments used for immoral Democrats, in contrast, would not have been as obviously 
Democratic if their party had not been explicit. The mayor of Nashville in Figure 40 is a woman 
and city mayor, both associated with liberalism, but she is also a Southerner, which might send 
mixed signal about her party affiliation. The second instrument used, about Democratic senators 
supporting a possibly racist bill (Figure 46) would likewise not be associated with Democrats if 
they were not explicitly noted. 
Figure 46. Group Neutral Story for Democrat Immorality / Racism 
 
Group neutral instrument that was more likely to be truly group neutral (i.e. subjects would be less likely to guess 
senators were liberal and / or Democrat). 
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It may be the case, then, that while conservative subjects would need an explicit cue to identify 
Democrats as the moral transgressors in the articles, liberal subjects would need no such cue. If 
we compare the sharing preferences of Democrat and Republican subjects in Figure 47 we see 
this could be the case. Subjects who identify as Democrat were nearly equally willing to share 
the story about an immoral Republican regardless of whether his party was explicitly identified 
or not. Republican subjects, however, were substantially more likely to say they’d share the 
morality story only once they were told the perpetrator was a Democrat (p=0.04).  
Figure 47. Morality - Comparing Democrats & Republicans  
 
Frequency that Democrats and Republicans share stories that explicitly impugn the morality of the outgroup 
(treatment) or are group neutral. 
In sum, we find evidence that partisans and ideologues are more inclined to share stories that 
exalt one’s ingroup or conversely disparage the outgroup. This is most cleanly and clearly seen 
in stories that attest to the ingroup’s inherent superiority; stories that affirm the ingroup is either 
more intelligent or good-looking than the outgroup are not only more likely to be shared by 
ideologues than stories that say groups have parity, but they are more likely to share them 
than ideologically moderate subjects. Partisan subjects are also more likely than independents to 
share a story that gives their party credit for introducing legislation.  Finally, partisans are more 
likely than independents to say they’d share a story about a morally corrupt politician from their 
outgroup, even though (possibly given this researcher’s poor choice of instruments), we only see 






















These experiments both give us a clearer picture of what drives a social media user to share 
politically congruent information as well as why they may be more apt to share extreme stories. 
The ideologues in these studies are unabashed tribal cheerleaders. We can see that most clearly 
in the stories about groups’ inherent traits; if a story explicitly notes the superiority of their 
ingroup – even regarding a quality that should be irrelevant to one’s political worldview – 
subjects are happy to put it on their social media wall. Similarly, though to a lesser degree, if a 
story credits the ingroup or impugns the morality of a member of the outgroup, it is seen as more 
shareworthy. We also saw evidence, though weak, that stories will be more desirable to share the 
more they dogmatically confirm the ingroup’s beliefs. 
Expectation 2: Social media users are communicating with an “imagined 
audience” that reflects one of their political groups 
The experiments above confirm the intuition that social media users prefer to share stories that 
are favorable to their political groups. They likewise confirm that stories are more share-worthy 
if they exalt the ingroup or denigrate the outgroup or, to a lesser degree, if a story is more 
dogmatic in confirming the ingroup’s beliefs. We also saw that users’ sharing choices were not a 
mere mirror of “selective exposure.” These results are compatible with the Group Impression 
Management theory I have presented – i.e. that social media users are motivated to project an 
image of themselves as true and loyal group members. This is a good start. If users had failed to 
exhibit a tendency to share information favorable to their group or if such a bias could be 
explained by the same forces that produce “selective exposure,” it would be hard to claim that 
users were motivated to signal to group members that they are worthy members. But we still lack 
evidence that users are, indeed, signaling to their group members and that they do so to bolster 
their group inclusion. 
In this next study I test the claim that users are signaling - or communicating - with their political 
groups as their “imagined audience.” To do so, I lean on theory and methods not from the 
scholars who study imagined audiences, but from researchers who study social identity. As 
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discussed previously, social identity theory posits that part of our individual identity is formed by 
the social groups that we belong to. Those groups can be multiple and varied, and can include 
racial, religious, professional, and cultural groups (Huddy, 2001; Tajfel, 1978).  
Those social identities can also wax and wane in prominence depending on our current 
environment (Cameron, 2004; Hogg & Reid, 2006). Researchers take advantage of this 
multiplicity and lability of social identity to study its influence; by priming one identity over the 
other in an experimental setting it is possible to see, for example, how social identities influence 
political preferences (Klar, 2013; Jackson, 2011). 
I borrow those interventions to see if I can prime one of a subject’s social groups and, in so 
doing, shift their “imagined audience” and alter the stories they choose to share. In using this 
manipulation, I am assuming that by raising the salience of a social identity, I likewise am 
heightening the presence of one social group in a subject’s mind. This is a bit of a leap, but not 
an insensible one. When, for example, I think of myself as a “New Yorker,” I can only do so by 
thinking of myself as a part of the group “New Yorkers” (Turner, 1975). One’s group identity 
would thus naturally elicit consciousness of one’s group. My expectation is that if subjects are 
primed to have one of their social groups more present in their mind they would be more apt to 
think of that group when selecting a story to share.  
In two separate studies I recruit subjects who have dual social identities to test that hypothesis. 
One set of subjects identify both with a non-white minority group (Black or Latino) and as 
Democrats. Another set, in which I include only white subjects, identify both as partisans (either 
Democrat or Republican) and, given their location in the US, I expect will also identify as 
American. (And, indeed, 95% of subjects in the experiment say they identify as American at 
least “a little.”) 
In the case of the experiment with white subjects, I use the identical instrument as in previous 
experiments; subjects once again are presented with sets of stories that each include one article 
that is favorable to Democrats and one favorable to Republicans and are asked which story they 
would be most likely to share. Subjects are randomly assigned into a control group or one of two 
treatment conditions in which they are primed either with their partisan identity or their 
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American identity. My expectation is that when subjects’ partisan identities are primed, their 
partisan group will become more salient and they will be more likely to share the story that 
reflects well on their party. When their American identity is primed, in contrast, I expect that 
their partisan inclinations will be mitigated; with the super-ordinate social group in mind - one 
that encompasses Americans beyond just their partisan sympathizers - they will be less inclined 
to signal their identity as partisans and might even share stories that indicate they are open to 
more diverse views. (For a similar approach investigating selective exposure see Levundusky, 
2018.) 
For the subjects who identify with one of the minority groups I use a somewhat modified 
instrument. Subjects likewise saw sets of five news stories among which one is favorable to 
Democrats, but instead of seeing a Republican-friendly story subjects see an article that is 
relevant to their minority identity. For the Democratic stories I use the same type of stories as in 
previous studies; that is, recent stories from Reuters that either confirm a Democratic point of 
view or make Democrats look good. For the articles intended to be relevant to the subjects’ 
minority identity, I selected and pre-tested three types of news stories: one that showed the 
minority group in a strongly positive light (e.g. a story about an African American Olympian), 
one that was threatening to the group (e.g. a story about low test scores among Latino students) 
and one that was relatively neutral (e.g. a story about minorities and the housing market). Similar 
to the experiment with white subjects, the expectation is that the story subjects share will vary 
depending upon whether the subject’s Democratic or minority identity is primed. 
Finally, for both studies I include a parallel set of conditions in which I ask subjects which 
stories they would be most likely to read. Like the earlier experiment which included a “share” 
and “read” condition, I want to be sure that any effects we see are related to subjects’ 
motivations for sharing information. If we were to observe that subjects are more apt to share 
party relevant stories when primed with their partisan identity, for example, it might not be the 
case we have shifted their “imagined audience,” but rather simply that their party becomes more 
salient, drawing them more to those stories. By including a read condition we can test – and 
possibly discount - that alternative hypothesis. 
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Results: Priming Race and Party Identities 
In the experiment with minority subjects, I initially primed subjects’ identities simply by asking 
if they identified with a minority group (racial prime) or party (partisan prime). I recruited 
Mechanical Turk workers who had previously identified themselves as Black or Latino in an 
earlier qualification survey; 67 Black and 60 Latino subjects completed the survey experiment. 
I present the results of the Black and Latino subjects in Figure 48.68 What is first worth 
remarking is the overall popularity of the minority-relevant stories; subjects say they would share 
those stories 42% of the time in the control condition, more than twice the rate one would expect 
if they were choosing randomly. Stories that are pro-Democratic are relatively unpopular in the 
control condition, with subjects selecting those stories about 15% of the time. When primed with 
their partisan identity, however, subjects increase their preference for sharing the Democratic 
stories, though the difference does not quite reach statistical significance (p=0.09). Such a result 
suggests that subjects’ “imagined audience” has shifted; they still share stories that are relevant 
to their minority social group, but with less frequency.  
  
 




Figure 48. Effects of Priming Identity on Shifting the “Imagined Audience” I 
 
Frequency minority subjects (all of whom are Democrats) selected the story that was favorable to Democrats 
(“Democrat-friendly”) or salient to their minority group (“Minority relevant”) when they were primed with their 
party identity (“party prime”), their minority group identity (“minority prime”), or with no prime (control). (N=64) 
What we do not see, however, is a shift in the stories they share when primed with their minority 
social group; if anything we see a decrease in the frequency they say they’d share the minority 
relevant story. But the absence of an increase may not be too surprising; the popularity of the 
minority stories in the control condition suggest a “ceiling effect” could be at play. For racial 
minorities, race is a dominant group identity (McClain et al, 2009); priming racial identity will 
thus have little effect in increasing the relevance of that group. In other words it may not be 
possible to make subjects’ racial group much more salient than it is in the control condition. 
While the results above are suggestive, the sample size is so small that we cannot confidently say 
that there is a shift in subjects’ “imagined audience.” To see if the results are a fluke, I re-run the 
experiment, this time recruiting Mechanical Turk subjects through Turkprime, a service that lets 
researchers recruit subjects with specific demographic characteristics. In this second experiment 
I also strengthen the party and race primes by adding a secondary question asking subjects how 
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Combining the results from that experiment with the first experiment (N=195) we see similar 
results. Again, when subjects with dual Democrat and minority identities were primed with their 
party identity they were more apt to share the story favorable to Democrats, and the difference 
approached statistical significance (p=0.06) than in the first study. Likewise, respondents were 
yet again not more likely to share the story salient to their minority group when primed with that 
identity (p=0.88).69 
Figure 49. Effects of Priming Identity on Shifting the “Imagined Audience” II 
 
Frequency minority subjects (all of whom are Democrats) selected the story that was favorable to Democrats 
(“Democrat-friendly”) or salient to their minority group (“Minority relevant”) when they were primed with their 
party identity (“party prime”), their minority group identity (“minority prime”), or with no prime (control). (N=260) 
The results above suggest that when primed with their partisan identity, subjects are more apt to 
share party relevant stories, but does that imply a shift in their “imagined audience”? To answer 
that question we can compare the priming effect on what subjects say they will share to what 
they say they would read. Looking at such a priming effect in Figure 50 we see no greater 
 
69 The analysis of this second study varies slightly from the first in how subjects’ partisanship is identified. Because 
I am not able to pre-select Turkprime subjects on their partisanship (but only did so on their race) it was necessary to 
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willingness to read the Democratic story when subjects are primed with their partisan identity. A 
statistical analysis (looking at the interaction effect of “party prime” * “share vs. read”) confirms 
that the effect of priming partisan identity is unique to the share conditions (p=0.04). 
Figure 50. Effects of Priming Identity on Selective Exposure 
  
Frequency with which non-white respondents said they were most likely to read the story favorable to their party or 
relevant to their minority group after being primed with their party identity, their minority identity, or with no prime 
(control). When priming identity, we do not see the same effects on selective exposure as we do on selective 
curation in Figure 49. 
Results: Priming Party and American Identity 
In the experiment with white subjects the results are both inconclusive and underpowered 
(N=103). I report them here nonetheless. As with the results in previous studies, Figure 51 shows 
the frequency with which partisan respondents said they would choose the story that reflects well 
on their party or the other party, again in three conditions: when subjects had a partisan identity 
prime, an American identity prime or no prime. As none of the results near statistically 
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Figure 51. Effects of Priming Identity on Shifting “Imagined Audience” III 
  
Frequency with which white respondents said they were most likely to share the story favorable to their party 
(“party-friendly”) or the outgroup party (“other party friendly”) after being primed with their party identity, 
American identity, or with no prime (control). 
Expectation 3: We are motivated to share stories favorable to our group 
in order to secure our inclusion in that group 
Finally, we arrive at the question of motivation. So far we have seen that social media users, as 
commonly thought, do tend to share information that would endear them to their political social 
groups. We also have - tepid - evidence that social media users have those social groups in mind 
as they select information to share. But we have not yet directly hit on what motivates those 
users to share stories that glorify their ingroup while damning the outgroup. Here I test the 
proposition that social media users’ curatorial choices are motivated in part by the need to 
solidify their inclusion in their social groups. 
To test that hypothesis, I introduce a manipulation into the experimental design to variably 
decrease or increase subjects’ need for inclusion, observing if they then, indeed, change their 
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For that manipulation I lean again on work in identity and social psychology and use the “self-
affirmation” treatment designed by Claude Steele (1988). Self-affirmation theory, as discussed 
above, posits that humans have a need to perceive themselves as good and competent, and that 
when they experience a blow to that perception they are motivated to re-establish a sense of self-
worth. In Steele’s self-affirmation treatment subjects “affirm” their sense of self by 
contemplating a time when they exhibited qualities that they value; once subjects so affirm 
themselves, they have less of a need to find other ways to bolster their sense of self. Although 
first used to support a counter hypothesis to Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory, it has since 
been used in experiments in other contexts, including selective exposure (e.g. Cohen et al, 2007). 
In using a “self-affirmation” treatment, I again make a conceptual leap from the internal self to 
the external social self. In Steele’s conception, humans need to maintain a perception of 
themselves as good and capable. But if we take the Kurzban view, as discussed earlier, that 
internal self is merely am image used to project to one’s social connections; we need to see 
ourselves as good and competent in order to project that socially fit image. That internal image 
also then functions as an internal social meter, tracking one’s social worthiness; if our experience 
of self-worth is high, we will likewise experience that we are in good social stead, but if our self-
worth dips it will be a signal that our social standing is at risk. With this Kurzban lens we can 
then hypothesize that those who have a strongly affirmed self will feel assured of their social 
image and have less need to signal their group bona fides. Conversely, those who are less 
affirmed will have a greater need to bolster their inclusion in their social groups, and so will be 
more apt to want to signal group allegiance.70  
As with earlier studies, I recruited Mechanical Turk workers who had previously indicated their 
partisan identity to take a “10 minute survey.” The outcome instrument for this experiment was 
the same as in most of the previous studies; subjects were presented with sets of five recent news 
stories and asked to place in order which studies they would be most likely to share on social 
 
70 At least one study, that shows that marginal group members are most likely to express derogation of the outgroup, 
supports the view that expressions of group solidarity come from a need to strengthen inclusion (Noel et al, 1995). 
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media. In this study, however, subjects were randomly assigned to either receive a self-
affirmation treatment, to be in a control group or, in a second version of this study, to be in a 
“de-affirmation” treatment. In the affirmation treatment, subjects were first asked to place a set 
of values in the order most important to them and then to write about a time when they felt they 
exhibited the most important value. In the de-affirmation condition, subjects were instead asked 
to write about a time they failed to exhibit that value. Subjects in the control condition wrote 
about a movie they recently saw. 
The study was run on two separate occasions, first in January 2017 and then again in June 2017. 
The first round, in which 349 subjects participated, included the affirmation treatment and 
control conditions. Results were in the direction expected, yet underpowered. I ran the 
experiment a second time, introducing the third - de-affirmation - condition, to see if I could 
strengthen the manipulation. Over the two rounds, 798 subjects completed the survey, 49% 
Democrat and 51% Republican. 
I present the combined results of the two experiments for the control and affirmation conditions 
in Figure 52 (since both conditions were present in both studies). There we can see weak 
evidence for the hypothesis; partisans are less apt to select the partisan story if they have been 
affirmed, yet the difference doesn’t meet standards for statistical significance (p=0.14) in spite of 
the experiment being sufficiently powered (N=668). (Adding a de-affirmation condition did not, 









Figure 52. Affirming Away a Need for Inclusion 
 
Frequency with which respondents said they were most likely to share the story favorable to their party (“party-
friendly”) or outgroup party (other party-friendly”) after receiving a self-affirmation treatment or with no treatment 
(control). 
What might explain the weak results in this experiment, other than the possibility that the 
hypothesis is wrong? Again, we cannot attribute the weak results to the experiment being poorly 
powered; if we do not see an effect with 668 subjects in two conditions there is unlikely an effect 
worth noticing. Nor is the instrument likely at fault; Steele’s self-affirmation treatment has been 
widely used tested and we have evidence from half a dozen earlier experiments that our outcome 
variables are strong.  
One possible explanation for the weak results are, however, that Steele’s intervention does not, 
indeed, affect one’s “need for inclusion”; in other words, the need to perceive oneself as 
competent and good is not the same as the need for one’s group to see one as competent and 
good, as I posited. If this were the case, then a different instrument that more directly affects the 
need for inclusion might produce an effect. For example, one could use K.D. Williams social 
isolation intervention (2007), which induces a feeling of exclusion through an online interaction 
in which subjects are kept out from a game of catch. There is evidence that experiencing 
rejection increases identity and connection with one’s social groups (Knowles & Gardner, 2008). 



















and also because it is known to backfire, making some subjects anti-social. It could, however, 
more directly and successfully induce a higher need for inclusion in subjects. As it stands now, 
regardless, we do not have strong evidence that it is a need to be included and accepted in a 
social group that prompts partisans to share stories that favor their party.  
Adding Up the Evidence for Group Impression Management Theory 
In this chapter, I presented a series of survey studies designed to test Group Impression 
Management theory, the proposition that social media users share political stories in order to 
signal their group allegiance and thus secure their inclusion in their political groups. While the 
results of those experiments are consistent with the theory – and better explain observed behavior 
than does Selective Exposure theory – we do not find strong evidence to support all elements of 
the theory. In particular, we have little support for the claim that users are motivated to secure 
their group inclusion when posting political news on social media. 
What the experimental results do demonstrate is that, in an experimental setting, users show a 
preference for stories that signal group loyalty. Subjects indicated they are more apt to post 
stories that generally favor their political group, either by confirming the group’s beliefs or by 
extolling the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup. We also have strong evidence that partisans 
and ideologues prefer to share stories that explicitly tout the ingroup’s superiority. To a lesser 
degree we saw indications that users likewise prefer to share stories that show the outgroup has 
moral failings and that the ingroup are effective leaders. 
The experiments in this chapter also offer evidence – though lukewarm – that users are, indeed, 
communicating to their political groups when they share political stories. In a group of subjects 
that hold dual social identities – with their political party and with their racial minority group – 
we saw that their selection of what story to share shifted when primed with one identity over the 
other. This shift suggests that users do, indeed, have an “imagined audience” in mind when 
sharing on social media, an audience that mirrors one of their social groups. 
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But while users may be speaking to their political groups and they clearly have a preference to 
share stories that would signal group allegiance, we do not have direct evidence that they share 
those stories in order to strengthen their inclusion in those groups. The crux of Group Impression 
Management theory – that users are motivated to secure their acceptance in a group – finds only 
weak support. There is circumstantial evidence, but no smoking gun. In the conclusion I propose 
ways forward both for re-testing that conjecture and exploring other motivations for why users 






When I began working on this dissertation in 2014, the original plan was to study how - and how 
much - social media solidifies our political echo chambers. My initial inspiration for studying 
political behavior, indeed, had been Cass Sunstein's writings on the dangers of echo chambers 
online and in civil society. Sunstein's work and my growing concerns about social media and 
polarization, in turn, led me to work for Eli Pariser as a research assistant on his concept-
conceiving book The Filter Bubble. By the time I arrived in graduate school a year later it was 
almost a truism - to me at least - that social media was narrowing our worldview, protecting us 
from dissonant voices and endangering democratic society. My research, the plan was, would 
both serve as further confirmation that social media strengthens our echo chambers and 
hopefully give some insight into how to pry those chambers open. 
But as I began to dig into and examine the mechanisms of social media - modeling diffusion 
patterns, examining Twitter users' retweeting choices, and comparing levels of homophily on and 
offline - I kept bumping into the same dis-confirming evidence. Social media did not appear to 
be filtering out challenging information; if anything, it was creating cracks in those chambers, 
exposing users to information they would less likely come across off social media. When I 
compared levels of political homophily on social media and in real life I found that, contrary to 
common thought, our friends and acquaintances on social media reflect our own political colors 
no more than do our friends offline. Even if we were to surround ourselves with friends who are 
ideological mirrors of ourselves, those online friends would be apt to send us political 
information from across the political divide; among the group of Twitter users followed in this 
work, even the strongest ideologues shared a sizable amount - 20% - of stories from counter-
ideological news sources. Finally, modelling diffusion in polarized networks made it apparent 
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that social media sites don't further filter our information for us, as intuition might have it - rather 
they lead to a distribution of information that is more diverse than the friends we connect with. 
Fortunately - from the perspective of any self-interested researcher who abhors a null result - as I 
saw my original thesis crumble one study at a time, my data and models repeatedly pointed to 
another - unanticipated - phenomenon. Although social media appeared to expose users to 
information from the opposing political camp, the stories that percolate to the top tended to be 
articles from each side's extremes. As seen in the Twitter data I collected as well as data from 
other scholars, what users reshare is more often than not stories from the DailyKos’s and 
Breitbarts of the online news ecosphere. Balanced, nuanced stories from NPR and the 
Economist, in contrast, lose out in the battle of re-tweets. Likewise, when it comes to the spread 
of those "extreme" stories - stories that are dogmatic, tribal and emotionally charged - diffusion 
is not a potential dampener as it is with echo chambers; rather diffusion amplifies the reach and 
dominance of extreme news. 
My academic journey - from conviction that social media solidifies our echo chambers to the 
realization that it is more likely a breeding ground for extreme information - reflects in large 
degree public perception of social media's political role over the same time period. In 2014, 
when my research began, "echo chambers" and "filter bubbles" were known and well 
documented phenomenon. Eli Pariser's 2011 The Filter Bubble had invented a term that had 
already entered common parlance in discussions about online media and society.  
Figure 53. Filter Bubbles in the Public’s Mind 
 
Relative frequency of Google searches for the term “filter bubble” 2014 until today. (From Google Trends) 
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Academics likewise produced a steady stream of studies that analyzed and visualized our online 
bubbles, each with accompanying visuals of the red and blue "hair balls" of our online networks. 
Figure 54. A Popular Visualization of Online Echo Chambers  
 
 
Image of blogosphere network from Adamic & Glance (2005). 
Echo chambers, true, were not the only social ills associated with our online lives in 2014. 
Trolling, flame wars, bullying - and other versions of uncivil or harassing behavior - were also 
well recognized scourges. But while platforms and academics worked to figure out how to 
minimize online harassment, by and large these antisocial behaviors weren't seen as a threat to 
political society.   
Those threats did materialize in 2016. A new set of trolls - this time savvy at manipulation and 
often bent on disrupting democracy - emerged in the presidential election that year. "Fake news" 
sites proliferated, taking advantage of social media to push news stories that fed into the fears 
and fantasies of left and right ideologues. Foreign actors set up bots and fake Facebook groups to 
further promote and disseminate the spread of stories designed to stoke inter-group animosity. 
With less of an intention to harm the democratic process, but perhaps with equally harmful 
consequences, hyper-partisan news creators and alt-right groups likewise capitalized on social 
media's capacity to drive traffic to sensationalist stories and extreme views. All those trends were 
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part of a larger phenomenon of what I term the rise of "extreme news" on social media. Though 
it comes in many forms, is sometimes fake but more often well-spun reality, extreme stories 
share three traits; they dogmatically uphold partisan beliefs, use emotion rather than reason to 
engage users and stoke tribal disagreement and conflict. 
Figure 55. Fake News Enters the Discussion 
 
 
Relative frequency of Google searches for the term “fake news” 2014 until today. (From Google Trends) 
Today, social media is still seen as a creator of cozy echo chambers that coddle Americans into 
thinking everyone shares their views, but also as a conduit and amplifier of conspiracy theories, 
outrage politics and ideological rhetoric wars. We are left with twin demons of online 
polarization - protected in the belief that we are right in our political views, on the one hand, 
while also having our fears stoked by extreme news that portrays the other side is corrupt and 
dangerous. 
Except, as this dissertation helps demonstrate, that portrait of social media is not completely 
accurate. Social media users do tend to surround themselves with like-minded friends on social 
media and see more information that reflects their political beliefs, but our social media echo 
chambers are also quite porous. That view of social media is not just supported by this 
dissertation. Since 2014, other scholars have likewise poked holes in the information bubble 
narrative. For the most part online news consumers are exposed to a healthy diet of centrist, 
mainstream news with considerable overlap between right and left readers (Guess, 2015). Social 
media does lead users to more ideologically congruent news sources than do search engines, but 
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also to a more diverse array than if those users were to go directly to their preferred news sites 
(Flaxman et al, 2016). Looking at data from Facebook and Twitter, it becomes apparent why that 
is the case; social media users connect to a fair number of counter-ideologues (Bakshy et al, 
2015, supplemental; Faris et al, 2017).  
But even though claims that social media reinforce echo chambers are misinformed, that does 
not mean platforms and scholars should be complacent and not put effort into breaking down the 
walls of our echo chambers online even further.  
Indeed, social media offers an opportunity to bridge left and right that does not exist offline. In 
the real world, connecting liberals and conservatives faces geographical barriers. Though stark 
maps of "blue vs. red states" often exaggerate the physical distance between left and right, 
Americans who live in pockets of liberalism (Hello Berkeley) and conservatism (Hi Colorado 
Springs) would find it difficult to find a counter-ideologue to have coffee with even if they were 
inspired to reach across the ideological divide. (When this liberal tried to find conservatives in 
Manhattan once upon a time, she had to go to a Young Republicans meetup, and even there only 
found economic conservatives). On social media, however, there are no geographical barriers. 
An Oakland liberal can converse easily with an Oklahoma City conservative.  
Social media likewise has leverage in altering our information sharing behavior that is limited 
offline. Changing human behavior is no mean task. It is possible, however, to "nudge" behavior 
in one direction or another by altering the environment a person is in. Altering Americans' real 
world environments would, of course, be a monumental - and foolish - enterprise. On social 
media, however, modifying a user's environment is a matter of changing some code. The setting 
of a social media platform is completely under the control of its designers; it opens the 
possibility of shifting our behavior in ways that not only appeal to social designers but possibly 
also to users on that platform.71 
 
71 Here I am adopting the Thaler & Sunstein (2009) view that humans by and large want to be their “better”, 




How could social media platforms help make our echo chambers even more porous? This 
dissertation does not offer any silver bullets, but it does provide some clues. For one, the models 
in Part I can help direct platforms where to focus their design energies. When looking at how to 
diversify users' information environments social media presents two levers: it could help create 
more connections between left and right users or it could nudge those users to share more diverse 
information. (It could also, of course, more directly tweak its algorithm to promote more diverse 
stories or simply place diverse news in ads or on users' feeds.) In choosing which lever to 
capitalize on, platforms may want to consider which will get more miles for their money. In 
Chapter 2, we saw that all nudges do not produce the same size effects. As information diffuses 
through polarized networks the level of information homogeneity ("information sorting") moves 
towards an equilibrium. That equilibrium, as shown in Figure 56, depends on how homophilous 
a network is and how biased users are in what they share. 
Figure 56. Information Sorting Equilibria: Reprise 
 
Information sorting equilibria (“concentration among co-ideologues”) reached in networks of varying levels of 
homophily and selective curation (“selective sharing”). Based on simulations in an infinite network.  
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The graph illustrates that the relationship between information sorting, homophily and selective 
curation is not a linear pay-off. Depending on its starting point, a platform will get different gains 
whether choosing to nudge its users toward greater homophily or less biased sharing. If users are 
highly ideological in choosing information to share (with a curation bias greater than 80%), 
pushing them to be less biased will have a small effect on diversifying users' information 
environments. At high levels of biased curation, then, more will be gained by nudging users to 
have less homophilous friend circles. On the other end, if users are already fairly unbiased in 
what they forward to their friends (with a curation bias below 80%), any move toward less bias 
will have a relatively large impact on the network's information diversity. 
What we saw in examining the sharing behavior of social media users on Twitter suggests, 
however, that users are already fairly unbiased in what they choose to re-share. Indeed, this 
work's sample of Twitter users were on average completely unbiased; users tended to share the 
same proportion of liberal and conservative news that they were exposed to themselves. If those 
Tweeters are anywhere near representative of the average social media user, there may not be 
much room to encourage social media users to be less ideologically biased in what they reshare; 
they are already equal opportunity sharers. The only way for platforms to break down echo 
chambers any more would be to nudge users to build more connections to counter-ideologues.  
This dissertation doesn't propose ways to build those bridges, but it does ask: is that something 
we'd really want to do? Bubble bursting advocates like Cass Sunstein argue ideologues should be 
exposed to views from their opponents with the hope that such exposure will lead to, if not 
consensus, then at least a level of mutual understanding and tolerance that sets the foundation for 
politically necessary compromise. Such an outcome, however, presupposes that the information 
partisans are exposed to will inspire understanding and tolerance. We have good reason, 
however, to suspect that is not the case on social media. Cross-ideological exposure can lead to 
greater understanding and tolerance, but as practitioners and theorists of deliberative democracy 
know, if interaction between contentious political groups isn't "appropriately empathic, 
egalitarian, open-minded, and reason-centered," the benefits of cross-ideological engagement 
may go missing (Mendelberg, 2002). If a baseline of facts is missing or the rules for discussion 
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aren't clear, any bridge that is created will end up in flames. Flame wars are, indeed, what too 
often materialize when liberals and conservatives meet online. 
Similarly we should expect that a news article posted by a counter-ideological friend on social 
media would do little to inspire political comity.  Sampling recent stories from one of my 
conservative friends on social media, as illustration, I see the following posts: a news report 
claiming that climate scientists fake data, an op-ed claiming that the most efficient states are 
Republican led, and a post touting the accomplishments of Trump. As a liberal reading these 
posts, I confess, I do not feel I have a greater understanding of the world nor am I reassured that 
conservatives have well-founded reasons for their views. I might even be tempted to think this 
friend - and other conservatives - are biased partisans with conspiratorial tendencies and not very 
smart. (When I speak with my friend, in contrast, I know this not to be true; he is actually 
intelligent and thoughtful.) 
I am not alone in having this reaction to seeing conservative posts. Jaime Settle (2019) examines 
how users form political attitudes on Facebook and argues that the Facebook feed is "uniquely 
suited to facilitate processes of polarization." Users make inferences about counter-partisans 
when they see their political posts online. More often than not those inferences serve to increase 
negative stereotypes about those who do not share their political views. A similar process may 
explain why, when researchers induced Twitter users to follow the account of a counter-partisan 
for a month, those users did not increase their appreciation of their political opponents but rather 
became further entrenched in their partisan views (Bail et al, 2018). 
The work in this dissertation gives insight into why exposure to counter-partisans may lead to 
polarization. The inferences we make about others depends in part on what they are sharing. As 
we saw among the Twitter users we followed - and as seen by other researchers - the problem is 
not that users are posting news with a left or right lean, but that they are sharing stories with 
extreme left or right leans. Diffusion models, moreover, show that those individual biases will 
amplify the reach of extreme tweets - relative to more nuanced and balanced news stories - as 
tweets move through a homophilous network.  
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In sum, breaking through our echo chambers on social media may do little to reduce polarization. 
Instead, building online bridges may have the unintended - and harmful - effect of pulling left 
and right farther apart. If we want to mitigate social media's capacity to fuel polarization, then, 
bursting bubbles is not enough - it will be crucial to stem the spread of extreme news. 
Social media platforms are already working to rein in the worst offenders of extreme media - 
fake news and hate speech. They do so with brute force moderation, banning users that propagate 
hate speech or are known purveyors of fake news (Brownlee, 2019; Constine, 2018). But much - 
or most - extreme news stories are neither fake nor explicitly hate-directed. They are, however, 
as capable of inspiring outrage, animosity and self-righteousness as a fabricated conspiracy 
theory or blatant bigotry.  
If platforms were to focus on mitigating the spread of extreme news more broadly, how might 
they do so? For starters, they may not want to use blanket censorship. Culling extreme stories 
comes with at least two obstacles. First a platform would need to create a reliable algorithm for 
identifying an extreme story; even with the strides being made in AI as of the writing of this 
dissertation, such an algorithm (machine learned or otherwise) seems far off. More dauntingly, 
deploying such censorship would likely face backlash among users who will not be pleased when 
they see their OccupyDemocrat and Fox stories disappear.  
Algorithms could be deployed to, instead of outright censor, simply downgrade extreme stories, 
giving them less prominence in friends' feeds. Google search uses such a tactic, rewarding news 
sources it deems high in expertise and trustworthiness (The Economist, 2019); if social media 
sites were not already using such weighted measures it would surely be within their reach to do 
so. If users are less likely to see extreme news stories they will necessarily be less likely to 
reshare them. But even such weighting risks cries of censorship. 
A different approach is to steer users away from choosing to share incendiary news. As discussed 
above, social media platforms have full control over the environment in which their users 
interact; design features can be tweaked to likewise tweak users' behavior. To know what design 
features might nudge users away from sharing extreme news, it is necessary to know what 
motivates users to share political stories in the first place. That, of course, was the object of Part 
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II of this dissertation. I proposed that social media users are driven to project an image of 
themselves that would make their social groups accept them as a member. If ideologues and 
partisans are concerned with signaling that they are a member worth having - i.e. one that is true 
and loyal - we would expect them to share news stories that reaffirm the group's beliefs and 
generally show the ingroup in a positive light relative to the outgroup. We'd also predict that 
stories that have the hallmarks of extreme news - i.e. are dogmatic in their confirmation of group 
beliefs, emotionally laden and tribal (extolling the ingroup while denigrating the outgroup) - do a 
better job of signaling group allegiance and so would be more shareable yet. 
Experiments in Part II confirmed many of those expectations. We did indeed see that when social 
media users have a choice, they are more apt to say they'd share stories that make their group 
look good, in particular stories that explicitly proclaim the superiority of their group members. 
We also saw some evidence - although weak - that users are speaking to their politically relevant 
groups when they share political stories. What the experiments failed to shed light on, however, 
was the ultimate motivation for why users share those stories. Experiments intended to find 
evidence that users are motivated to secure their inclusion in a group were inconclusive.  
The studies in Part II, nonetheless, suggest a couple of interventions that might diminish users' 
predilection to spread extreme news. Far more so, those studies point to how much more work 
needs to be done to understand what does, indeed, drive our sharing behavior. Below I review 
elements of the theory I proposed, for each suggesting possible relevant interventions and 
offering a roadmap for further research. 
The Imagined Audience 
What We Know and Need to Learn:  
In the experiments in Chapter 7, we observed some evidence that users are communicating with 
their social groups when they post news stories on social media. Democratic Black and Latino 
exhibited different sharing preferences when cued to think of their minority group vs their 
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partisan group, a finding which suggests the stories users select to share are determined in part 
by the audience users have in mind when making that choice.  
Those effects were not, however, seen with White subjects when primed either with their 
partisan or American identity. But a lack of an effect in those experiments could be due to their 
low statistical power. To confirm that a user's imagined audience can be adjusted, more - well 
powered - studies would need to be conducted across other populations with other dual identities, 
Possible Interventions 
If users do, indeed, have their partisan and ideological groups in mind when they share political 
news - and their object is to signal shared beliefs and group loyalty - then shifting users' 
"imagined audience" should also shift the impression they want to make. Any move away from 
thinking of their political groups should result in sharing less extreme news. If, for example, a 
Democrat has only fellow Democrats in mind when sharing news about abortion policy they may 
be more apt to share a story that strictly upholds a pro-choice position while disparaging those 
who support limits to abortion. Such an article, while buying cred with their Democratic friends 
will serve to polarize friends who are not lock step progressives. If, however, they are cued to 
think of another social group - perhaps their work friends, church community or all Americans - 
they might be less willing to send such a pure signal of Democratic solidarity and instead choose 
to share a story that, while still supportive of a pro-choice position, is less strident and dismissive 
of those who disagree.  
There are number of ways a platform might cue a user's non-partisan identities. On platforms in 
which users subscribe to "groups" a platform could choose to make those other groups more 
visually salient, either in general or when users click on the "share" button. Similarly when a user 
clicks to "share," a platform could pull up the profile thumbnail of a variety of the user's friends. 
Such interventions might serve to remind users that their post will not only be seen by fellow 
partisans and ideologues, but by a wide array of connections - some of whom might not applaud 




What We Know and Need to Learn 
This dissertation posited that, in sharing political news, social media users were primarily 
motivated to secure inclusion in their groups. Experiments, however, failed to find evidence that 
is the case. I used a self-affirmation manipulation to reduce users' need to seek approval and 
acceptance from their social groups, yet such a manipulation had little effect (and no statistically 
significant effect) in deterring users from sharing group-affirming stories. To see if users are, 
indeed, motivated to signal group solidarity further experiments are necessary. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, it may be that the manipulation used did not, indeed, affect a user's need for group 
inclusion; an alternative manipulation that could be tried is William’s (2007) social isolation 
intervention which more directly makes subjects feel socially rejected and thus, possibly more 
motivated to ingratiate themselves with their social groups. 
Possible interventions 
If further studies show that users are motivated to secure group inclusion, platforms might nudge 
users away from sharing extreme stories by re-affirming their social standing. One way to do so 
would be to remind users of their social acceptance, for example showing how many friends 
have liked their posts. A risk here, however, is that showing a tally of likes could gamify their 
behavior, incentivizing users to push that tally up. If they recall that their more extreme posts get 
the most responses (as is likely) this could spur them to post more incendiary stories.  
Increasing Status 
What We Know and Need to Learn 
The theory of motivation I present posits that users are not only driven to secure inclusion in 
their groups but also to raise their status within those groups. I did not test this proposition 
directly, but some exploratory work I did on traits that predict ideological and partisan sharing 
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indicates that status may be a driver. In that exploratory work, described in Appendix III, I asked 
subjects to say how much they agreed with a series of statements including "I tend to take 
charge." While I expected this statement to act as a proxy for a need for status and so to increase 
partisan sharing, I found the opposite; those who rated themselves high in leadership were 
actually less biased in the news they shared. In contrast, another group of subjects - who tended 
to agree with the statement "I value my intelligence as an important part of me" - were the most 
partisan sharers.  
Those twin results - one expected and one unexpected - suggest that users may post stories to 
impress others - yet not only in the way I assumed. It is not news that partisans who are most 
politically savvy are also those who hold their beliefs most firmly (Zaller, 1992). Those more 
certain of their outlook are also more likely to be politically engaged (Mutz, 2002) - and thus the 
most prolific political news curators on social media. Sharing political stories is an opportunity 
to demonstrate their intelligence and so raise their status. (Or, at least, they imagine it will raise 
their status; how many of their friends admire them or simply roll their eyes is up for debate.) 
But, whereas I posited that users are motivated to raise their status within their social groups, this 
desire to look smart quite possibly transcends group allegiance. It could be, rather, that these 
users are both motivated to share political stories and happen to have strong partisan and 
ideological beliefs; it follows they will be likely to share extreme stories in general, not just to 
gain status with a particular group. 
The other finding regarding subjects who see themselves as leaders could also indicate that 
status-seeking is a motivator for sharing extreme news. Whereas I anticipated that those who see 
themselves as leaders are status seekers, however, the opposite may be the case; leaders might be 
those who see themselves already as having high status. If that is the case they don't need to 
jockey for position by signaling they are even more devout believers; they may even be in a 




If an insecurity about one's status does drive partisans to share more firmly group-affirming - and 
so extreme - stories, then one tactic to mitigate that drive would be, as above, reassuring users 
that their status is already high. Yet, as with the caution in mitigating the drive to be included, 
such a signal risks incentivizing status-seeking behavior. The desire to impress others may be so 
strong, moreover, that it is foolish to imagine that a design feature could make users more secure 
in their status.  
A better approach might be to alter users' perceptions of what kinds of stories are more likely to 
raise their status. Users who want to signal their smarts, in particular, would be sensitive to being 
caught out sharing an article that comes from a source known to be careless with its facts and 
analyses. Facebook does this to an extent already, linking news stories to Wikipedia pages with 
information about their source. Yet, although users could read the full Wikipedia entry to figure 
out if the source has a strong reputation, that demands work. Platforms could instead link to 
independent ratings of that source's reputation for reliability and sound analysis. If such 
information is made salient, users who value their own reputation for intelligence might be more 
careful not to share stories from extreme news sources. 
Threat and Fear 
What We Know and Need to Learn 
Another element of the theory of motivation that I did not test is that users are driven to share 
extreme stories when they feel they - or their ingroup - is threatened. Sharing an extreme story - 
say about a corrupt leader, a policy that threatens the group's values, or an event that is deemed 
an existential threat - is a way to alarm the group and galvanize them to act in unison to combat 
the threat. There are a number of ways to test this proposition - by using manipulations that 
either mitigate or induce a subject’s baseline feeling of threat. Subjects who are made to feel 




Any intervention that decreases a user's general experience of threat might likewise diminish 
their motivation to share alarmist stories. One approach would be to mitigate the experience of 
threat from what most immediately precipitates it - that is, the news story the user sees on their 
social media feed. When reported on by an extreme source a threatening news event may indeed 
seem more alarming yet. A less sensational source is more likely to put an event in context and 
give a more balanced, nuanced picture of its relevance. An intervention then might be to just 
offer "other sources on this story" when a user sees an extreme news article. Whereas the 
Breitbart or DailyKos story might stir fear, a New York Times or even Fox News story may offer 
a take that is less alarming. 
Far More Work to be Done 
The suggested interventions and roadmap for further research above are by no means exhaustive. 
The theoretical framework for understanding sharing behavior I offer in this dissertation, 
likewise, is merely offered as a starting point to think deeply and broadly about what drives our 
choices to share political information online social media.  
Hopefully I have convinced a reader or two that this is an important question to ask. It is 
impossible to predict what our media environment will look like fifty - or even ten - years, but in 
the immediate future we can expect that social media users - that is, all of us - will in large part 
determine the information diets of our fellow citizens. What makes up those diets will influence 
how well civil society can work together to address national and global problems. As I have 
argued in this dissertation, we should be concerned about the amount of extreme information that 
funnels through our news feeds; by heightening tribal divisions between left and right extreme 
news inhibits our ability to see common ground and, more ominously, raises animosity between 
political tribes. What work other scholars do to understand what drives our propensity to share 
extreme news - and thus be able to discover ways to mitigate that drive - will help diffuse inter-







Appendix I: Agent-Based Simulations Across Homophily Levels 
In Chapter 2, I presented the results of diffusion simulations using agent-based models on graphs 
with 0.8 homophily. Here I present those results across graphs with levels of homophily from 0.5 
to 0.95. 
Figure 57. Diffusion in Agent-Based Models: Information Sorting at the Network Level 
A. Binary Random 
    
B. Binary Small World 
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C. Random Continuous 
    
Proportion of nodes exposed to congruent messages (“information sorting”) over waves of diffusion for different 
levels of selective curation (S for binary networks and SD for continuous networks), in simulated diffusions on a) 
binary random networks, b) binary small world networks and c) continuous random networks. Initial messages share 
ideology of seeded node. Looking across networks with homophily (H) levels of 0.5, 0.65, 0.8, and 0.95. All 
networks have average degree of 8. 
Figure 58. Diffusion in Agent-Based Models: Information Sorting at the Node Level 
A. Binary Random 
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B. Binary Small World 
    
C. Random Continuous 
    
Proportion of messages nodes are exposed to that are congruent (“congruence”) over waves of diffusion for different 
levels of selective curation (S for binary networks and SD for continuous networks), in simulated diffusions on a) 
binary random networks, b) binary small world networks and c) continuous random networks. Initial messages share 
ideology of seeded node. Looking across networks with homophily (H) levels of 0.5, 0.65, 0.8, and 0.95. All 
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Appendix II: Self-report and Naïve Theories of Selective Curation 
An approach scholars often take to understand social media users’ motivations is to simply ask 
them, using self-report surveys. In this dissertation I avoid using surveys for the reason that 
humans are by and large (if not entirely) unaware of their motivations (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999). The goals we have for sharing information online are, just like any other goals, most 
likely unknown to us. What explanations we do offer for our behavior are usually confabulations 
or rationalizations we create in the moment to explain our behavior in a way that is both 
plausible and that creates a positive image of ourselves (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). I suspect this 
to be even more true in the realm of political behavior, in which individuals may be particularly 
prone to rationalize their beliefs and behaviors and be desirous to appear as good citizens.  
As a demonstration of why we may not want to trust self-report to motivations, I ran a survey 
asking a number of social media users, once again recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
why they post political information. I also, in the same survey, asked a subsection of respondents 
why they think others post political information. I presented 201 subjects, a subset of whom said 
they at least occasionally posted political information on social media (N=89), with ten possible 
reasons for sharing political information72. Among the ten reasons, four were attributed to self-
serving or negative motivations, four presented more altruistic or positive motivations and two 






72 I had distilled those ten reasons from open-ended responses from fifty other Mturkers whom I had asked “If you 
had to say, why do you think [people/you] post information on social network sites about politics?”  
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Table 3. Reasons for Sharing Political Information 
Self-serving or negative 
motivations 
To validate their beliefs. 
To persuade their friends to believe something that is in their self-interest 
(that is, the self-interest of the poster, not their friends'). 
To get attention. 
To appear intelligent. 
Neutral motivations To find others who think the way they do. 
To show their friends they share their friends' beliefs and values. 
Altruistic / positive 
motivations 
To inform their friends about important issues. 
To find out their friends' views on an issue. 
To keep their friends up to date on topics they know their friends care 
about. 
To engage in discussions where everyone learns from different 
perspectives. 
Ten possible motivations for sharing political information on social media. 
Among the subjects who said they sometimes post political stories, I asked a random subset 
(N=44) “What are the most likely reasons you post information about politics or social issues?” 
(emphasis added here) instructing them to place the ten reasons in order from most to least 
likely. To the other 157 subjects (including the other social media users who do post political 
information themselves) I asked “What are the most likely reasons people post information about 
politics or social issues?” (again, emphasis added). 
Figure 58 shows the average placement subjects gave for the ten reasons from most likely (1st 
place) to least likely (10th). When asked about other people, there was not strong consensus 
(average placements range from 4th to 7th place), yet overall subjects tended to say that users 
have self-serving motivations in posting about politics; the top two reasons they gave were that 
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users wanted to “validate their beliefs” or “persuade their friends” to believe something in their 
(the poster’s) self-interest. Least likely, according to subjects, is that posters want to keep their 
friends up to date on issues their friends care about or that they want to learn about their friends’ 
views.  
When we ask subjects about their own motivations for posting about political issues, in contrast, 
there is both more consistency in how they assess their motivations and consensus that their 
motivations are selfless. Almost all agree (37 out of 44) that one of their top motivations is to 
“inform their friends about important issues.” And few (6 out of 44) are willing to say that one 
their top motivations is to “get attention.” (Rather 24 out of the 44 place “get attention” in 10th 
place.) 
Figure 59. Reasons for Posting Political Information, Ordered from Top to Bottom 
 
Average order of reasons subjects say they (“You”) or others (“People”) are most likely (1) to least likely (10) to 
post information about political or social issues. 
The disparity between the motivations subjects attribute to others’ behavior versus their own 
behavior will not be surprising to survey methodologists or social psychologists. As discussed in 
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this work, survey participants are well known to give “socially desirable” answers on 
questionnaires; having self-serving motivations is frowned upon so subjects will be loath to 
admit such selfish behavior to a survey giver, even a remote one online. But subjects may not 
just be trying to fool a researcher; they are likely also fooling themselves. Harkening back to 
Steele (1988), we know that humans need to think of themselves as good and competent 
individuals. Since we do not have access to see our true motivations, we will confabulate 
explanations that put us in a positive light. When a survey participant says she shares information 
“to inform her friends about important issues” and that she is not motivated to “get attention,” 
she actually believes her own spin (Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007; Millham & Kellogg, 1980). When 
it comes to the behavior of others, however, she can be more objective and thus able to think like 
an intuitive psychologist, correctly divining the motivations of others.73 Another possibility is 
that she attributes selfish motivations to others because it makes herself feel virtuous by 
comparison.  Regardless of our objective ability to guess the motivations of others, when it 
comes to our own self-assessment, it is most likely that a need to perceive ourselves as decent 
humans is behind our explanations for our motivations.  
The reader might propose an alternative explanation; perhaps it is the case that people who post 
political information do have more insight into their motivations and are able to accurately 
identify those motivations. The disparity between their self-assessment and the assessment of 
others may be explained by the fact that those who don’t post political information cannot draw 
on their own experience and self-reflect, so instead must guess about the motivations of others.  
We can see if that is the case by restricting our results to only the subjects who say they post 
about politics on social media; in theory they should be able to draw upon insights into their own 
motivations to inform how others might likewise behave. If we restrict ourselves to that sample, 
however, we see similar results as above:  
 
 
73 Although our assessment of others based on their behavior is far from perfect (Ross, 1977). 
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Figure 60. Reasons for Posting Political Information, Ordered from Top to Bottom, Among 
those who Post Political Information Themselves 
 
Average order of reasons subjects who post political information say they (“You”) or others (“People”) are most 
likely (1) to least likely (10) to post information about political or social issues. 
Subjects who post political information are somewhat more generous in guessing the motivations 
of others (they now agree that the most likely motivation is to inform their friends), but they still 
by and large are more apt to attribute self-serving motivations to others than to themselves. In 
this case it is harder to make a case for why subjects would see their own sharing in such a 
positive light while seeing others’ sharing so negatively - other than to say they have a self-
serving bias. We do not know, however, if that self-serving bias pumps up the estimation of their 
own motivations or merely depreciates the motivations of others.  
The key point is “we don’t know.” Not knowing how individuals’ biases distort their perception 
of their own motivations, we cannot trust their self-reports. Instead of asking subjects why they 
do what they do, we are better off using the tools of social psychology and social science; 
developing theory and testing those theories in experimental settings.  
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Appendix III: Traits that Predict Selective Curation 
Another way to explore what drives a behavior is to see if individuals with certain traits are more 
or less prone to that behavior. In the case of ideological selective sharing, if we imagine – as this 
dissertation proposes – that users share partisan news in order to secure inclusion in their 
political groups, then we would expect users who generally have a greater need to be included to 
be more careful to signal their political alignment than other users. 
In an exploratory experiment, I tested this prediction along with several others about traits that 
might lead to greater levels of ideological curation. I look both at traits derived from the 
theoretical framework presented in this dissertation as well as traits in line with the naïve 
theories proposed by the subjects surveyed in Appendix II.  Those traits and their association 
with ideological curation are presented below. 
Need for Inclusion: 
There is no existing measure for an individual’s need for inclusion; as proxies I instead used two 
measures – Need for Belonging and Need to Conform – that, similar to a need for inclusion,  
home in on an individual’s connection to social groups and need to be part of those groups.  
Need for Belonging, in Leary’s conception, “goes beyond a mere desire to affiliate or socialize to 
a desire to be accepted, form relationships, and belong to social groups" (Leary, 2013). On a 5-
point scale I asked subjects how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the two statements “I 
have a strong need to belong” (Nichols & Webster, 2013) and “If other people don’t seem to 
accept me, I don’t let it bother me” (reverse coded) (Leary, 2013). 
For Need to Conform, I used two items from a composite index for Conformity / Dependence / 
Need for approval: “I need the approval of others” and “I don’t care what people think of me” 
(reverse coded).  
Need for Affiliation. As an alternative theory to Need for Inclusion, I modified an index from Hill 
(1987), taking items that tap into two dimensions of affiliation; emotional (“If I feel, unhappy I 
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usually try to be around others to make me feel better”) and positive stimulation (“Listening to 
others and relating to them is one of the most satisfying things to do”). 
Need for Status.  
To test the proposition that those who seek status in a group will also be careful to signal group 
allegiance, I looked for – and failed to find – a measure for Need for Status. Coming up short I 
instead used a plausible proxy; using items from a composite measure for Leadership: “I tend to 
take charge” and “I usually wait for others to take the lead” (reverse coded). 
Naïve Theories. 
Need for Validation. Among subjects I surveyed (discussed in Appendix II), the most popular 
answer to the question “Why do others post political information?” was “to have their beliefs 
validated.” There being no measure of “need for validation” I instead used low self-esteem as a 
substitute, reverse coding Hill’s one item self-esteem item “I have high self-esteem” (1987). 
Need for Attention. Subjects likewise suspect others post political news to get attention. To 
measure need for attention I use one item from Hill (1987), “I like to be around people who are 
impressed with who I am,” and reverse code “I feel uncomfortable being the center of attention.”   
Altruism. A common reason proposed for why individuals share political information with their 
friends is that they are doing so altruistically. To see if altruism does lead to more or less 
curation I use two items from a composite altruism scale: “I love to help others” and “I take little 
time to help others” (reverse coded). 
Curious / Need to learn. Others claim they share political information in order spark discussion 
and learn from their friends. If this is the case we might expect to see those with a stronger desire 
to learn to have different sharing patters. Again, I take items from a composite index for curiosity 




Need for intelligence. Finally to test the naïve theory that users post political information to look 
smart, I invent a mini-index for “Need for intelligence,” with the two items: “I value my 
intelligence as an important part of me” and “I think it’s more important to be good than smart” 
(reverse coded). 
Results 
Figure 4 charts what degree – if any – the above traits predict partisan curation (in the initial 
experiment presented in Chapter 7).  The items I used for Need for Inclusion (Need belong and 
Need conform) have no association with partisan curation. The item I used as a proxy for Need 
for status (Leadership) has a negative association with partisan curation. The only item that 
successfully predicts partisan curation – by a wide margin – is Need for Intelligence. 
Figure 61. Association between User Traits and Ideological Curation 
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